All-party delegation isn't failure of Indian missions abroad. Diplomats work behind the camera

The Print

2 days ago

The starting premise of the article is laid down clearly: 'My view is that the government was compelled to send these delegations because Indian missions abroad are unable to aggressively promote India's national interests'. While appearing as plausible at first, I would argue that this analysis makes a distinction error. The decision to constitute and deploy all-party delegations was not undertaken after making a careful assessment of the performance of missions, and to fill the communication gaps. The very choice of the countries indicates foreign policy calculations beyond the performance levels of specific missions. For instance, the inclusion of countries such as Algeria, Guyana, South Korea, Sierra Leone, and Slovenia is explained by their status as current non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
The intervention offers a rare foray into the role, purpose, and state of Indian missions. To that degree, it is welcome and given that both India's rise as well as an increasingly disorderly world are placing greater demands on them. Unfortunately, Kumar misdiagnoses the problem and recommends solutions that could damage Indian foreign policy objectives. Let me explain.
A recent article in ThePrint made several noteworthy points about the state of Indian missions and embassies abroad, and in light of the all-party delegations being sent worldwide to convey India's message after Operation Sindoor. The author Arvind Kumar argues that this short-term measure exposes the infirmities in Indian missions abroad and, along with it, the need for structural reforms. Rectification of the same lies in what he terms 'active leadership', 'de-colonisation' as well as due recognition of leadership efforts by Indian media and citizenry 'back home'.
The decision logically follows from the need to counter the narrative that both the terror attack and the resultant war were linked to the ruling government's ideology. This required a high-impact political delegation constituted of both opposition members and those from the minority community (including from Kashmir) in order to underscore the falsity of the same perception.
In other words, it was a case of the messenger itself being the message. By emphasising that India has been a victim of terrorism across decades and various governments and contexts, the idea was to convey a simple truth: the Pahalgam attack and India's response are both rooted in Pakistan's strategy of using terrorism to undermine India's progress and stability. The all-party delegation is an innovative form of diplomacy. But it can only complement the work that Indian missions already undertake on an everyday basis and without attending to cameras. To elevate one at the cost of the other is indeed both unwise and unfair.
Additionally, the author appears to presume that the less-than-ideal responses from foreign governments can be boiled down to underperformance by Indian missions. Unfortunately, such a view is overly anecdotal and too simplistic. International responses are constituted by several and much larger factors, including geopolitics, geo-economics, and perceptions of the relevant country's role and value in the international system. Outside of a few exceptions perhaps, embassy officials (of any country) cannot break new ground or shape new trends.
Their task essentially is to build on positive relations between countries on the ground, and not themselves alter the foreign policy of the host countries. Such a task, indeed, requires persistent and painstaking daily gruel more often than not. Assertive and 'active leadership' may have the immediate effect of reassuring us through greater visibility, but it can be a very narrow and misleading metric as well. Indian diplomats have always worked well in a more discretionary setting and with the view that the mission is a well-synchronised team rather than a unit that needs strong 'leadership'.
The author also makes a curious point about Indian missions requiring pending de-colonisation and on the basis of the fact that the UK mission still has designated ranks of 'ministers'. But such designations are not an uncommon feature globally, codified in the Vienna Convention of 1961, and have very little to do with lingering colonial forms of organisation. In fact, the term predates colonialism. The claim that such ranks confuse host country officials does not seem significant enough to explain systemic outcomes. If anything, it is odd that the author skipped the salient issue of understaffing in foreign missions and embassies—arguably the most important constraint behind their below-potential performance.
Also read: India's military revival hinges on overestimating Pakistan Army
Public recognition from back home
The author explains and laments that officials working in Indian embassies don't get enough recognition back home, arguing that it 'impacts their performance'. This is a highly unadvisable suggestion for the future of Indian diplomacy.
Diplomacy mostly involves quiet, patient, and painstaking work. Most of the time, to be frank, it is boring, persistent work.
An incentive system that is based on validation through recognition 'back home' would lead to a preference for 'spectacle' over 'substance'. Moreover, what should (and does) matter for officials and diplomats is recognition from colleagues, seniors, and political leaders. Wider public and media-led recognition goes against the ethos of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and for understandable reasons. It allocates disproportionate power to blunt populist instincts and sentiments over mission tasks that require nuance, dexterity, and calibration.
However, the author's preference for more open, dynamic, and active public diplomacy is valid. Indian diplomats are known to be much more rigid, cautious, formal, and bureaucratic compared to their Western counterparts – even as this appears to be changing somewhat gradually. Many self-imposed constraints emanate from the awareness that the slightest and most innocuous 'indiscretion' or slip-up has a tendency of taking a life of its own 'back home' and within Indian domestic politics.
This explains the self-imposed norm of avoiding the usage of alcoholic beverages in public events for networking purposes, as well as an adherence to a 'better safe than innovative' mindset in general. In fact, the recent online harassment of Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and his family for announcing the government policy related to the India-Pakistan ceasefire is a key example of the dangers of public glare on the work of diplomats in an age of hyper-nationalism.
More recently, a 'leaked' video of delegation-head Shashi Tharoor singing to what appears to be an audience of embassy staff has already led to 'outrage' on Indian X (Twitter) and calls for his resignation. Contrary to the author's prescription, diplomats and officials will be more keen on receiving greater public trust from citizens 'back home' rather than the allure of recognition and public praise. Recognition should be earned from those who are in a position to accord such recognition—colleagues and seniors, and perhaps the backward gaze of posterity.
This article is in response to Arvind Kumar's opinion article on all-party delegations and Indian missions abroad, published on 2 June 2025.
Sidharth Raimedhi is a Fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR), a New Delhi-based think tank. He tweets @SidharthRaimed1. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)