Ethereum co-founder Gavin Wood says Web3 is on track as finance firms move in
A decade after launching the Ethereum
blockchain , co-founder Gavin Wood is maintaining his vision for a
Web3 beyond
cryptocurrency and creating a truly decentralised
internet alive through Polkadot.
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At the Polkadot Jam Tour, during which Wood met Polkadot blockchain developers around the world and spoke of his vision for updates to the protocol, the Web3 architect held a presentation in Hong Kong just ahead of
Consensus , the crypto conference that organiser CoinDesk held in the city for the first time this year.
Wood's main focus these days for Polkadot, a blockchain network that is improving scalability and throughput with updated architecture. At Jam, he spoke for more than an hour about technical upgrades that would allow people to run more standard computer software directly on the blockchain.
Traditional financial use cases – something Hong Kong has been increasingly focused on – are not that interesting to the man who helped put automated transactions through smart contracts on the blockchain.
'As Web3 becomes a more accepted part of the scenery that banks operate in, that regulators operate in, we will probably see increased integration [with financial systems],' Wood told the Post after his Jam Tour speech at Cyberport on February 17. 'Tentatively speaking, we may be on a path to the integration of more legitimate Web3 technologies than the sorts of things that we were seeing 10 years ago with banks taking up permissed ledgers.'
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'I think there's a lot of interesting use cases for Web3, and I think stablecoins are actually one of the less interesting ones,' he added.
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