Drone factories, camouflaged trucks: Iran releases images of Israel's covert operation

France 24

4 hours ago

The Israeli drones successfully neutralised several of the Islamic Republic's anti-air defences deep inside its territory. What is particularly surprising is that some of these drones were manufactured in covert production facilities deep within Iran. Iranian state TV has broadcast images showing camouflaged lorries and vans that were used to transport the drones, as well as images of the makeshift FPV factories.
The Israeli attack on Iran began on June 13. Its first targets were commanders of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, nuclear scientists, and military and nuclear facilities. According to Israeli information, 16 IRGC commanders and 14 nuclear scientists were eliminated by the Israeli army in the first round of attacks on Iran.
Eyewitnesses report that from the very first moments, small drones and FPVs were seen or heard in the skies of several Iranian cities, particularly Tehran. Videos released by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) show these small drones attacking Iran's missile systems. Additional footage reveals the drones being launched from inside Iran, demonstrating their use against targets within the country.
In response to the widespread use of this tactic by infiltrated Israeli agents on the ground in Iran, the Iranian regime's security forces on June 14 were compelled to publicly urge the people of Iran to stay vigilant and report any suspicious lorries, vans, or activities to the authorities.
Images of these lorries and vans, converted to transport FPV drones and discovered by citizens or security forces, were widely shared on social media.
State-run television and pro-regime outlets also aired videos showcasing hidden, makeshift drone production facilities discovered near Tehran and Isfahan.
In one of the videos, the state TV presenter shows kits for small drones that are ready for production. According to the report, this makeshift facility was located covertly in a three-storey building near Tehran.
But were Israeli agents able to establish drone-production sites right under the nose of Iran's intelligence services?
'Most of this system is designed for internal repression'
Farzin Nadimi, a research fellow at the Washington Institute and an expert on Iranian weaponry, explains:
We have known for many years about the deep infiltration of Israeli assets, almost at every level of the IRGC, the IRGC intelligence service, other intelligence services of Iran, the military and among politicians.
In my opinion, the main cause could be corruption. But it's not only that. There is a lot at stake when working with Israel in Iran. With all the risks involved, money can't be the only motivation. When they see how corrupt the system is, they lose respect and loyalty for it, and the higher their rank, the better they understand how corrupt the whole system is.
Multiple Iranian officials had issued warnings about the infiltration of Israeli agents within Iran, including at high-ranking levels of the IRGC and the broader power structure.
In an unprecedented speech in 2021, Ali Younesi, former intelligence minister of Iran, stated: 'Over the past ten years, the Mossad [Israel's main intelligence agency] has infiltrated several of the regime's structures, to the point that every single Iranian official must now worry for their own life. Any attack is now possible.'
On another occasion, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former president of Iran, claimed in a 2024 interview with CNN Türk: 'The head of Iran's counterintelligence, tasked with finding Mossad operatives, was himself an Israeli agent.'
Nadimi continues:
On the other hand the Iranian secret services have trained their apparatus for internal security risks. Most of this system is designed for internal repression and internal protests, and they have seen these protests as the more urgent threat than a foreign attack.
Nadimi emphasises that he's not surprised that Iranian intelligence services are caught off guard by these drones:
In fact, it is not so complicated to smuggle them into Iran. These drones consist of small parts that are easy to smuggle into Iran. Many parts are easy to manufacture in Iran, such as fibreglass parts. The controls and other electronic parts would be easy to smuggle into Iran via the Persian Gulf region, e.g., Dubai and other borders.
For a complex mission like this, however, you can't rely entirely on locals and local assets, you need to have agents on the ground. They had planned this for a long time. They claim to have been working on this plan for many years.
The Iranian authorities have cut the internet connection since June 18, and claim this has significantly curbed FPV and small drone attacks since then.
Nadimi explains:
Drone technology has made enormous progress in recent years, particularly in the Russia-Ukraine war. In this war, we have seen drones or FPVs use different types of technologies. We have seen that the Ukrainians use mobile phone networks to guide their drones deep into Russian territory. Thanks to the mobile network, they send information and users can also send them commands. This is quite useful and practical. So these drones could have relied on the 5G, mobile and LTE networks, so a disruption of the network at this level could theoretically have a partial impact on them.
This is not the first time Israeli agents have infiltrated Iran in recent years. In July 2024, Israel successfully targeted and killed Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, during a visit to Tehran. He was killed by a precise strike on his room in a protected compound in northern Iran.
On November 27, 2020, Israel also succeeded in eliminating Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the scientist whom Western intelligence agencies and Israel believed to be the mastermind behind "Project Amad", Iran's covert effort to build a nuclear bomb in the early 2000s. He was killed on his way home when he came under fire from a machine gun mounted on a parked truck, which was remotely controlled via satellite.