Latest news with #IRGC
Al Mayadeen
15 hours ago
- Politics
- Al Mayadeen
Iran notified Qatar about intentions to strike US air base: Reports
Iran had informed the United States, via two diplomatic channels, of its intention to target the US Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, hours before carrying out the retaliatory attack, Reuters reported on Monday, citing a senior regional source. Earlier, Iran's Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that it had targeted the Al-Udeid Air Base with a 'powerful and destructive" missile strike as part of an operation it dubbed Annunciation of Victory, in response to the US aggression that struck three peaceful nuclear facilities in Iran. The source added that Tehran also notified the Qatari government, a detail confirmed by The Wall Street Journal, which cited Arab officials and sources familiar with the events as saying that Doha had received a direct alert from Iran ahead of the strike. In the same context, the officials told WSJ that the US administration was aware of the Iranian attack in advance. Meanwhile, Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the targeted base had been evacuated well before the missiles landed. Doha also took additional precautionary steps, including closing its airspace. The US embassy in the Qatari capital issued a warning earlier in the day, urging American citizens to remain in place. Read more: Tankers divert from Gulf following US-Israeli strikes on Iran A US military official told Al Mayadeen that the Al-Udeid Air Base, southwest of Doha, was hit by an Iranian missile strike using short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The official said that 'so far, there are no reports of casualties among US forces,' and noted that the military command is closely monitoring the situation. In Washington, a senior White House official told CNN that the Trump administration had anticipated the Iranian response following the US strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities over the weekend. The official claimed that US President Donald Trump 'is not seeking further military engagement in the region.' Read more: 'Israel' seeking swift end to aggression against Iran: WSJ
Al Mayadeen
15 hours ago
- Politics
- Al Mayadeen
Iran retaliates, targets US air base in Qatar with missiles
Iran's Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) announced on Monday evening that it had targeted the Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar with a 'powerful and destructive" missile strike as part of an operation it dubbed Annunciation of Victory, in response to the US aggression that struck three peaceful nuclear facilities in Iran. According to the statement, Al-Udeid Air Base serves as a key air force hub and is the most strategic asset of the US military in West Asia. The IRGC stressed that the decisive action taken by the Iranian armed forces sends a clear and direct message to the White House and its allies, which is that Iran "will not leave any aggression against its territorial integrity, sovereignty, or national security unanswered under any circumstances." #WATCH | Footage circulating online shows Iranian missiles entering Qatari airspace, heading toward #US bases in #Qatar. emphasized that US bases and mobile military targets are not a source of strength for national defense but rather a vulnerability. The statement warned that any repetition of hostile actions against Iran will only hasten the collapse of the US military presence in the region, accelerate its retreat from West Asia, and bring closer the shared aspiration of the Islamic Ummah and the free peoples of the world to eradicate the 'cancerous gland of Zionism." Meanwhile, the Iranian National Security Council announced that, one hour ago, Iranian armed forces destroyed the US airbase at Al Udeid. The council stated that the number of missiles used in the operation matches the number of bombs the US deployed against Iran's nuclear facilities. It emphasized that the targeted base is located far from urban and residential areas in Qatar, stressing that the strike poses no threat to the 'friendly and brotherly state of Qatar or its people.' The council also reaffirmed the Islamic Republic's commitment to maintaining its historically close ties with Qatar and continuing cooperation. According to Axios, an Israeli official stated that Iran had launched 10 missiles toward the Al-Udeid Air Base.
Mint
2 days ago
- Business
- Mint
Iran is losing its stranglehold over Iraq
He was killed by an Israeli air strike in Lebanon last year. Yet the face of Hassan Nasrallah, formerly the boss of Hizbullah, is still plastered on posters all over Baghdad, Iraq's capital. Alongside them are images of other Shia militia leaders from Iraq, Iran and Lebanon. They have one thing in common: their outfits are backed by Iran. The posters are testament to Iran's long-standing influence in Iraq. Yet they also mask a growing dissatisfaction among Iraqis about their country's alignment with its bigger neighbour, particularly among the young. Many dreaded being dragged into Iran's war with Israel and America, and were relieved that their government stayed out of it. The response to calls by the militias to march on the American embassy during the war in June, which ended with a ceasefire after just 12 days, was lacklustre. As its influence wanes across the region, Iran cannot rely on Iraq the way it used to. The relationship between the neighbours, which share a 1,600km-long border, has waxed and waned. Their religious leaders compete for influence among Shia Muslims around the world. In the 1980s they fought a war in which hundreds of thousands of people died. Yet in the years since America toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003 Iraq has been a staging ground for Iran to project power across the region. With extensive Western sanctions in place to stymie Iran's nuclear programme, Iraq's economy has been one of the few lifelines for its beleaguered neighbour. For years the regime in Tehran manipulated the Iraqi central bank's daily dollar auctions to secure hard currency to pay for imports, circumventing sanctions. Only America's blacklisting of Iraqi banks in 2023 slowed the practice. Iraq is also a crucial market for Iranian exports. Iran presses Iraqi government departments and ministries to prioritise Iranian goods over those from elsewhere, according to businesspeople in Baghdad. 'If the Americans occupied Iraq militarily,' says one banker from the region, 'then Iran has done so economically.' Even more important has been Iran's exertion of military influence through militias backed by its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The rise in Iraq of Islamic State (IS), a Sunni extremist group, in 2014 triggered a call to arms from Shia religious authorities in both Iraq and Iran. Iran supported the establishment of a number of Shia armed groups in Iraq. They battled IS and eventually helped to degrade it significantly. But they also provided Iran with a way to control much of Iraq's politics and economy. The militias' unmarked pickup trucks still roam the streets of the capital. Their members have vast business interests and control important ministries, including those in charge of oil and metals exports. Until recently they exerted significant influence over the supreme court. Much of that control was exerted by Qassem Suleimani, who as head of the Quds force, the IRGC's elite arm, helped co-ordinate Iran's foreign-influence activities. But Iran's hold over the militias has diminished since an American drone strike killed Suleimani in 2020. Even as some joined Iran's 'axis of resistance', others turned inward, focusing on domestic affairs. One reason is that Esmail Qaani, Suleimani's successor, lacks his predecessor's deft touch in managing the factions' competing interests, says a veteran Iraqi lawmaker. 'The requests became demands,' he says. Another is that Iran's allies in Iraq have grown rich and now have much to lose from getting dragged into a conflict with America or Israel. Some still believe in Iran's Islamic revolution and the need to fight Israel. But others are increasingly resentful of their country's status as its neighbour's satrap. Perhaps most important, a younger political class that grew out of anti-government protests in 2020 has become increasingly vocal about its opposition to the militias. The armed groups are 'corrupted and have built economic empires', says Muhi Ansari, who heads the Iraqi House foundation, a new civil-society group. 'The concept of resistance [to Israel] is hollow in Iraq,' he says. That sentiment was on full display during Iran's brief war against Israel and America last month. Even Iran's closest allies in Iraq were too wary of retaliation by America or Israel to offer much help. As Abu Meethaq al-Amsari, a political analyst close to Badr, one of the biggest Iran-backed factions, explained on national television on June 21st: 'The brothers in the factions are practising a high degree of self-restraint and rationality.' Israel's decimation of the IRGC's high command during the dozen-day war and America's strike on Iran's nuclear programmes have raised hopes among some Iraqis that Iran's hold over Iraq's politics and economy will diminish. As militias and politicians loyal to Iran find themselves adrift, a space could open up for other, homegrown political forces. 'Whatever they say in public,' says a civil servant, 'we're not sad to see Iran weakened.'
Cedar News
2 days ago
- Cedar News
Blast Near IRGC Site in Karaj, Alborz Province — Smoke Rises After Explosion
A video circulating online shows smoke billowing after an explosion near a site believed to be affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) north of Karaj, in Alborz province, just west of Tehran. The blast reportedly shook the area, causing alarm among nearby residents. No official statement has yet been issued by Iranian authorities regarding the cause or impact of the explosion. Security forces have surrounded the area, and emergency teams have been dispatched. Unconfirmed reports suggest possible injuries. The affected area is known to house sensitive military and security facilities, raising questions about whether the incident was the result of an internal malfunction or an act of sabotage.
Indian Express
2 days ago
- Politics
- Indian Express
To become a strategic actor, Iran must shed its reliance on proxies
In April 2024, as Iranian missiles rained down across Israel and many were intercepted mid-air, analysts around the world took note of the sheer scale of Iran's ballistic reach. Many seasoned military minds could easily note what didn't happen — there was no Iranian 'air power' to speak of. Not a single Iranian fighter entered contested airspace, no attempt was made to suppress Israeli defences through air dominance, and not one sortie altered the course of events. The longstanding asymmetry in Iran's force structure — a missile-rich, air force-poor doctrine — was laid bare. This was, surprisingly, decades in the making. It's the reality of war that is making this dawn on us. I recall with clarity that in 1992, as someone who regularly tracked military developments, I closely monitored Iran's acquisition of North Korean Hwasong-5 and 6 missiles and the building of the architecture of Iran's burgeoning rocket programme. At that time, too, our assessment was blunt — without a matching air force, Iran could not hope to counter Israel in any meaningful way. There was — and still is — no shared land border. Yet, a set of strong conventional armed forces — army, air force and air defence — was imperative, besides the maritime force. What mattered was the ability to deliver precision strikes from the air, both to deter and to punish, while adequately defending the airspace. Even then, it was evident that Iran was betting on the wrong horse. Iran's defence posture since the 1990s has been shaped less by hard-nosed strategic logic and more by institutional interests — especially those of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC's progressively growing dominance over defence and foreign policy led to a doctrinal preference for asymmetric tools — missiles, drones, and proxy militias. This was driven by Israel's dominance of the conventional war environment in the Middle East and the reputation gained from major victories against Arab conventional armed forces. It led to Iran choosing to become the world's foremost practitioner of hybrid and grey-zone warfare, from Lebanon to Yemen, Syria to Gaza. Its missile arsenal expanded from basic Scud variants to precision-strike capabilities. Its drones progressed to become battlefield disruptors. But its air force — still operating pre-1979 US-made aircraft like the F-4 and F-14 — remained frozen in time. Why did Iran, despite close defence ties with Russia and access to Chinese systems, fail to modernise its conventional forces? The answers lie in a mix of structural and doctrinal blind spots. First, sanctions and isolation played their part. Western arms embargoes after the Revolution, followed by UN Security Council restrictions, effectively barred major transfers of combat aircraft. Even friendly suppliers like Russia and China hesitated, fearing diplomatic costs and technical dependency. This never applied to Pakistan, although one can presume that if the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had not taken place in 1979 and Pakistan had not acquired the status of a US frontline state, its fate, too, may have been similar. As late as 2016, Iranian negotiations for Russian Su-30s stalled due to international scrutiny and internal disagreements. Second, there was a cost-complexity trade-off, which probably applies more to any air force. A modern air force is expensive, not just to buy but to sustain. Pilots must be trained, platforms upgraded, and supply chains secured. In contrast, missile systems — especially those based on solid fuel and deployed from underground silos — offer lower operating costs, greater survivability, and rapid retaliatory capability. Creating indigenous capability for aircraft manufacturing of the modern kind is almost an impossible challenge. Missiles can still be researched and manufactured. The North Korean Nodong was Iran's most critical acquisition. It allowed Iran to target Israel and the Gulf with ballistic missiles for the first time. China's role was more discreet. Chinese entities were instrumental in helping Iran build its own production lines, especially for the Fateh-110, Zolfaghar, and later systems. Without these two sources, Iran's missile programme would likely have remained a tactical artillery force, not the strategic arsenal it wields today. For a regime obsessed with strategic messaging and revolutionary self-preservation, missiles were the attraction, especially because the Arab nations had invested more in conventional forces and failed. Missiles and rockets also ensured a quasi-multi-front capability, taking some other Arab nations as potential adversaries, too. Third, and perhaps most important, was strategic culture. The all-powerful IRGC probably viewed conventional force modernisation as secondary to its regional ambitions. Its influence on Iran's foreign policy ensured that Tehran invested in Hezbollah's arsenal, the Houthis' reach and Iraqi militias' resilience, while neglecting its own conventional balance. All of them proved effective in their conflicts, fighting as Iran's proxies, convincing the IRGC that its decision was right. Fighting through proxies was smart, but it was never going to be decisive. It could bleed enemies, not break them. That is the bane of asymmetric proxy war. The events of 2024-25 should force a review in Tehran. Iran's adversaries — especially Israel — have mastered the art of integrated deterrence: Layered missile defence, electronic warfare, and unmatched airpower. A revolutionary guard corps is an excellent mechanism for regime protection, internal security, and ideological enforcement. But when war calls for black-and-white outcomes — dominance, not deterrence — only conventional forces can deliver. Air power remains the centre of gravity in any future conflict, especially in the Middle East, where terrain and geography demand long-reach precision and rapid mobility. Perhaps now, more than three decades after it first chose rockets over wings, Iran will revisit that decision. The conflict dynamics have changed, but the fundamental truth has not: Strategic victory demands air superiority. No amount of missiles can substitute for it. Iran now faces the reality that asymmetry is being countered with global coordination — a major shift from the permissive environment it exploited earlier. Iran's strategic choice to privilege proxies and missiles has reached its upper limit. Israel is not its only adversary. Despite Chinese efforts at rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, the strategic competition in the Gulf remains unresolved. For Iran to transition from a reactive regional disruptor to a true strategic actor, it must reinvest in conventional power. Only then can it match ideology with capability — and rhetoric with reach. The writer is a former corps commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps and member, National Disaster Management Authority. Views are personal
