Passengers flee smoking jet on emergency slide after apparent landing gear problem at Denver airport
American Airlines Flight 3023 reported a 'possible landing gear incident' during its departure from Denver International Airport on Saturday afternoon, the Federal Aviation Administration said. The Boeing 737 MAX 8 was on its way to Miami International Airport.
Video aired by local media showed people sliding down the inflatable chute near the front of the plane while clutching luggage and small children. Some of the passengers, including at least one adult carrying a young child, tripped at the end of the slide and fell onto the concrete runway tarmac. The passengers were then taken to the terminal by bus.
One of the passengers was transported to a medical facility, authorities said. Five people were evaluated for injuries at the scene but did not require hospitalization, Denver International Airport officials said in a statement.
'About halfway to takeoff speed, we hear a big bang and a pop,' passenger Shaun Williams told KUSA-TV. 'The pilot immediately started abort procedures for taking off. You could feel him start to hit the brakes.'
Firefighters called to the airport extinguished a fire after responding to the aircraft, the Denver Fire Department said.
In a statement, the FAA said it will investigate.
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