Lilly's obesity drug sales rise 60% in India amid rising demand
NEW DELHI: Eli Lilly & Co. increased sales of weight-loss and diabetes drug Mounjaro 60 in India in May from April in its second full month of being on offer in the South Asian country, which has the world's third-highest number of obese people.
The US drugmaker sold 126 million rupees (US$1.5 million) worth of the injections last month, according to market analysis firm Pharmarack Technologies. Sales of its five milligram version more than doubled to about 75 million rupees, while revenue from the 2.5 mg shot was 51 million rupees.
"The patient number may have actually doubled' in May from April, Pharmarack Vice President Sheetal Sapale told Bloomberg News. The demand is gradually rising and should continue, she said. Newer patients are being introduced with the lower dose and upgraded to five-mg injections after four weeks, according to Sapale.
The increase in sales reflects the need for anti-obesity solutions in the vast market in India, where Danish rival Novo Nordisk A/S is also expected to launch soon. The country's generic drugmakers are awaiting the expiration of some patents from next year to unleash a flurry of copycat treatments.
On Tuesday, Biocon Ltd. received approval for Liraglutide, a generic version of Novo Nordisk's type-2 diabetes and anti-obesity drug Victoza.
India has about 100 million people living with diabetes and obesity each, Eli Lilly said earlier this year. - Bloomberg
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The Star
5 hours ago
- The Star
Lilly's obesity drug sales rise 60% in India amid rising demand
NEW DELHI: Eli Lilly & Co. increased sales of weight-loss and diabetes drug Mounjaro 60 in India in May from April in its second full month of being on offer in the South Asian country, which has the world's third-highest number of obese people. The US drugmaker sold 126 million rupees (US$1.5 million) worth of the injections last month, according to market analysis firm Pharmarack Technologies. Sales of its five milligram version more than doubled to about 75 million rupees, while revenue from the 2.5 mg shot was 51 million rupees. "The patient number may have actually doubled' in May from April, Pharmarack Vice President Sheetal Sapale told Bloomberg News. The demand is gradually rising and should continue, she said. Newer patients are being introduced with the lower dose and upgraded to five-mg injections after four weeks, according to Sapale. The increase in sales reflects the need for anti-obesity solutions in the vast market in India, where Danish rival Novo Nordisk A/S is also expected to launch soon. The country's generic drugmakers are awaiting the expiration of some patents from next year to unleash a flurry of copycat treatments. On Tuesday, Biocon Ltd. received approval for Liraglutide, a generic version of Novo Nordisk's type-2 diabetes and anti-obesity drug Victoza. India has about 100 million people living with diabetes and obesity each, Eli Lilly said earlier this year. - Bloomberg
New Straits Times
11 hours ago
- New Straits Times
Rivers as the New Frontlines of Geopolitics
We are used to thinking of power grids, trade routes, and semiconductor fabs as the terrain of 21st-century power competition. But now add rivers—yes, rivers—to that list. Not just as lifelines of civilisation, but as instruments of national leverage. What's unfolding high on the Tibetan plateau, in a canyon deeper than the Grand Canyon and barely touched by modernity, is a tectonic shift—both literal and geopolitical. China's proposed mega-dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo—known downstream as the Brahmaputra—isn't just an engineering feat. It's a declaration. At $137 billion and 60,000 megawatts, it will dwarf even the Three Gorges Dam. But its real power isn't electrical—it's geopolitical. This isn't just about energy. It's about sovereignty, security, and survival in an age where climate instability and great power rivalry are converging. China's Hydro-Imperium: Controlling the Source The dam sits in Tibet, the "Water Tower of Asia," source of major rivers that sustain over a billion people across 10 countries. For Beijing, it's part green transition, part strategic assertion. At one level, it's about reducing coal dependence and meeting net-zero targets. At another, it's about establishing hydro-sovereignty: the idea that whoever controls the headwaters controls the future. This becomes starkly provocative when we consider Asia's hydro-geometry. China sits upstream of the Brahmaputra, Mekong, Irrawaddy, and Salween—rivers that snake into India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand. Unlike India, which is bound by the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan and the Ganges Treaty with Bangladesh, China has signed no binding transboundary water agreements. It prefers soft, bilateral deals—tools it can adjust as strategic needs evolve. India's Strategic Counter: Deterrence Through Waterworks That's why India is alarmed. From New Delhi's perspective, this is not just another dam— it's a hydrological threat vector. It gives China the power to flood, throttle, or reroute a river that nourishes India's northeast, sustains Bangladesh's delta, and symbolises shared South Asian destiny. Indian policymakers worry Beijing could weaponise seasonal flows— triggering sudden surges during monsoons or withholding water during critical planting seasons. That's not paranoia. That's strategic realism in an age of gray-zone conflict. India's response? Not missiles—but megawatts. The revival of its Siang Upper Multipurpose Project (SUMP), just downstream of the proposed Chinese dam, is both symbolic and strategic. On paper, it's about power generation. In reality, it's about deterrence. It sends a message: You control the upstream, but we can shape the downstream. And there's more. India's recent suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan— once a pillar of regional stability—marks a sharp turn in water diplomacy. The 1960 World Bank-brokered agreement had weathered decades of war and tension. But following a recent conflict and accusations of cross-border terrorism, India withdrew, citing Islamabad's refusal to renegotiate outdated terms. For Pakistan, which depends heavily on the Indus for irrigation, the implications are severe. And here's the kicker: the Brahmaputra has no treaty at all—no buffer, no arbitrator—just rising stakes and deepening mistrust. Ecology at the Edge: Sacred Lands Under Siege The fallout isn't just political. It's ecological. The Yarlung Tsangpo Canyon is a vertical Eden—home to snow leopards, Bengal tigers, 330-foot-tall cypress trees, and thousands of plant species. It's a living archive of Asia's natural history, shaped over millennia. Yet both Chinese and Indian dam projects threaten to unravel this biodiversity in the name of "national interest." The canyon is sacred to the Indigenous Adi and Monpa peoples, who have lived in its shadow for centuries. But their voices are absent from the rooms where dam blueprints are being drawn. This is no longer just a clash between nations. It's a collision between technocracy and tradition, between megaprojects and memory. Asia's Water Reckoning: From Cooperation to Contestation All of this plays into a larger game—the Asian chessboard of the 21st century. China and India are nominally partners in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. But beneath that façade lies a contest over spheres of influence, connectivity, and now, hydrology. China's Belt and Road Initiative has already expanded into Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh. Through "dam diplomacy," it's turning infrastructure into influence. India, in turn, is hedging—through its Act East policy, its Quad alignment with the US, Japan, and Australia, and its Indo-Pacific strategy. But none of these frameworks were designed to manage river flows or mediate water disputes. That leaves a strategic vacuum—one that China is swiftly filling with pipelines, rail links, and now, river control. And while Chinese officials insist their mega-dam is safe and non-threatening, the reality is more complex. The site is near a seismic hotspot—just 300 miles from where the strongest inland earthquake on record struck in 1950. A breach triggered by seismic activity could be catastrophic for India, Bangladesh, and the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta. Add melting Himalayan glaciers and climate volatility to the mix, and you have a fragile ecological equation—made more dangerous by opacity and mistrust. What Now? A Blue Bretton Woods for Asia's Rivers So what do we do? We stop pretending this is just a bilateral issue. It's not. This is Asia's water reckoning, and it demands a multilateral response. The world has institutions for trade (WTO), finance (IMF), and carbon (UNFCCC). But for transboundary water governance? We have nothing binding. What we need is a Blue Bretton Woods—a pan-Asian water regime with enforceable rules, real-time data sharing, independent monitoring, and ecological safeguards. Because if hydro-diplomacy collapses into hydro-nationalism, the consequences won't just ripple through Asia—they'll surge. The water wars of the 21st century won't begin with gunfire. They'll begin with closed sluice gates, unpredictable flows, and displaced communities—from the Himalayas to the Bay of Bengal. Asia's rivers once gave birth to its civilisations. The question now is whether they will define its conflicts—or its cooperation. ————-—————————————————- Author Bio: Samirul Ariff Othman is an international relations analyst and economic commentator. A former senior researcher at the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER), he has written extensively for numerous regional outlets. Currently he is a senior consultant with Global Asia Consulting and an adjunct lecturer at Universiti Teknologi PETRONAS (UTP)
The Sun
a day ago
- The Sun
UK and India discuss 'counter-terrorism' cooperation after Pakistan ceasefire
NEW DELHI: Britain and India on Saturday discussed expanding their 'counter-terrorism' collaboration following recent fighting between India and Pakistan, Britain's foreign minister told Reuters after meeting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. British foreign minister David Lammy is the highest-profile Western official to have visited both New Delhi and Islamabad since the South Asian neighbours agreed to a ceasefire last month after their worst fighting in nearly three decades. The latest tensions began in April after the killing of 26 men in Indian Kashmir that New Delhi blamed on 'terrorists' backed by Pakistan, a charge Islamabad denied. India then attacked what it called 'terrorist infrastructure' in Pakistan, leading to escalation from both sides until a May 10 ceasefire. 'We want the situation to be maintained, but of course we recognise fragility, particularly in the backdrop of terrorism, terrorism designed to destabilise India,' Lammy said in an interview at the residence of the British High Commissioner in New Delhi. 'We are keen to continue to work with our Indian partners on counter-terrorism measures.' He said he discussed the next steps with both Modi and Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, but gave no specifics. Last year, India and Britain discussed combating the financing of terrorism, cooperation between law enforcement and judicial bodies and information sharing. Lammy said he also discussed boosting trade between the world's fifth and sixth largest economies. The countries concluded talks for a free trade deal early last month. 'I know that Prime Minister Keir Starmer is very much looking forward to coming to India very soon to sign the free trade agreement,' Lammy said. 'There is so much that our two nations can continue to do together.'
