Tactical vehicle mishaps are training failures — simulators could help

Yahoo

3 days ago

According to a 2021 Government Accountability Office report, from 2010 to 2019, the Army and Marine Corps recorded 3,753 tactical vehicle mishaps — an average of nearly one per day. These incidents led to 123 service member deaths, making vehicle mishaps the leading cause of non-combat training fatalities. Notably, this figure excludes mishaps in combat zones or involving commercial government vehicles.
Human error — such as loss of control, misjudged clearance and failure to follow procedures — was the primary cause of 83% of accidents, according to GAO's report. Yet, despite this clear pattern, no tactical or combat vehicle fielded by the Defense Department has been fielded concurrently with a driver training simulator.
To prevent further unnecessary deaths, Congress must act. The fiscal 2026 National Defense Authorization Act should require that all ground tactical vehicle procurement programs include funding for driver training simulators and that the services use the funding to actually field and sustain those simulators. This mandate would align ground vehicle safety standards with those of military aviation and provide service members with the tools they need to survive.
Every military aircraft fielded in the last 40 years — fixed or rotary-wing— has been paired with a pilot training simulator. Simulator use is mandatory and regulated under Federal Aviation Administration standards and also for military pilots. For ground vehicles, however, simulators are treated as optional and are inconsistently employed. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), for example, costs around $400,000 per unit. Still, its acquisition program included no provision for a simulator.
Tactical vehicle licensing course curriculum includes approximately 250 miles of driving experience, of which 185 miles are daylight driving and 205 miles are on roads. Students receive little if any training to operate vehicles in tactical conditions, which include inclement weather, rugged off-road terrain and doing all of the above while driving at night while wearing night vision devices.
The GAO report referenced above found that 'licensing programs provided soldiers with limited exposure to driving in diverse conditions such as varied terrain or driving at night.' These 'edge case' driving conditions with fog, rain, ice, sand, soft shoulders and narrow single lanes are where simulators excel at providing a driving experience that cannot be replicated in training on the road. Specific events requiring student drivers to practice expert driving skills can be simulated repetitively in simulators to build proficiency. Flight simulators are extensively used for training at the 'edge of the envelope' because they provide experience with safety and at far lower cost than training in the aircraft itself.
In response to vehicle rollovers during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars — many caused by the added weight of armor — the military briefly prioritized simulators. Using Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, the Army and Marine Corps deployed driver simulators to the Motor Transport School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and various operating bases. A 2012 study by the Institute for Defense Analyses confirmed the positive impact of these simulators on safety and readiness. But as combat deployments wound down, neither the Army nor the Marine Corps continued funding simulator maintenance and updates.
The Marine Corps issued a directive in 2014 tasking the commanding general of Training and Education Command to publish a performance-based curriculum mandating the use of driver simulators for tactical vehicle licensing. The directive is still in effect, but no such training curriculum for driver simulators has been published.
In 2013, the Army awarded a contract with a ceiling of $40 million for a new generation of the Common Driver Trainer, but the contract was terminated in 2015 without any new simulators delivered. In 2016, the Army awarded a new contract for the Common Driver Trainer to a different company with a ceiling of $10 million. Four years later, in 2020, the Marine Corps joined the Army on this contract and increased the ceiling to $110 million with deliveries scheduled to begin in 2020. But that contract was likewise terminated in 2023 without any driver simulators delivered.
In response to military training accidents, Congress included a provision in the fiscal 2022 National Defense Authorization Act directing the Defense Department to establish an Accident Investigation Review Board. However, as of 2025, this board still does not exist.
Prescriptive use of driver training simulators for both initial licensing and sustainment training saves lives and preserves the readiness of the military's tactical vehicle fleet. Business-as-usual attitudes have resulted in weak policies for establishing driver training standards and insufficient resources for ground vehicle training systems. It is long overdue for Congress to impose discipline on the Defense Department to ensure budgets and policy are aligned with the mission for ground vehicle programs, as they are for aviation.
Walt Yates served in the U.S. Marine Corps for 27 years and his final assignment was program manager for Training Systems at Marine Corps Systems Command. He is a 2002 graduate of the Modeling, Virtual Environments and Simulation degree program at the Naval Postgraduate School. His assignments include the Marine Air Ground Task Force Battle Simulation Center; assistant program manager for Range Training Aids, Devices and Simulations; and project manager for the Framework for Assessing Cost & Technology (FACT).