Former MKP leader, officials challenge dismissals over R588m Covid-19 hospital renovations
Former Gauteng premier David Makhura at the opening of AngloGold Ashanti Hospital in Carletonville. Officials involved in the procurement of renovations of the facility, that skyrocketed from R50 million to R588m, are now challenging their dismissals.
Image: Supplied
FORMER uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) secretary-general Dr. Sifiso Maseko and several other senior Gauteng provincial government officials are challenging their dismissals for renovations to a Covid-19 hospital, where costs ballooned from R50 million to R588m.
Maseko, who was the provincial department of health's chief director responsible for infrastructure management, was asked to return to work from suspension in October last year following the conclusion of his disciplinary hearing and while awaiting its findings.
In February, the provincial government announced that five of the nine officials, who were suspended in 2022 facing charges of financial misconduct and gross financial misconduct, had been dismissed and two received written warnings, one was acquitted while another could not be subjected to disciplinary action after leaving the public service.
They were held responsible for the costs of the skyrocketing project, from the initial estimate of R50m to R588m, without having received approval from the provincial health department.
The action taken against the officials followed Special Investigation Unit (SIU) recommendations that premier Panyaza Lesufi's office institute disciplinary action against them over irregularities in the awarding of contracts for the refurbishment of the Western Deep Levels Hospital (also known as the AngloGold Ashanti Hospital) in Carletonville on Gauteng's West Rand - at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic.
According to the SIU, a dozen professional service providers and contractors appointed for the project were not on the departments' approved panel and were telephonically advised of their appointments but overcharged the provincial government.
Maseko is now among the four officials challenging their dismissals alongside Mokhele Raseboka, Sipho Makhumisani and Trevor Tabane, who were employed by the Gauteng department of infrastructure development.
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The former MKP leader has hauled the provincial department of health before the Public Health and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining Council (PHSDSBC), where the provincial department of health wanted the matter to be heard as a stated case.
A stated case is arbitration without the need for a formal hearing or presentation of evidence and involves parties agreeing on specific relevant facts stating legal questions at issue.
Parties then submit their written arguments and submissions for consideration and a decision is made based solely on the agreed facts and the legal arguments presented in the submissions.
Both departments also wanted an order for the joint and consolidated arbitration disputes to be dealt with by way of a stated case to save time and money since it will be repetition of the same facts and testimonies about the same or similar acts of misconduct.
Maseko objected to the matter being heard as a stated case as he felt it would be prejudicial to him.
He also wanted his application to be consolidated with the one brought by Raseboka, Makhumisani and Tabane at the General Public Service Sector Bargaining Council.
Maseko told the PHSDSBC that all four affected employees seek relief based on the same cause of action arising from a joint disciplinary enquiry presided by the same presiding officer.
PHSDSBC commissioner Advocate Ronnie Bracks declined to consolidate the disputes on May 5, saying the bargaining council did not have the jurisdiction to do so.
Bracks also declined the provincial health department's bid to have the matter heard by way of a stated case but granted application for the appointment of a senior commissioner.
On Tuesday, Maseko said no date has been set for hearing the matter.
Maseko was the MKP secretary-general between June and October last year, when he resigned and was replaced by former EFF deputy president Floyd Shivambu.
loyiso.sidimba@inl.co.za
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