Hypersonic Arms in South Asia: Racing Toward Instability?

The Diplomat

5 days ago

On July 16, India reportedly tested its most advanced hypersonic cruise missile under the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO)'s classified Project Vishnu. Powered by an indigenous scramjet engine, media reports said the missile reached Mach 8 (around 11,000 km/h), demonstrated low-altitude maneuverability, and struck its target with precision. Designed for deployment from land, sea, and air platforms, the missile is dual-capable – able to carry conventional or nuclear payloads.
While India has not officially confirmed the test, and some later reports denied a test had taken place, there is no doubt that India is moving toward development and testing of such a missile under Project Vishnu.
India's hypersonic trajectory began with the Shaurya missile, tested in 2008 and 2020, which reached Mach 7.5 and laid the early groundwork for India's maneuverable strike systems. The Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) followed in 2020, reaching Mach 5.9 at 30 km altitude. The upcoming BrahMos-II, developed with Russia, is expected to achieve Mach 8 over 1,000-1,500 km, with flight trials due by 2027. India is also developing hypersonic drones like the RHH-150, reportedly capable of Mach 10 and mid-flight directional agility, potentially transforming regional strike and surveillance dynamics.
These hypersonic platforms are not just technological upgrades; they reflect a broader doctrinal evolution in Indian thinking. Precision strikes at blistering speed are increasingly central to India's response options under a time-constrained escalation window. During the recent India-Pakistan conflict, India reportedly targeted six major airbases inside Pakistan, including a surface-to-air missile (SAM) site near Mailer base. Drones were used to locate and attack air defense batteries ahead of time, an indication of India's evolving emphasis on suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and kill-chain integration.
This operational logic mirrors Israel's recent campaign against Iran, where coordinated air, missile, and drone strikes systematically neutralized Iran's air defense networks before penetrating strikes were executed. Israel's experience in 1973, where it lost over 100 aircraft largely to SAMs, has shaped a doctrine of pre-emptive suppression. Indian defense officials appear to be embracing similar lessons.
At a recent conference, India's defense attaché to Indonesia remarked that the Indian Air Force took losses in the conflict 'only because of the constraint given by the political leadership to not attack the military establishment or their air defenses…' He later added: 'After the loss, we changed our tactics and we went for the military installations… we first achieved suppression of enemy air defenses and then all our attacks could easily go through using BrahMos missiles.'
These statements, when read alongside India's test and doctrinal posture, indicate a potential shift toward decapitation-style strikes – precise, rapid, and aimed at disabling Pakistan's retaliatory infrastructure before full mobilization. While India insists on maintaining escalation control, the technological velocity of hypersonic platforms may outpace political deliberation.
Pakistan's geographic closeness to India compresses the available time for detection, target discrimination, and interception. Even with potential acquisitions like the Chinese HQ-19 missile defense system, Pakistan's capacity to neutralize fast, low-flying missiles across an extended border remains severely constrained. In the second phase of the recent crisis, India appeared to probe precisely this vulnerability.
Islamabad has two primary options for responding to the threat, both perilous. The first is pre-emptive strike. India's deputy army chief recently revealed that during DGMO-level talks, Pakistan warned India to 'pull back' a launch vector, indicating Islamabad's real-time intelligence and vector tracking capabilities. Once Pakistan inducts stealth platforms like the J-35, it may be tempted to launch pre-emptive strikes targeting Indian aircraft or missile launchers pre-emptively. But such action would carry enormous political and military risk.
The second option available to Pakistan is to exercise restraint and refrain from launching a pre-emptive strike, even in the face of credible signs of an impending Indian attack. However, this path carries serious risks of its own. India's hypersonic capabilities – particularly when paired with drones and precision-guided munitions – could severely degrade Pakistan's conventional response capability by targeting runways, radar networks, and air defense systems in the opening phase of conflict. Such strikes would not only impair Pakistan's ability to respond with conventional force but also disrupt command-and-control infrastructure critical to second-strike readiness. In this context, conventional deterrence begins to erode.
The risks are further amplified by the fact that many of India's hypersonic systems are dual-capable. Most of these hypersonic missiles can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads, but their operational role remains undefined in India's public doctrine. This lack of transparency creates dangerous ambiguity. In a crisis, Pakistan would have no reliable way to discern whether an incoming hypersonic strike is intended to disable conventional forces or to deliver a strategic decapitation blow.
Both of these factors – the erosion of conventional deterrence and the inability to distinguish between conventional and nuclear payloads under intense time pressure – heighten the risk of worst-case assumptions.
In such a scenario, restraint becomes dangerous. Faced with a rapidly deteriorating battlefield and the possibility of strategic disarmament, Pakistan could shift toward a 'use-it-or-lose-it' mindset, increasing the likelihood of early nuclear use and inadvertent escalation.
Escalation risk is further exacerbated by the absence of robust crisis communication mechanisms between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. As Pakistan's chairman of the Joint Chiefs observed, there is only a single operational hotline between India and Pakistan, with no supporting missile pre-notification regime or formal crisis control frameworks in place. In such an environment, strategic ambiguity, paired with the speed and opacity of hypersonic weapons, creates a dangerously unstable vacuum.
The role of external powers is also under strain. During the latest crisis, the United States initially hesitated to intervene. Though it eventually played a backchannel role in securing a ceasefire, its involvement became politically toxic in India. Opposition leader Rahul Gandhi accused the government of 'surrendering to the U.S.,' prompting official denials of any foreign mediation. In future crises, such domestic political costs may deter Indian leaders from accepting U.S. involvement, weakening the last remaining circuit breaker in South Asia's escalation ladder.
India's hypersonic capabilities are accelerating. Its doctrinal shift toward rapid precision strikes, backed by stealth, space-based ISR, and drones, suggests that the next India-Pakistan conflict may unfold more rapidly than ever before. But strategic speed, in a region without escalation buffers, is a double-edged sword.
Without arms control mechanisms, missile restraint regimes, or institutionalized pathways to reduce tensions, South Asia risks sleepwalking into a conflict where no side can confidently predict outcomes – only costs.