Israeli strike near Gaza health clinic kills 17, including eight children
Gaza receives first delivery of fuel in 130 days
Israel will strike Iran again if threatened, defence minister says
Houthi leader says group won't permit sea passage of goods related to Israel
UNRWA review warns Palestinian aid group could collapse
At least 57,762 Palestinians killed and 137,656 wounded since Gaza war began
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The National
8 minutes ago
- The National
Israel starts call-up of 60,000 reservists for Gaza city offensive
The Israeli military said that about 60,000 reserve orders were issued on Wednesday, before a planned offensive against Hamas in Gaza city. In addition, 20,000 reservists who have already been called up will receive a notice extending their current orders, the military said. 'The decision regarding the reserves was made after in-depth discussions on the extent of manpower required for the continuation of combat,' the military said. The mobilisation comes after Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz approved the military's plan to seize Gaza city. It remains unclear when the operation will begin, but it could be a matter of days. The planned offensive, announced earlier this month, has heightened international condemnation of Israel and fuelled fears of another mass displacement of Palestinians. Human rights groups warn that the humanitarian crisis could worsen in Gaza, where most residents have been displaced, vast neighbourhoods lie in ruins and communities are facing the threat of famine. Mediators and Hamas both said this week that the militant group had agreed to a ceasefire proposal, though similar announcements have been made in the past that did not lead to a halt in fighting. The group said its main proposed amendment in the latest plan is for Israeli troops to withdraw more than 800 metres from residential areas in Gaza. Israel has yet to formally respond to the ceasefire proposal put forward by Qatar and Egypt. However, it has demanded the release of all 50 hostages held in the Palestinian territory, contrary to the current plan for a phased release, and dimming hopes for a last-ditch truce. Qatar on Tuesday urged Israel to accept a 60-day truce to avert a 'humanitarian catastrophe' in the strip. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly said he will oppose a deal that does not include the 'complete defeat of Hamas'. More than 62,000 people have been killed during Israel's 22-month offensive in Gaza, according to the enclave's Health Ministry. The ministry said that at least 266 people, including 112 children, have died of malnutrition-related causes during the conflict.
Middle East Eye
24 minutes ago
- Middle East Eye
Syrian foreign minister held meeting with Israeli officials in Paris
Asaad al-Shaibani, Syria's foreign minister, participated in a US-mediated meeting with an Israeli delegation in Paris on Tuesday, according to Syria's state news agency Sana. Syria and Israel have held US-mediated talks in recent months, though it has rarely been acknowledged in Syrian state media. The most recent discussions focused on de-escalation in southern Syria and non-interference in Syrian domestic affairs, Sana reported. 'These talks are taking place under US mediation, as part of diplomatic efforts aimed at enhancing security and stability in Syria and preserving the unity and integrity of its territory,' Sana reported. The two sides discussed re-activating the 1974 disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria, which created a UN buffer zone in Syria's Golan Heights, an area that has been occupied by Israel since 1967. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters When Bashar al-Assad's government fell in December, Israel occupied the buffer zone and declared that the 1974 agreement was null and void. There was no immediate comment from Israeli officials about the talks on Tuesday. Earlier this week, Israeli media reported that Ron Dermer, Israel's strategic affairs minister, was set to attend the meeting, alongside Tom Barrack, the US envoy to Syria. It was the second such meeting to take place between the two countries in Paris in less than a month, Reuters reported. Sweida after the ceasefire: Executions, a mass grave, and the voices left behind Read More » Dermer and Shaibani also met in Azerbaijan a few weeks ago. The talks last month centred around the situation in the southern region of Sweida. Violence in Sweida erupted on 13 July between Bedouin fighters, Druze factions and government forces, killing over 1,500 people. Israel also carried out strikes on Syrian cities, including the capital Damascus, framing its attacks as an effort to protect the Druze minority. A US-brokered truce ended the fighting, while the Syrian government said it had set up a committee to investigate the violence. Since the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December, Syria has been rocked by waves of sectarian violence which new President Ahmed al-Sharaa has struggled to manage. In March, attacks by Assad loyalists in the coastal province of Latakia provoked a violent sectarian backlash against the Alawi population, which the former president and his family were members of. At least 1,500 Alawis were killed in the subsequent violence, with a Reuters investigation tracing much of it back to officials in Damascus.
Middle East Eye
34 minutes ago
- Middle East Eye
How Egypt's reliance on Israeli gas could blow up in its face
Since the mid-1990s, negotiations over natural gas between Egypt and Israel have oscillated between strict secrecy and political exploitation. In 1994, the first discreet talks began over the possibility of exporting Egyptian gas to Israel via undersea pipelines, at a time when the Egypt-Israel peace treaty was still hugely unpopular, and any such step was seen as a political gamble. Yet economic interests and deep security ties between the two countries' intelligence services pushed the matter forward, culminating in a 2005 agreement to supply Israel with Egyptian gas at preferential rates. That deal later sparked a major scandal when it was revealed that the prices were far below global market levels. The arrangement, implemented through the East Mediterranean Gas Company in direct coordination with Egypt's General Intelligence Service (GIS), eventually led to one of the largest international arbitration cases brought against Egypt. Following the 2011 revolution, with repeated attacks on the Sinai pipeline, gas deliveries ceased. Israel's Electric Corporation filed for arbitration and, in 2015, won a final ruling awarding it $1.7bn in compensation. A similar case was brought by Spain's Union Fenosa after gas supplies to the Damietta liquefaction plant, which was 80 percent owned by the Spaniards, were cut. The company won $2bn in compensation. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters These combined liabilities placed Cairo in a severe financial and diplomatic bind, prompting the search for a solution to settle all disputes in one stroke. That solution was for Egypt - once a net exporter of gas - to become an importer of Israeli gas. In February 2018, Israel's Delek Drilling announced a $15bn, 10-year deal to export gas to Egypt. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hailed it as a 'day of celebration', declaring it would bolster Israel's economy, security and regional standing. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, for his part, downplayed the criticism, insisting the government was not a party to the agreement and that it was purely a matter for the private sector - though all indications point to the GIS, which under 2022 amendments to Law 100/1971 gained the right to establish and hold stakes in companies, as the real architect of the deal. Why Israel? The key question remains: why Israel specifically? The answer lies less in economics than in geopolitics. The agreement - boosted this month by a record $35bn deal that will see a tripling of Egyptian gas imports - is part of a broader effort to normalise and institutionalise new regional alignments in the Eastern Mediterranean, integrating Israel as a central energy supplier and political actor. Sisi has positioned himself to the West as a 'moderate' interlocutor with Israel, offering it practical recognition and, in return, securing valuable political credit in Washington and Tel Aviv, which ensures their continued backing regardless of Egypt's human rights record. American pressure has been decisive. Washington championed the creation of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) in Cairo in 2019, bringing together Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, while excluding Turkey and Russia. The US goal was not merely 'cooperation', but to make Egypt the export bridge for Israeli gas via its liquefaction facilities in Damietta and Idku, re-shipping it to Europe and reducing the EU's dependence on Russia. In any future conflict, Israel could, with a single decision, cut gas supplies, plunging Egypt into blackouts, halting factories, and crippling its war industries For Sisi, this role promised far greater political dividends than economic ones, placing him at the centre of a western strategic project. Alternative paths to energy independence - such as sourcing from Algeria, Qatar, Iran or even Russia - were dismissed. Such options would require complex diplomacy, risk placing Egypt outside the US strategic orbit, and, in some cases, involve states firmly in the opposing Middle Eastern camp (notably Iran and Russia). Instead, the Israeli option aligned perfectly with the geopolitical axis Cairo had chosen. In practice, the arrangement was more than an energy trade; it recast the strategic relationship between Egypt and Israel. Importing Israeli gas allowed Egypt to liquefy it at its own plants, especially in Damietta and Idku, for re-export to Europe, while at the same time resolving the arbitration cases with Tel Aviv and Madrid. Yet what looks on paper like a win-win economic deal masks deeper transformations that cut to the core of Egypt's sovereignty over its resources. Consider the actual structure of Egypt's gas sector: even with the discovery of the giant Zohr field in 2015 - touted as the salvation of Egypt's energy balance - the state, through its holding company EGAS, owns only about 40 percent of production. The remainder is split among Italy's Eni, Britain's BP, Russia's Rosneft and the UAE's Mubadala, each free to sell their share to the government or on the open market. In other words, the oft-repeated claim of 'self-sufficiency' is largely an accounting illusion; the so-called surplus is mostly corporate property, not the state's. Stark implications What's more, the most decisive player has been the GIS itself, which under its new legal powers has become a direct economic actor with energy holdings and negotiating authority. Its influence has extended beyond Egypt's domestic energy balance to reshaping regional gas relations in ways that serve political aims beyond Cairo. This is where the EMGF plays a pivotal role. For Washington, it is a tool to re-engineer the Eastern Mediterranean energy map, cement Israel's place as a normal fixture in the regional order, and deny its rivals any leverage in energy markets. For Egypt, it has made the country indispensable to Israel's gas export strategy, but also tied its own energy security to a web of dependencies whose ultimate decision-making lies abroad. The Egypt-Israel gas deal: What's the chance it will go up in smoke? Read More » The security implications are stark. Israeli gas now feeds Egypt's power plants and factories, including those producing military equipment. This effectively places the keys to Egypt's industrial output, and even its defence capabilities, in the hands of a state that has historically targeted Egyptian soldiers on the border. In any future conflict, Israel could, with a single decision, cut gas supplies, plunging Egypt into blackouts, halting factories, and crippling its war industries. The dependency stretches to Gaza as well. The Gaza Marine field, discovered in 1999 about 36km offshore, has remained untapped under Israeli blockade and political pressure. Now it is being revived as part of a broader political-economic package: Gaza's reconstruction, under a Palestinian leadership 'acceptable' to Israel, with direct Israeli oversight of development and production. In 2021, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority signed a memorandum of understanding to develop the field and sell most of its output to Egypt, under arrangements managed by energy companies linked to the GIS. This not only binds Gaza's economic security to Israel but also casts Cairo not as a guarantor of Palestinian independence, but as an operational partner in Tel Aviv's strategy. All of this is unfolding amid a global energy realignment. The war in Ukraine, sanctions on Russia, and Europe's urgent need to diversify gas supplies have turned the Eastern Mediterranean into an attractive alternative. But making Israel a central player in this system was only possible with the acceptance and cooperation of major Arab states - Egypt foremost among them. The result is a dense network of pipelines, liquefaction plants, and long-term contracts ensuring Israel's indispensability to Europe's energy security for decades to come. A new equation The 2018 deal thus became more than an agreement between two companies. It is the embodiment of a new equation: a country that once owned its resources and exported its surplus now finds itself dependent on imports from a neighbour that once occupied its land and still occupies Arab territory, all under the banner of 'economic cooperation'. While the Egyptian government sells these policies as strategic triumphs, the facts on the ground suggest something closer to the surrender of national leverage While the Egyptian government sells these policies as strategic triumphs, the facts on the ground suggest something closer to the surrender of national leverage in exchange for regionally assigned roles crafted abroad. Ultimately, this is not just a story about gas; it is a story about sovereignty, and how natural resources can shift from being a source of strength to a tool of subjugation when placed within asymmetric political alliances. Egypt, long self-styled as the beating heart of the Arab world and its security backbone, now shares the decision to power its factories and defence systems with an external actor, reflecting deeper changes in the regional order, and the transformation of energy from a commodity into a geopolitical weapon. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
