Patriots' Robert Kraft expresses concerns over failures to call antisemitic attacks for what they are
New England Patriots team owner Robert Kraft expressed concerns on Tuesday with the media and political leaders for failing to call attacks on Jewish people antisemitism.
Kraft pointed the discourse around three events that have occurred over the last few months – an arson attack on Pennsylvania Gov. Josh Shapiro's home, the killings of two Israeli Embassy workers outside the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C., and the attack in Colorado on those rallying in support of Israeli hostages held by Hamas.
"I'll just tell you that there's been three events that have happened that have really shook me up," he told CNN's Kaitlin Collins. "What happened to Governor Shapiro in Pennsylvania, what happened out in D.C. with a couple of young people who were just employees of the embassy in Washington, and then what happened in Boulder … and people are afraid to call it what it really is. That gentleman you just had on, he called it antisemitism right from the start.
"And I'm very concerned that our political leaders and other people in the news area don't report it as blatant antisemitism. We've let this go on, and it's happened at college campuses now for quite a long time, and we need people to speak up and call it for what it is."
The Boulder, Colorado, attack on Sunday was another sign of rising antisemitic attacks in the U.S. since the start of 2025. The FBI described it as a "targeted terror attack."
However, it was far from the only questionable incident over the weekend.
A commencement speaker accused the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) of being part of wiping "Palestine from the face of the Earth," leading multiple students to walk out.
Megha M. Vemuri, MIT's 2025 class president, praised her classmates for protesting against Israel in the wake of the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks and the ensuing Gaza War. The comments drew a mix of boos and cheers from the crowd.
An antisemitic incident also occurred at a Barstool Sports bar in Philadelphia last month.
Kraft has been among those combating antisemitism since before the Oct. 7 terror attacks. He started the Foundation to Combat Antisemitism in 2019.
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