Soft power key to Pakistan's diplomacy'
Dr Maleeha Lodhi and Dr Duksha H Saiyid engage in a dialogue about Pakistan's missed opportunity for cultural diplomacy at the "Culture and Art – The Soft Power of Diplomacy" event in the federal capital. PHOTO: ZUNAIRAH QURESHI/EXPRESS
A discussion on soft power diplomacy through cultural exchange was recently held by the Asian Study Group (ASG) in the federal capital right next to a hall hosting a dinner for the Bangladesh cricket team, which was in town for the ICC Champions Trophy 2025.
With the Pakistan cricket team placing last and out of the high-stakes tournament hosted at home after 28 years, talk of cultural diplomacy and its importance in restoring the national image stood in contrast with the country's apparent priorities.
The programme titled "Culture and Art – The Soft Power of Diplomacy" took the form of a dialogue between former Pakistan ambassador to the US and permanent representative to the UN, Dr Maleeha Lodhi, and Youlin Magazine Editor and historian, Dr Dushka H Sayid.
At the same time, the audience comprising members of the diplomatic corps and professionals from various backgrounds supplied the conversation with their own insights.
Soft power diplomacy refers to the use of cultural and social exchanges of tangible as well as intangible tools such as films, local cuisines, art, sports, student-exchange programmes and developmental investments to build relationships with other nations and craft a positive national image. It focuses on influencing nations through positive engagement as an alternative to hard-power-driven coercion.
As an example, Dr Lodhi shared her own efforts towards projecting Pakistan's soft power when, as Pakistan's high commissioner to the UK, she organised a large-scale concert in Trafalgar Square, London, which included performances from local artists and celebrities, a fashion show and a community band.
"Money is not the issue; I was able to raise half of the funding for this event through the Pakistani business community in the UK alone. What we need is the chief executive of the country to take interest in this, and then we need to have a foreign minister," said Dr Lodhi while explaining what it would take for Pakistan to get serious about soft power diplomacy. "We need to have a foreign minister," she reiterated with a smile to resounding laughter from the audience.
In response to a question that asked why soft power diplomacy does not work in Pakistan, Dr Lodhi said that it was essential for leaders to first have faith in the future of the country and belief in what they represent. "It is crucial for the leadership of the country to believe that soft diplomacy is useful, that it will help Pakistan promote its objectives abroad and solve its image crisis."
Dr Lodhi further elaborated upon her point by drawing from her experience as an ambassador to the US during the 9/11 catastrophe, when she had to leverage Pakistan's soft image to counter misconceptions of its involvement with the Taliban and the ensuing Islamophobia that Muslims faced.
Dr Sayid, on the other hand, pointed out the role of Pakistani films like "Shah" and "Waar", which were released to international acclaim. She further highlighted the role of CPEC in changing the narrative of China and delivering its message of maintaining peace as a testament to the successful use of soft power diplomacy.
Audience members engaged with the talk by sharing stories of their own attempts at highlighting indigenous traditional arts like Punjabi Sufi music over mainstream popular media and wondering how the influence of Pakistani dramas in India, where the content is found relatable, may have impacted the country's perception across borders. In response to which younger participants expressed concern over the negative image that may result from the kind of regressive notions that are perpetuated in local TV dramas.
Many appreciated the talk for discussing a vital topic. "Just this morning, in a meeting, we proposed a series of cultural actions which would help change the image of Pakistan," shared the UNESCO Pakistan culture and heritage expert, Dr Christina Menegazzi as she thanked the speakers for highlighting the subject.
Others expressed their disappointment at the speakers having barely spoken, with the event scheduled for 2 hours wrapping up in less than 1.5 hours.
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