OASES drives growth in Hong Kong's innovation landscape by guiding tech companies into the city
The Hong Kong government is actively fostering an ecosystem tailored to grow the city's I&T prowess. Last September, the Innovation and Technology Commission introduced a HK$10 billion (US$1.27 billion) funding programme, the New Industrialisation Acceleration Scheme (NIAS), for enterprises in the fields of life and health technology, artificial intelligence (AI) and data science, and advanced manufacturing and new energy technology that plan to set up smart production facilities in the city.
Besides funding, Hong Kong's innovation infrastructure continues to expand, with facilities like the Advanced Manufacturing Centre (AMC) at Tseung Kwan O InnoPark offering cutting-edge prototyping and production capabilities. This complements existing I&T hubs, including Cyberport and the Hong Kong Science Park, to collectively reinforce the city's commitment to hi-tech industrialisation.
The Office for Attracting Strategic Enterprises (OASES) serves as a cornerstone of Hong Kong's I&T strategy. Established in 2022 following Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu's policy address, OASES focuses on attracting promising strategic enterprises from five industries, namely advanced manufacturing and new energy technology, AI and data science, financial technology, life and health technology, and cultural and creative.
As of April, the office has successfully attracted 84 strategic enterprises, which are expected to invest HK$50 billion and create over 20,000 jobs in Hong Kong in the next few years. OASES actively engages with these companies before they enter Hong Kong and also offers various types of support during and after their entry. Such support can range from connecting companies with potential clients and partners to help grow their businesses to providing insights on the latest market trends and relevant government policies.
Fourteen of these enterprises belong to the advanced manufacturing and new energy technology industry. Among them is Gotion, a company specialising in battery technology for electric vehicles (EVs) and energy storage systems. First established in 2006 in Hefei in eastern China's Anhui province, Gotion has since expanded its operations to eight R&D centres worldwide, including in the United States, Singapore and Japan. It is one of the largest EV battery manufacturers in the world and ranks sixth in the industry in terms of market share.
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