Middle powers such as Australia relied on the rules-based order, but that's in doubt. Here's what we must do

The Guardian

25-02-2025

The iconoclastic news whirlwind around Donald Trump points to a new US approach on the international stage: globalism and free trade are out. Spheres of influence are back in vogue. It's not isolationism, it's transactional mercantilism. But with Australia heavily invested in its US relationship we need to calmly undertake a net assessment: to weigh up what's at stake while looking to engage with our region more fully.
US globalism has been soured by the effects of catastrophic wars in the Middle East since 2001, coupled with the 2008 global financial crisis, a drug scourge, a surge of immigration, a sense of being taken advantage of and an undermining of faith in government. These echo in Australian society.
China's rapid growth and adversarial mercantilism helped. Russia's barbarous invasion of Ukraine added to the mix. Trump has supercharged the disruption with his sidelining of allies and favouring of autocrats. That leaves us at an inflection point.
For middle powers such as Australia, the rules-based order has been convenient, helping to enable global trade and enhanced prosperity. But it's also been flimsy and is now in doubt.
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The 2017 foreign policy white paper, issued shortly after Trump came to office last time, was effectively our 'Plan B'. In the face of a US transactional retreat from ideational leadership, the white paper talked up the alliance but mainly bolstered other connections to offset growing US disengagement. We emphasised the Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean); the Pacific Islands Forum (Pif); the Indian Ocean Rim Association (Iora) and others.
The 2024 national defence strategy was written with China's adventurist mercantilism and military expansion in mind. But these two documents now need a significant rethink. A net assessment is in order, carefully re-examining Australian interests and regional obligations, and the best way to approach our exceptional friend, the US.
We came closer to European partners with our involvement in the war in Afghanistan, and because they too are concerned about reverberations at both ends of the Eurasian landmass.
The Quad also helped tie in the US, alongside Japan, India and Australia, working on regional economic, technical and human security projects.
Meanwhile, the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangements, spawned in the second world war, prompted parallel defence, border security, policing and intelligence ties.
Today the Europeans, Quad and Five Eyes connections may have a newfound utility – for engaging with equally shocked erstwhile US allies and partners including friends in Asean, the Pif and Iora.
Take the Anzus alliance: it doesn't include an HQ, a commander, forces assigned or a mutual defence guarantee. It's an 800-word essay. To be sure, the security ties are now wide-ranging but, if the treatment of our strategic cousins in Canada is anything to go by, this pact offers no assurance. What mitigates this is the convenience of Australia as a suitable piece of real estate, for facilities at Pine Gap (intelligence), Tindal (air force), Darwin (marines) and Perth (navy and submarines).
Australia's one-punch boutique defence force and limited volunteer emergency services are structured for the unipolar moment and to make not much more than niche contributions far afield. This was for a more benign time.
The Aukus agreement for sharing advanced technology has been described as a waste of money that, with Trump's return, leaves Australia vulnerable to being dragged into another war. Yet Trump hasn't started wars and evidently seeks to avoid conflict over Taiwan, perhaps even making a deal with China.
So far Aukus retains broad bipartisan support in Australia and the US, including with Trump and the US submarine industrial base is being re-energised. While challenging, therefore, the concerns are still manageable.
Instead of conscription, we could consider introducing a voluntary but incentivised national and community service scheme – covering the armed forces and cyber force, along with state emergency, police, fire and national park services. We could also have a Peace Corps-like body to bolster regional engagement and delivery of aid and humanitarian assistance – and perhaps compensate in the Pacific for drastic cuts in USAid.
Strong and broad ties with Indonesia and Papua New Guinea are critical. These have been strengthened but need to go deeper across business, education, societal and security links. After all, when we last faced an existential crisis in 1942, it was there. Now, though, there are ways to sweeten the connections in collaboration with other neighbours.
We also need to boost offerings to Pif member states, facing looming environmental catastrophe, governance challenges and the buffeting from great power competition. We should propose a grand compact or a Pacific island federation. It could look like a cross between Asean, the European Union and the Pacific compact state arrangements. This way we would share some sovereignty and gain some collective security and bolster self-reliance.
Australians have a fear of abandonment matched by a lingering fear of entrapment. Those fears are more acute now than in ages.
John Blaxland is professor of international security and intelligence studies at the ANU's strategic and defence studies centre