Beijing's bid to entice researchers home, visa-free policy expanded: SCMP daily highlights
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China is launching dedicated recruitment programmes to lure Chinese-born researchers who are considering leaving the US, a source told the South China Morning Post.
Despite US President Donald Trump's 'landmark' investment deals with Saudi Arabia valued at US$600 billion announced this week, China's deeply entrenched position in the region is not in jeopardy as the two economic giants vie for influence there, analysts said.
China has been expanding visa-free access as part of a push to attract more foreign tourists. Photo: AP
China is expanding visa-free travel to five South American countries, the foreign ministry said on Thursday. Starting from June 1, citizens of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru and Uruguay will be allowed to enter China without a visa and stay for up to 30 days for purposes such as tourism, family visits or business. The arrangements will be in force for one year.
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Asia Times
an hour ago
- Asia Times
The end of Taiwan's strategic flexiblity
The escalating rhetoric between Washington and Beijing reached a new crescendo last weekend when US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth declared that China poses a threat that 'could be imminent,' warning that Beijing is 'credibly preparing to potentially use military force to alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.' China's foreign ministry fired back immediately, accusing Hegseth of a 'cold war mentality' and demanding that the US 'stop inciting conflict' in the Asia-Pacific region. This verbal warfare exemplifies exactly why Taiwan finds itself in an increasingly untenable position that deserves far more attention than it currently receives. While policymakers in Washington and Taipei publicly maintain that US-China strategic competition enhances Taiwan's value, the reality may be far more sobering: the island risks becoming the primary casualty of this new bipolar world order. The uncomfortable truth that neither side wants to acknowledge is stark: Taiwan's strategic importance to America has historically stemmed from its unique position as a technological and economic bridge between Western innovation and Chinese manufacturing capacity. As this bridge systematically burns under the weight of great power rivalry, so too does much of Taiwan's economic relevance and diplomatic leverage. Taiwan's semiconductor dominance didn't emerge in isolation—it flourished precisely because it could serve both American technological advancement and Chinese production needs simultaneously. TSMC's remarkable success story is fundamentally about occupying the crucial nexus in a globalized supply chain that current US policy is methodically dismantling. When that integrated system fractures, Taiwan doesn't automatically become more strategically valuable; it risks transformation into an expensive military outpost with diminishing economic justification. The current export restrictions on advanced semiconductors and manufacturing equipment present Taiwan with what amounts to an impossible choice: comply with Washington's demands and forfeit access to China—still Taiwan's largest trading partner—or resist these controls and risk losing access to critical American technology and security guarantees. What makes this particularly problematic is that these restrictions weren't designed to benefit Taiwan; they're crafted to contain China while preserving American technological superiority. Taiwan is expected to function as America's high-tech manufacturing base while being severed from its most significant market. This isn't strategic partnership—it's technological dependency with geopolitical strings attached. Washington's broader restrictions on Chinese students and researchers create another unintended consequence that directly undermines Taiwan's interests. Recent announcements by Secretary of State Marco Rubio to 'aggressively revoke visas for Chinese students, including those with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields' reveal a critical blind spot that damages Taiwan's long-term prospects. When the US becomes less accessible to Chinese talent—particularly from Hong Kong and mainland China in sensitive technological fields—these individuals don't simply disappear. They redirect to Singapore, the UK, or increasingly, remain home to strengthen China's domestic capabilities. Taiwan, despite its democratic credentials and technological expertise, often gets overlooked in this reshuffling because it lacks the scale and global academic brand recognition to effectively capture this displaced talent pool. More perversely, Taiwanese students and researchers in America now face heightened scrutiny due to bureaucratic confusion over their status. The broad-brush approach to restricting 'Chinese' academic collaboration frequently fails to distinguish between Taiwan and mainland China, creating unexpected barriers for Taiwan's own academic and research communities. Perhaps most concerning is how this new bipolar competition eliminates Taiwan's traditional diplomatic maneuverability. The Hegseth-Beijing exchange illustrates this perfectly: when American officials frame the situation in such stark, militaristic terms and China responds with equally heated rhetoric about US 'provocations,' Taiwan loses any space for nuanced positioning. During periods of US-China engagement, Taiwan could leverage relationships with both sides, executing a complex but effective balancing act that maximized its options and influence. The current zero-sum dynamic forces Taiwan into a binary choice that fundamentally eliminates its strategic autonomy. When Washington and Beijing were economically intertwined, both had powerful incentives to avoid military confrontation over Taiwan—too much economic value was at stake. As these ties dissolve, the cost-benefit calculation for potential military action shifts dramatically. Paradoxically, economic separation may make conflict more probable, not less. When defense secretaries openly speak of 'imminent' threats and foreign ministries respond with accusations of 'stoking flames,' the temperature rises to dangerous levels that leave little room for the kind of strategic ambiguity that has long served Taiwan's interests. The broader trend toward 'supply chain warfare' poses a significant threat to Taiwan's position as a global innovation hub. Innovation thrives on the free movement of ideas, talent, and capital across borders. As these flows become weaponized tools of statecraft, Taiwan's ability to maintain its technological edge becomes increasingly challenging. Taiwan's historical success has been built on being globally connected while preserving its distinct identity. Forced economic bifurcation threatens this model at its foundation. The island risks becoming highly proficient at producing yesterday's technology for an increasingly narrow customer base. Taiwan urgently needs to develop what might be called 'strategic polycentrism'—building capabilities and relationships that don't require either Washington's or Beijing's approval. This approach demands: Diversifying technological partnerships beyond the US-China axis, particularly with Europe, Japan, and emerging economies that offer growth potential without the complications of great power competition. Creating new institutional frameworks that allow Taiwan to maintain economic engagement with China while preserving security relationships with the US—perhaps through multilateral mechanisms that provide political cover for all parties. Investing heavily in indigenous innovation capabilities that reduce dependence on either American technology transfers or Chinese market access. Building specialized advantages that larger powers cannot easily replicate, focusing on high-value niches rather than attempting to compete in mass markets. The most unconventional aspect of Taiwan's current predicament is this: the island's long-term survival may require developing the capacity to disappoint both Washington and Beijing when their demands conflict with Taiwan's fundamental interests. This isn't about choosing sides—it's about choosing survival. Taiwan's leadership must recognize that both great powers view the island primarily through the lens of their own strategic competition, not Taiwan's welfare. When American officials speak of Taiwan primarily as a strategic asset against an 'imminent' Chinese threat, and when Beijing responds by framing Taiwan as an 'internal affair' that brooks no foreign interference, Taiwan's own voice gets lost in the escalating rhetoric. Genuine strategic autonomy requires the political courage to occasionally frustrate allies and the wisdom to understand that Taiwan's interests aren't always identical to America's interests, regardless of how aligned they may appear. The current trajectory leads Taiwan toward becoming a heavily fortified, economically isolated garrison state. While this may serve American strategic objectives, it's unclear how it serves the Taiwanese people, who deserve both security and prosperity, not a forced choice between them. Taiwan's greatest asset has always been its adaptability and strategic acumen. In this new era of great power competition—where defense secretaries speak of imminent threats and foreign ministries trade accusations of warmongering—it will need both qualities more than ever to chart a course that serves its own interests first. Y. Tony Yang, endowed professor and associate dean at George Washington University in Washington, DC, earned a law degree from National Taiwan University and a doctoral degree from Harvard.
South China Morning Post
2 hours ago
- South China Morning Post
Keeta's dangerous order-grabbing mechanism should be scrapped
Feel strongly about these letters, or any other aspects of the news? Share your views by emailing us your Letter to the Editor at [email protected] or filling in this Google form . Submissions should not exceed 400 words, and must include your full name and address, plus a phone number for verification Advertisement I refer to the article , 'Keeta riders stage third strike in Hong Kong over pay, work conditions' (May 22), which highlighted the danger of the food delivery platform's order-grabbing mechanism that has drivers vying for jobs while on the road. In the fast-paced food delivery industry, such a feature poses a significant safety hazard. Instead of automatically assigning orders, this mechanism has riders taking on orders on a first come, first served basis, so they must watch out for pop-up alerts on the app and react quickly. This leads to reckless competition, distracted riding and a higher risk of accidents. The system is flawed and urgently needs reform – or even a ban. In an open letter last week, Keeta said nearly 90 per cent of orders were assigned to drivers, while only a small percentage of orders go out through the order-grabbing mechanism, which is intended to supplement drivers' income. I believe the most effective solution is to scrap this feature. Keeta should assign all orders automatically and adopt artificial intelligence-powered distribution to ensure fairness. Advertisement If Keeta refuses to abandon the order-grabbing mechanism, it must disable order acceptance when a rider is moving faster than 10km/h or in motion for more than three seconds. It should also penalise drivers for reckless riding and suspend those caught accepting orders while driving.
Asia Times
2 hours ago
- Asia Times
US-China tensions surge as tech and mineral wars intensify
Beijing and Washington accused each other of violating the consensus reached during trade talks in Geneva, as both sides strengthened export controls on technology products and raw materials. Tensions have surged again since US President Donald Trump said in a social media post on May 30 that China 'has totally violated its agreement with us.' Trump said he made a fast deal with China on May 12 because he did not want to see Chinese 'civil unrest' sparked by a deterioration of the Chinese economy caused by his trade war. However, he added that he would no longer be 'Mr Nice Guy.' 'Instead of reflecting on its own actions, the US has groundlessly accused China of violating the consensus, a claim that grossly distorts the facts. China firmly rejects these unjustified accusations,' an unnamed spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MoC) said Monday (June 2). 'The US has unilaterally and repeatedly provoked new economic and trade frictions, exacerbating uncertainty and instability in bilateral economic and trade relations.' The MoC spokesperson said the US has seriously undermined the consensus reached during the China-US economic and trade talks in Geneva by introducing multiple, discriminatory, restrictive measures against China. These measures included issuing guidance on artificial intelligence chip export controls, halting sales of chip design software to China and announcing the revocation of visas for Chinese students, including those studying technological-related fields. The spokesperson also criticized the US for undermining the consensus reached by Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in a phone call on January 17. In that call, Xi congratulated Trump on his reelection as president. He said confrontation and conflict should not be an option for the two countries. Trump said the US and China should get along well for years to come. The MoC's latest comments came after US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told Fox News on May 29 that US-China trade negotiations are 'a bit stalled.' Bessent said the two countries' leaders must speak directly about key issues. US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said on May 30 that China's reluctance to approve exports of key niche minerals is one reason why Trump said Beijing violated its side of the trade agreement reached in Geneva. White House National Economic Council director Kevin Hassett told ABC News on June 1 that Trump and Xi could talk about trade as soon as this week. Hassett said both sides were willing to talk, but they did not set a specific date for a conversation between the two leaders. He added that Greer's team communicates with their Chinese counterparts daily, 'trying to move the ball forward on this matter.' It is unclear whether a Xi-Trump phone call will be possible in the short run, particularly after the recent volley of accusations. The Chinese side has not commented on the matter. On May 12, China and the US agreed to de-escalate their trade war by significantly lowering tariffs for each other for 90 days. The US agreed to lower its 145% tariff to 30%; China reduced its retaliatory 125% tariff to 10% after the Geneva meeting. According to a US-China joint declaration, China also agreed to adopt all necessary administrative measures to suspend or remove the non-tariff countermeasures taken against the US since April 2, 2025. Immediately thereafter, many Chinese pundits said China does not need to relax its key minerals export rules, as the US-China joint declaration did not state which non-tariff countermeasures would be canceled. 'The current situation is interesting. The US got a trade agreement with China but failed to get what it wanted most,' a Hebei-based columnist wrote in an article on May 13. 'Tariff matters are about money, but key minerals are related to national security, and there is no room for bargaining for this.' The writer said the Americans thought they had found China's weak spot, but they hit a wall. In fact, on May 9, the Office of the National Export Control Coordination Mechanism and several government departments held a meeting in Shenzhen about combating the smuggling of strategic minerals. According to the meeting, the government will take adequate measures to promote and regulate the enforcement of export controls on strategic mineral resources. It will also enhance implementation and refine institutional frameworks regarding methods, scope, timing and intensity. On May 19, China's Cailian Press reported that at least six Chinese companies were granted licenses to export seven types of medium and heavy niche minerals, including samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium. The seven types of minerals are raw materials used for producing parts for fighter jets, submarines, missiles and radars. China announced the export controls on these minerals on April 4, following Trump's imposition of reciprocal tariffs globally on Liberation Day on April 2. Cailian Press added that obtaining a license takes 45 to 60 days, and exporters must apply for a new license if the formulas of their products change. They also need to seek approval for each shipment. 'We should adopt a dual-track strategy that bans the export of China's key minerals to the US but relaxes the export to the European Union,' Li Jian, a Shanxi-based columnist, writes in an article on June 2. 'Practically, we will loosen our key mineral export controls for the EU companies willing to share technologies with China, such as photoresist formula and magnet designs,' Li says. 'Whoever follows the United States' call to ban Huawei's equipment will receive fewer niche minerals from China,' he says. 'EU firms will then realise whether they should do business with the US or China.' He says China will build facilities in friendly countries, such as Hungary, to refine its key minerals, making it difficult for the US to intervene. After Washington reached a trade deal with Beijing on May 12, Bessent said the US did not want a generalized decoupling from China, but rather a 'strategic decoupling', particularly in the steel, critical medicines, and semiconductor sectors. On May 13, the US Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security rescinded the Biden administration's AI Diffusion Rule, and replaced it with three guidelines to forbid companies from: -using Huawei's Ascend chips, -deploying US chips to help Chinese firms train their AI models, or -re-exporting US high-end chips to China. On May 23, the US government informed the Electronic Design Automation industry about new export controls on electronic design automation (EDA) software to China and Chinese military end-users globally. The US also suspended the supply of CFM LEAP-1C engines, which power China's Comac C919 jets. 'What the US does overstretches the concept of national security, politicizes and weaponizes trade and tech issues, and is a malicious attempt to block and suppress China,' Lin Jin, a spokesperson of the Chinese foreign ministry, said on May 30. However, he said China is ready to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on export controls with relevant countries and regions to stabilize global industrial and other supply chains. Read: US eases trade war, pursues 'strategic decoupling' from China
