Declassified 1993 CIA study on the possibility of war between India and Pakistan

Indian Express

04-05-2025

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has recently declassified a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) prepared by it in 1993 to evaluate the possibility of war between India and Pakistan in the 1990s. The document was cleared to be released in February 2025 and is now available on US government websites. With India and Pakistan locked in yet another confrontation, which may bring the two countries to war or at least on the brink of it, it is interesting to notice that many of the postulates mentioned in the three-decades-old dossier still hold true.
While the NIE gave a low probability of a conventional war taking place between the two countries in that period of time, it rates the possibility of war between India and Pakistan as about 1 in 5. It also pointed out that war could still happen due to a variety of factors, one of which could be a 'spectacular terror outrage that one side believed the other directed or abetted'.
'Indian security personnel are fighting an insurgency (in Jammu and Kashmir) that appears to have no end. Firing incidents along the Line of Control are common, particularly in the spring when militants begin their seasonal infiltrations across the Line of Control. In our judgment, Indian security forces can prevent Kashmir's secession or its acquisition by Pakistan, but these forces will not be able to defeat the insurgency in this decade,' the NIE says.
It goes on to say that Kashmiri militants have the staying power to tie down substantial numbers of Indian security personnel. 'New Delhi will continue efforts begun last spring to establish a dialogue with Kashmiris with the goal of ultimately holding state elections. New Delhi hopes that divisions among the militants and war weariness among Kashmiris will work in its favor. These efforts to restart the political process in the war-torn state probably will falter because Kashmiri moderates have been weakened by New Delhi's tough security policies and because Kashmiri hardliners are intransigent,' the report says.
It mentions that Pakistan uses the Kashmir issue as a foreign policy bludgeon against India. Whenever discontent in Jammu and Kashmir erupts, Islamabad highlights the problem and demands international action favourable to Pakistan's interests in the dispute, the report says.
pointed out that war could still happen due to a variety of factors, one of which could be a 'spectacular terror outrage that one side believed the other directed or abetted'. (Express Photo)
'New Delhi and Islamabad are unlikely to stop supporting secessionist and other militants in each other's territory. Pakistan has had a more aggressive campaign than has India. Pakistan wants the secession of Kashmir and has a receptive audience there. India has supported ethnic separatists in Pakistan, but the effort has been comparatively small. India has no desire to annex Pakistani territory. Both sides will be wary that extremist attacks could invite military retaliation or US sanctions,' says the report.
'War is probably not on the horizon'
The NIE says that despite these flashpoints, overall, the possibility of war between India and Pakistan is about 1 in 5 for the following reasons:
Leaders on each side will fear the other's nuclear weapons potential and thus will be cautious about risking a conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level.
Key Indian and Pakistani leaders are deeply concerned that a fourth war cannot be kept limited.
The likely deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and development of nuclear warheads before the end of the decade will increase bilateral tensions but should, in the long run, provide a more credible deterrent, particularly for Pakistan.
Military leaders will exercise caution because they know they cannot achieve victory at an acceptable cost. Both militaries will remain ill-equipped for war. Budget constraints, supply disruptions, and the burden of internal security duties will continue to undermine readiness.
India outnumbers Pakistan in almost every category of military capability – a disparity not likely to change in this decade. India, however, has no overriding strategic interest in initiating a war with Pakistan.
Pakistani military leaders probably believe that another conflict with India could well destroy the Pakistan military, if not the state.
'But war may still break out'
The NIE also gives out arguments in support of its hypothesis on why war could still break out between India and Pakistan. It states that Pakistani war plans call for pre-emptive strikes against Indian forces if Pakistani leaders are convinced an all-out attack is imminent because Pakistan lacks the strategic depth to absorb such an attack.
The report says war could also take place under the following conditions:
If India's military leaders were convinced – rightly or wrongly – that Pakistani units were preparing another conventional assault on Kashmir, they probably would order armoured strike units into wartime positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. That, in turn, would prompt Pakistani counter moves.
A spectacular terrorist outrage that one side believed the other directed or abetted.
An Indian military cross-border action, for example, to close infiltration routes along the Line of Control or to punish Pakistan for supporting terrorism.
The NIE also touches upon the two incidents, which had taken place a few years earlier, that brought the two countries to the brink of war.
'Indo-Pakistani crises of 1987 and 1990 were symptomatic of the deep suspicions each side harbors about the other's intentions. In early 1987, India's BRASSTACKS military exercises precipitated a high-stakes game of military brinkmanship.
'Diplomatic intervention by Pakistan's martial law ruler defused tensions and allowed both sides to step back from the brink. Two years later, Pakistan staged its own major exercise, 'Strike of the Believers' (Exercise Zarb-e-Momin),' the NIE says.
The NIE says the 1990 crisis stemmed from India's deployment of additional troops to Kashmir. 'The Pakistan Army's subsequent preparations for a major summer training exercise – probably intended to send a message to New Delhi – and Indian assessments of unusually large Pakistani force deployments in late April caused alarm in New Delhi. India then deployed armored, artillery, and infantry units closer to the border,' it says.