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Indian Express
04-05-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Declassified 1993 CIA study on the possibility of war between India and Pakistan
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has recently declassified a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) prepared by it in 1993 to evaluate the possibility of war between India and Pakistan in the 1990s. The document was cleared to be released in February 2025 and is now available on US government websites. With India and Pakistan locked in yet another confrontation, which may bring the two countries to war or at least on the brink of it, it is interesting to notice that many of the postulates mentioned in the three-decades-old dossier still hold true. While the NIE gave a low probability of a conventional war taking place between the two countries in that period of time, it rates the possibility of war between India and Pakistan as about 1 in 5. It also pointed out that war could still happen due to a variety of factors, one of which could be a 'spectacular terror outrage that one side believed the other directed or abetted'. 'Indian security personnel are fighting an insurgency (in Jammu and Kashmir) that appears to have no end. Firing incidents along the Line of Control are common, particularly in the spring when militants begin their seasonal infiltrations across the Line of Control. In our judgment, Indian security forces can prevent Kashmir's secession or its acquisition by Pakistan, but these forces will not be able to defeat the insurgency in this decade,' the NIE says. It goes on to say that Kashmiri militants have the staying power to tie down substantial numbers of Indian security personnel. 'New Delhi will continue efforts begun last spring to establish a dialogue with Kashmiris with the goal of ultimately holding state elections. New Delhi hopes that divisions among the militants and war weariness among Kashmiris will work in its favor. These efforts to restart the political process in the war-torn state probably will falter because Kashmiri moderates have been weakened by New Delhi's tough security policies and because Kashmiri hardliners are intransigent,' the report says. It mentions that Pakistan uses the Kashmir issue as a foreign policy bludgeon against India. Whenever discontent in Jammu and Kashmir erupts, Islamabad highlights the problem and demands international action favourable to Pakistan's interests in the dispute, the report says. pointed out that war could still happen due to a variety of factors, one of which could be a 'spectacular terror outrage that one side believed the other directed or abetted'. (Express Photo) 'New Delhi and Islamabad are unlikely to stop supporting secessionist and other militants in each other's territory. Pakistan has had a more aggressive campaign than has India. Pakistan wants the secession of Kashmir and has a receptive audience there. India has supported ethnic separatists in Pakistan, but the effort has been comparatively small. India has no desire to annex Pakistani territory. Both sides will be wary that extremist attacks could invite military retaliation or US sanctions,' says the report. 'War is probably not on the horizon' The NIE says that despite these flashpoints, overall, the possibility of war between India and Pakistan is about 1 in 5 for the following reasons: Leaders on each side will fear the other's nuclear weapons potential and thus will be cautious about risking a conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level. Key Indian and Pakistani leaders are deeply concerned that a fourth war cannot be kept limited. The likely deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and development of nuclear warheads before the end of the decade will increase bilateral tensions but should, in the long run, provide a more credible deterrent, particularly for Pakistan. Military leaders will exercise caution because they know they cannot achieve victory at an acceptable cost. Both militaries will remain ill-equipped for war. Budget constraints, supply disruptions, and the burden of internal security duties will continue to undermine readiness. India outnumbers Pakistan in almost every category of military capability – a disparity not likely to change in this decade. India, however, has no overriding strategic interest in initiating a war with Pakistan. Pakistani military leaders probably believe that another conflict with India could well destroy the Pakistan military, if not the state. 'But war may still break out' The NIE also gives out arguments in support of its hypothesis on why war could still break out between India and Pakistan. It states that Pakistani war plans call for pre-emptive strikes against Indian forces if Pakistani leaders are convinced an all-out attack is imminent because Pakistan lacks the strategic depth to absorb such an attack. The report says war could also take place under the following conditions: If India's military leaders were convinced – rightly or wrongly – that Pakistani units were preparing another conventional assault on Kashmir, they probably would order armoured strike units into wartime positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. That, in turn, would prompt Pakistani counter moves. A spectacular terrorist outrage that one side believed the other directed or abetted. An Indian military cross-border action, for example, to close infiltration routes along the Line of Control or to punish Pakistan for supporting terrorism. The NIE also touches upon the two incidents, which had taken place a few years earlier, that brought the two countries to the brink of war. 'Indo-Pakistani crises of 1987 and 1990 were symptomatic of the deep suspicions each side harbors about the other's intentions. In early 1987, India's BRASSTACKS military exercises precipitated a high-stakes game of military brinkmanship. 'Diplomatic intervention by Pakistan's martial law ruler defused tensions and allowed both sides to step back from the brink. Two years later, Pakistan staged its own major exercise, 'Strike of the Believers' (Exercise Zarb-e-Momin),' the NIE says. The NIE says the 1990 crisis stemmed from India's deployment of additional troops to Kashmir. 'The Pakistan Army's subsequent preparations for a major summer training exercise – probably intended to send a message to New Delhi – and Indian assessments of unusually large Pakistani force deployments in late April caused alarm in New Delhi. India then deployed armored, artillery, and infantry units closer to the border,' it says.
Time of India
02-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Pak may go for pre-emptive strikes against India in face of imminent war: US intel forecast
Guwahati: A recently declassified US intelligence report of 1993 evaluating the years ahead assessed that Pakistani war plans call for pre-emptive strikes against Indian forces if its leaders are convinced an all-out attack is imminent because it lacks the strategic depth to absorb such an attack and underlined that "intelligence failures could prove disastrous." Tired of too many ads? go ad free now The analysts in the report said, "If India's military leaders were convinced, rightly or wrongly, that Pakistani units were preparing another conventional assault on Kashmir, they probably would order armored strike units into wartime positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. That, in tum would prompt Pakistan countermoves." These forecasts were made by the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in its report, "India-Pakistan: Prospects for War in the 1990s", which added that in the event of a war, US believed "there was a strong possibility that such a conflict could lead to the use of nuclear weapons." Much of contents of the report was released by CIA in Feb in response to the National Security Archive's mandatory declassification review appeal. The analysts who authored the report found that heads of both countries want to avoid war, but underlined several events which could trigger an escalating confrontation, which include "a protracted surge of violence in ... Kashmir that threatened New Delhi's grip on the state." The report assessed that "India has no strategic interest in initiating a war with Pakistan" and "Pakistan has lost previous engagements, and its leaders probably believe another war could destroy the military or even the state." The report says existing crisis reduction mechanisms confidence building measures (CBMs) such as the military communications "hotline" between New Delhi and Islamabad, which have contributed to the lndo-Pakistani dialogue but "might prove irrelevant in a fast-moving crisis." Tired of too many ads? go ad free now It said that for US, its greatest concern is a breakdown of nuclear deterrence during a crisis. The report's "Indian and Pakistani Views on Nuclear Weapons" points out that India views nuclear weapons primarily as the coin of international power and prestige, deterrence against Pakistan, retaliation against a Pakistani first strike should deterrence fail, and a strategic equalizer with China. "India, though mindful of the high costs of a nuclear exchange, probably believes it could absorb a limited nuclear strike from Pakistan and then could retaliate" while "Pakistan sees nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent and as insurance for its survival if a conflict developed with conventionally superior India." The analysts have also assessed that "powers with interests in the region want stability" and are pushing the two sides to avoid war. "Russia no longer has a strategic reason to back India against Pakistan. China does not want instability nearby to distract it from domestic issues. Support for either side by Middle Eastern states is unlikely to be pivotal," the analysts add. On "complications for the United States", the analysts stated that India and Pakistan likely will seek US assistance in reducing the risk of inadvertent war and "yes, the two countries are not impervious to US pressure."
News18
02-05-2025
- Politics
- News18
Pakistan Fears India's Rise In 2025, Just Like US Intelligence Document Had Predicted In 1993
Last Updated: Pahalgam terror attack: From the triggers to the response and reactions, the US intelligence document is significant in view of the India-Pakistan current scenario The more things change, the more they remain the same — Pakistan fears India's rise, in 2025, just as it did in 1993. As the tension between the two countries escalate, the 32-year-old assessment of the India-Pakistan dynamic by the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which is available on the National Security Archive website, still holds true. From the triggers to the response and reactions, the US intelligence document is significant in view of the current scenario. On April 22, an attack on tourists in Pahalgam's Baisaran left 26 dead. The Resistance Front (TRF), a shadow group of the terrorist outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), claimed responsibility, leading to strong retaliatory measures by India. Meanwhile, Pakistan, despite the incitement by its Army chief, denies its involvement. Among the flashpoints for a war, it stated 'a spectacular terrorist outrage that one side believed the other directed or abetted". The conclusion in the document, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), was even more apt. 'If war erupts, it will likely start with something like Kashmir, and Pakistan will be on the back foot from the beginning." 'INDIA OUTNUMBERS PAK IN MILITARY CAPABILITY' The NIE was prepared by Bruce Riedel, a seasoned CIA analyst, when India had just experienced the Babri Masjid demolition (1992), and Pakistan was facing internal instability. Nuclear weapons were not yet tested. The document noted that neither India nor Pakistan wanted war. However, Pakistan, feeling overshadowed by India's growing power, was likely to act out of fear. This included supporting proxy groups in Kashmir or forming alliances with terrorists to counter India's influence. The CIA analysts saw a '20 per cent" chance of full-scale war, but were concerned about a potential chain reaction. The document listed a few triggers: A protracted surge of violence in Indian Kashmir that threatened New Delhi's grip on the state. Large-scale military exercises in border areas, especially if one or both sides deliberately evaded prior notification requirements. A spectacular terrorist outrage that one side believed the other directed or abetted. An Indian military cross-border action, for example, to close infiltration routes along the Line of Control or to punish Pakistan for supporting terrorism. Protracted Hindu-Muslim carnage that spilled across the border. The report warned of Pakistan's strategy of arming and training anti-India militants to 'liberate Kashmir." Sounds familiar? 'Pakistan sees nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent and as insurance for its survival if a conflict developed with conventionally superior India…," it added, in a bleak reminder of Pakistan Minister Hanif Abbasi's recent threat of 130 nukes. THE REACTION The document said 'most other Islamic states will give lip service to Pakistan's position on Kashmir, but will not risk mortgaging their relationship with India". 'Rapid Indian military improvements would strain Pakistan's ability to remain competitive. Islamabad would feel even more threatened by India's growing military edge and would rely more heavily on nuclear deterrence. As a last resort, a desperate government in Islamabad also might consider an extreme measure such as openly deploying nuclear weapons," it said. India was led at the time by Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and was growing. In contrast, Pakistan oscillated between military rule, political crises, and economic turmoil. The 1993 document predicted: 'Under certain extreme conditions, for instance, economic collapse and/ or a military dictator joining with militants-an Islamist government could be formed in Pakistan. A radical government almost certainly would establish an Islamic system of government based on its interpretation of shariah law and Islamic values. Such a regime would champion the cause of India's Muslims…It also would promote the liberation of Kashmir by openly arming and training anti-Indian militants." THE US top videos View all The NIE was to brief the White House and State Department. Then US president Bill Clinton visited India in 2000, coinciding with the Chittisinghpura massacre, where Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) killed 35 Sikh villagers. The CIA had a word of caution for the US. 'Confidence-building measures like hotlines and nuclear pacts were useful but might prove irrelevant in a real crisis. Verification was weak, and trust was thin. Once violence began, leaders would rely on instinct rather than protocol," it said. First Published: May 02, 2025, 17:42 IST News world Pakistan Fears India's Rise In 2025, Just Like US Intelligence Document Had Predicted In 1993
NDTV
01-05-2025
- Politics
- NDTV
A 1993 Declassified CIA Document That Exposes Pakistan's Fear Of India
New Delhi: The terrorist attack on tourists in Pahalgam's Baisaran Valley left 26 people dead and over 20 were wounded. A meadow where families came to rest became a burial ground for their loved ones. The Resistance Front (TRF), a group believed to be an offshoot of the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and backed by Pakistan's deep state, is linked to the attack. Pakistan denies involvement. The script is familiar. But behind this latest tragedy lies a decades-old reality - one that the US intelligence saw coming. In 1993, the CIA declassified a secret assessment. Buried inside it is the idea that Pakistan fears India. Not just economically or militarily, but existentially. The document, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), studied the India-Pakistan dynamic and offered one conclusion: if war erupts, it will likely start with something like Kashmir, and Pakistan will be on the back foot from the beginning. The 1993 Forecast The NIE was prepared under Bruce Riedel, a seasoned CIA hand. It came at a time when India had just seen the demolition of the Babri Masjid (1992), and Pakistan was grappling with internal instability. Nuclear weapons were a silent threat, not yet tested, but very real. The CIA analysts saw a slim "20 per cent" chance of full-scale war. But what worried them was the chain reaction - miscalculation, provocation, retaliation. A major terrorist incident, a misread military exercise, or sudden communal riots could trigger it. The document also noted something critical - neither India nor Pakistan wanted war. But Pakistan, feeling dwarfed by India's growing power, was likely to act out of fear. This included supporting proxy groups in Kashmir or forming informal alliances with terrorists to offset India's influence. The report didn't name TRF. That group didn't exist back then. But it warned of Pakistan's strategy of arming and training anti-India terrorists to "liberate Kashmir." Pakistan's Strategic Fear At the core of the CIA report was an uncomfortable truth for Islamabad. The balance of power had already tilted in India's favour. Economically, militarily, and diplomatically, New Delhi was rising, and Pakistan couldn't catch up. The gap wasn't just in firepower; it was also in stability. India, for all its internal challenges, had stable governments and a growing economy. India was, at the time, led by Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao, with Dr Manmohan Singh as the finance minister. Pakistan oscillated between military rule, political crises, and economic breakdowns. Fear, not confidence, drove its Kashmir policy. The CIA assessment explicitly said that a shift in military balance could push Pakistan to open nuclear deployment or seek asymmetric warfare. That included terrorism - low-cost, high-impact operations designed to bleed India without open confrontation. The 1993 document predicted that Pakistan might embrace Islamism not out of belief but as a tool. If an economic collapse came, or if a military dictator took charge, Pakistan could "join with militants" to distract the public and provoke India. It also warned that India's domestic politics - if dominated by religious polarisation - could fuel more communal unrest, making Pakistan's meddling easier to justify at home. The US' Role The NIE wasn't just for internal CIA use. It was meant to brief the White House and State Department. Bill Clinton had taken office, and South Asia was gaining attention. The former US President would visit India seven years later in 2000, right on the day of the Chittisinghpura Massacre, where Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) killed 35 Sikh villagers. The CIA warned to be careful. Confidence-building measures like hotlines and nuclear pacts were useful, but in a real crisis, they "might prove irrelevant." Verification was weak. Trust was thinner. Once violence began, leaders would rely on instinct, not protocol. The NIE also captured what the Pahalgam attack has now reignited: "a spectacular terrorist outrage that one side could attribute to the other" might be all it takes. Today, in Delhi, policymakers are flipping through that same scenario. More than thirty years later, the 1993 CIA document reads less like a historical paper and more like a warning label for the present.
Time of India
23-04-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Conflict With India could destroy Pak military, if not state: Declassified 1993 CIA documents
(You can now subscribe to our (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel Pakistan's military leadership probably believes that another conflict with India could destroy the Pakistani military, if not the entire state, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) said in a secret report in 1993, which has recently been a detailed assessment of the India, Pakistan military balance, economic growth and political atmosphere, the US agency estimated that the chances of an all-out conflict are only 20%, but this could be upended by events like a "spectacular terror outrage" that one side believed the other abetted. The 1993 National Intelligence Estimate titled 'India-Pakistan: Prospects for War in the 1990s', published by the National Security Archive after a declassification appeal, said India had no strategic interest in initiating a war and that Pakistan had lost the previous engagement and would be worried that a conflict could destroy the state. The assessment also factored in nuclear weapons that were then under development by both states and said that "Pakistan sees nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent and as insurance for its survival if a conflict developed with conventionally superior India". While it considered the possibility of an all-out conflict low, the assessment spelt out several scenarios in which an escalating confrontation could be triggered. Besides a spectacular terror attack, these included Indian military action."An Indian military cross-border action, for example, to close infiltration routes along the Line of Control or to punish Pakistan for supporting terrorism," it CIA also said that if India escalates its conventional superiority over Pakistan - as has been the case for the past two decades - the possibility of a nuclear threat could be exercised. "Rapid Indian military improvements would strain Pakistan's ability to remain competitive. Islamabad would feel even more threatened by India's growing military edge and would rely more heavily on nuclear deterrence. As a last resort, a desperate government in Islamabad also might consider an extreme measure such as openly deploying nuclear weapons," the CIA said in the secret 1993 report.
