
Philippines pulls Asean card on East Timor over extradition row. Will it work?
Referring to the move by Asia's youngest country to seek entry into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Manila's Justice Secretary Jesus Crispin Remulla said it was 'not going to be pleasant for East Timor', citing how the Philippines was 'one of the founding fathers of Asean'.
The saga centres on a Timorese court approving an appeal by Arnolfo Teves Jnr, a former Philippine House of Representatives member, to block his extradition to his home country. Teves is accused of murdering his political rival Negros Oriental governor Roel Degamo and eight other people in 2023.
The Philippines founded Asean with Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in 1967. Brunei, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia joined in the following years.
East Timor was granted observer status in Asean after its secession from Indonesia in 2002, with the bloc in 2022 agreeing 'in principle' to admit the country, allowing it access to the bloc's high-level meetings.
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