India's Kargil moment

Express Tribune

18-05-2025

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After Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 in response to India's detonations, it was widely believed that the two countries would no longer engage in a war due to the fear of nuclear catastrophe. This belief led to a historic development when then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee travelled to Lahore by bus, in a landmark visit aimed at opening a new chapter in the bilateral relations.
During this visit, both sides agreed to resolve all outstanding issues, including the longstanding Kashmir dispute. Pakistan's decision to go nuclear appeared to have paid strategic dividends. India had realised that with Pakistan's nuclear capability, conventional war was no longer a viable option. This was seen as a significant strategic advantage for Pakistan.
However, a few Generals led by then Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf had different ideas. They believed that conventional war — whether limited or full-scale — was off the table due to Pakistan's nuclear deterrence. This flawed assumption led to the Kargil misadventure. Musharraf and his aides believed that Pakistani forces could occupy the Kargil peaks, overlooking a key highway connecting Srinagar with India, without provoking a strong response.
They were under the illusion that India, fearing nuclear escalation, would not retaliate. That illusion was shattered when India launched a full military response. Within months, Pakistan had squandered the strategic advantage it once held. The Kargil episode broke the deterrence myth, proving that limited conflict under a nuclear overhang was indeed possible. One of Musharraf's close aides, Lt Gen Jamshed Gulzar Kiani later admitted that Kargil was a blunder.
Fast forward 26 years, and the Modi government faced its own Kargil moment following the Pahalgam attack. In 1999, Pakistan had not only lost a strategic edge but also suffered international humiliation. India now appeared to have repeated the same mistake. Just as some Pakistani generals believed nuclear capability gave them the licence for reckless adventurism, India — boasting economic, military and diplomatic prowess — believed it could dominate Pakistan with impunity.
True that India has made significant strides economically, becoming the world's fifth-largest economy. And Pakistan, in contrast, has been grappling with persistent crises: political instability, economic vulnerability and resurging terrorism. Its global standing diminished to the point where even close allies in the Muslim world began taking it for granted.
Against this backdrop, India sought to set a new normal — conducting cross-border strikes under the pretext of targeting terror camps without facing a response from Pakistan. This miscalculation echoed the thinking of Pakistani generals in 1999. Put simply, it was a fight between a heavyweight and an underweight opponent.
The heavyweight was expected to knock out the weaker opponent in the very first round. The heavyweight landed a slap, but the underdog punched back so hard that it broke the heavyweight's nose. That's how legends are born — when the underdog defies expectations. This is precisely what transpired in the four-day war between Pakistan and India.
Pakistan prevailed on all three fronts — military, diplomatic and political. On the battlefield, Pakistan shot down six Indian fighter jets. On the diplomatic front, despite India's economic muscle and global influence, no major power explicitly backed New Delhi.
In contrast, China, Turkey and Azerbaijan openly supported Pakistan, while the US, EU and the UK adopted a neutral stance. On the political front, India's belligerence unexpectedly became a blessing in disguise for Pakistan's current leadership. The military regained its lost popularity, national morale soared, and a renewed sense of resolve and unity took hold.
Even countries that had started taking Pakistan for granted are now reassessing their stance. When even Christine Fair, one of the most vocal critics of Pakistan, admits that Islamabad came out on top in this confrontation, it should settle the debate over who won and who lost.