Poll: Japanese opinion of South Korea up from 10 years prior
This latest joint public opinion survey was conducted by The Asahi Shimbun and South Korea's Dong-A Ilbo to mark the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea.
On the Japanese side, those who said they 'like' South Korea increased from 10 percent in 2015 to 19 percent this time around. Those who felt that Japan–South Korea relations are 'going well' rose from 7 percent to 29 percent.
Even so, views on the future of the bilateral relationship remained mostly unchanged from a decade ago, with only 17 percent of Japanese respondents believing ties will move in a 'positive direction.'
BILATERAL FEELINGS IMPROVED
This year's survey was conducted by phone in both countries, while the 2015 joint survey relied on the post on the Japanese side, making a direct comparison of the figures difficult.
However, compared to the strained relations at that time, in the wake of events such as the 2012 visit by then South Korean President Lee Myung-bak to Takeshima, known as Dokdo in South Korea, and the 2013 visit by then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Yasukuni Shrine, current relations appear more favorable.
On the South Korean side, those who said they 'like' Japan increased from 5 percent in the previous survey to 23 percent. Those who said they 'dislike' Japan dropped from 50 percent to 23 percent, while those who answered 'neither' increased from 43 percent to 54 percent.
In Japan, older age groups were less favorable toward South Korea 10 years ago. However, in the survey this time, age differences were small, except that only 12 percent of respondents in their 40s answered that they like South Korea.
Twenty-two percent of those in their 60s and the same ratio of those in their 30s answered that they liked South Korea.
The proportion of people who said they 'dislike' South Korea was especially low among those in their 30s and younger, at around 5 percent. Among older generations, the figure was around 15 percent, with little variation by age.
When asked about the current state of Japan–South Korea relations, 29 percent of Japanese respondents said the relationship was 'going well,' while 50 percent said it was 'not going well.'
In the previous survey, those figures were 7 percent and 86 percent, respectively. So, the survey this time showed a significant improvement.
On the South Korean side, 3 percent of the respondents said it was 'going well' and 90 percent said it was 'not going well' the last time. But the numbers shifted to 26 percent and 59 percent, respectively, this time.
However, when asked about the future of Japan--South Korea relations, Japanese optimism remained low. Only 17 percent responded that the relationship would go in a 'positive direction,' nearly unchanged from the 15 percent of 10 years ago.
Those who said it would go in a 'negative direction' was 14 percent, which increased from 10 percent in 2015, and those who believed it would 'remain the same' were 61 percent, decreased from 67 percent in 2015.
While the Japanese outlook for future Japan–South Korea relations remains cautious, South Korean respondents showed a more positive trend.
Those who said the relationship would move in a 'positive direction' doubled from 22 percent to 42 percent, making it the most common response. Those who expected it to worsen increased from 11 percent to 20 percent, and those who said it would remain the same dropped from 60 percent to 31 percent.
HISTORICAL TENSIONS REMAIN
In the joint poll, respondents were also asked about historical issues, including Japan's colonialization of the Korea Peninsula from 1910 to 1945.
In Japan, opinions were evenly split: 46 percent respondents said the issues had been 'resolved,' while the same percentage of respondents said they had 'not been resolved.'
In South Korea, 17 percent said the issues had been 'resolved,' up from 2 percent a decade ago, while those who said they had 'not been resolved' dropped from 95 percent to 80 percent.
Although there are signs of a shift toward a more future-oriented perspective, a considerable gap in perceptions of historical issues still remains between the two countries.
This year's survey was conducted by telephone in both countries. In contrast, the 2015 joint survey was conducted via postal mail in Japan, so a direct numerical comparison is difficult. At that time, 49 percent of Japanese respondents said the issue had been resolved, while 42 percent said it had not.
Respondents were also asked whether they believed Japan had sufficiently apologized for its annexation of Korea and colonial rule.
In Japan, 67 percent said the country had 'apologized sufficiently,' while 22 percent said the apologies were 'still insufficient.' These numbers were similar to the 2015 results, with 65 percent and 20 percent, respectively.
In South Korea, 13 percent said Japan had 'apologized sufficiently,' while 85 percent said the apologies were 'still insufficient.'
These figures on the South Korean side reflect a certain degree of change from 10 years ago when 1 percent were satisfied with the apology and 96 percent said it was not enough.
However, the majority still believe Japan's attempts to make amends are not enough.
Regarding the historical issues in Japan–South Korea relations, the two governments agreed at the end of 2015 that the issue of wartime 'comfort women' was 'finally and irreversibly resolved.'
Despite this shared official stance, strong domestic criticism in South Korea against the agreement has been persistent, and effectively became a mere formality following the change in the South Korean administration in 2017.
Regarding the issue of wartime mobilized workers, the South Korean Supreme Court ordered Japanese companies to compensate the South Korean wartime laborers in 2018.
The companies did not comply with the order. Under then President Yoon Suk-yeol, the South Korean government proposed a solution in 2023 where a state-affiliated foundation would provide compensation on behalf of the Japanese companies, funded by donations.
FINDING PARTICIPANTS
On the Japanese side, The Asahi Shimbun carried out the survey with eligible voters on June 7 and 8, using both landline and mobile phone numbers that were randomly generated by computer. A total of 1,124 of 2,824 voters who received the phone call provided valid responses
The Dong-A Ilbo conducted the survey in South Korea through a private research institution. The survey was conducted on those 18 and older on June 9 and 10 using mobile phone numbers that were also randomly generated by computer.
A total of 1,010 of 13,828 people who received the phone call provided valid answers to the survey.
(This article was written by Yasuhito Watanabe and Nozomi Matsui.)
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