Defusing the PMN-2 dispute between Cambodia and Thailand: Why the GBC Must Move Fast — Phar Kim Beng

Malay Mail

2 days ago

AUG 11 — Any ceasefire will always have spoilers. Not all guns can stay silent immediately.
The Cambodian–Thai border is once again under the shadow of an old but lethal danger: landmines. Stealth-like but supremely dangerous in breaking the ceasefire into ramparts at different flash points of Cambodia and Thai borders.
The latest dispute — allegations that Cambodia has deployed PMN-2 anti-personnel mines, which the Chief of Royal Thai Army strongly opposes — has the potential to unravel the fragile peace secured in the July 28, 2025 ceasefire agreement; which was further reinforced in Kuala Lumpur on August 4-8 2025.
The General Border Committee (GBC), now tasked with operationalising that truce, faces its first real test of whether Asean's centrality in conflict management can deliver more than symbolic breakthroughs.
The PMN-2 is not just another mine; it is one of the most infamous in the world.
Originating from Soviet military production in the mid-20th century, the PMN-2 was designed for simplicity of deployment and devastating impact. It contains a large explosive charge for its size, triggered by minimal pressure, ensuring injury — often amputation — rather than instant death.
While the Cold War justified its use in Soviet doctrine, in today's Southeast Asia it has no place in any arsenal. The Ottawa Treaty of 1997, which Cambodia ratified, outlaws such weapons, and their manufacture or import should be prohibited under regional law. Allowing their presence legitimises an indiscriminate device that continues to maim civilians decades after conflicts end.
An anti-government protester holds Thai national flag during a rally to condemn war with Cambodia and demand the resignation of Thailand? suspended prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, at Victory Monument in Bangkok on August 2, 2025. — AFP pic
The GBC must therefore move quickly and decisively. This is not a dispute that can be left to languish in committees or shuttle diplomacy.
Every day that suspected minefields remain uncleared is a day when a farmer's step or a child's misstep could shatter a family. Immediate measures are necessary — not just to remove the current threat, but to ensure such incidents never recur.
The first step is to launch a joint technical verification mission. Both Phnom Penh and Bangkok should agree to inspections by neutral, internationally accredited demining experts, perhaps from the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) or the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. Without a shared baseline of facts, negotiations collapse into accusation and denial.
Second, the GBC should require full mapping of all suspected minefields, drawing on military records from Cambodia and intelligence from Thailand.
These maps should be digitised and shared with both militaries and Asean's Interim Monitoring Teams to guide clearance operations and reduce civilian exposure.
Third, there must be a phased clearance schedule, prioritising high-traffic civilian areas and farmland. Joint inspections after each phase should confirm that no active devices remain, with clearance data made public to sustain transparency and trust.
Fourth, Asean should integrate mine action into its ceasefire monitoring mandate. The July 28 Putrajaya Agreement focused on troop withdrawals and heavy weapons; it should now expand to track and verify landmine removals, linking security enforcement with humanitarian safety.
Fifth, both sides must sign a binding 'no-replant' pledge, witnessed by the Asean Chair and relevant defence attachés (DA). Re-mining after clearance is not only a breach of the Ottawa Treaty but a betrayal that would collapse the ceasefire's credibility.
Sixth, the GBC should create a high and enforceable repayment mechanism for violations. Any party found planting new PMN-2s after the agreement should face penalties so severe — financially and diplomatically — that the act becomes strategically irrational. These repayments should be channelled into victim assistance funds and regional demining programmes, with Asean acting as the guarantor. The amount must be high enough to deter not only state orders but also rogue field commanders from contemplating their use.
Seventh, the GBC should launch community awareness campaigns along the border in local languages, using radio broadcasts, illustrated warnings, and village outreach. Too many landmine casualties occur because civilians unknowingly enter contaminated zones.
Eighth, Cambodia and Thailand should invest in advanced detection technologies, such as drones with ground-penetrating radar or AI-enhanced image analysis. Even use GPS softwares that can be downloaded into the phones of the soldiers and the people alike to stay away from the mines within a radius of 1 KM or bigger.
Asean's Dialogue Partners — Japan, South Korea, and even the EU — could be approached to fund these systems as part of their humanitarian cooperation portfolios.
Ninth, there must be a victim assistance programme that goes beyond emergency treatment.
Survivors need high quality prosthetics, physical rehabilitation, serious vocational retraining, and all round psychological support to reintegrate into society. Asean could pool resources with international donors to ensure no victim is left behind.
Finally, mine clearance must be linked with border economic development.
Clearing land should immediately open opportunities for cross-border trade, agriculture, and tourism that benefit both Cambodian and Thai communities. Such gains create tangible incentives for both sides to keep the border safe.
Embedding these measures in a legally binding bilateral protocol, lodged with Asean and recognised by relevant international bodies, will ensure they outlast political transitions in either country. This formalisation is vital in a region where leadership changes can otherwise disrupt fragile agreements.
Asean's credibility is now tied to how quickly and effectively the GBC acts. The July ceasefire was hailed as a triumph of quiet, firm facilitation under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's chairmanship. But a truce is only the beginning.
If the landmine issue festers, the perception of Asean as an effective mediator will weaken, and external powers could step in under the pretext of humanitarian intervention, complicating the strategic environment.
More importantly, the PMN-2 dispute is a chance for Asean to set a precedent. If Cambodia and Thailand can move from accusation to cooperation — fact-finding, mapping, clearing, pledging, penalising, educating, innovating, assisting, developing, and formalising — they can show that even the most entrenched security disputes can be resolved through humanitarian-driven diplomacy.
The alternative is grim. Delay would embolden sceptics who say Asean cannot handle hard security issues.
It would keep rural communities trapped in fear, their fields dotted with invisible killers. And it would normalise the quiet return of banned weapons into Southeast Asia's arsenals — a regression the region cannot afford.
The PMN-2, a relic of Cold War arsenals, should have no place in Asean's future. Its clearance from the Cambodian–Thai border is not just a matter of safety; it is a statement of principle that the region will not tolerate indiscriminate weapons, whether manufactured locally or imported covertly.
The GBC has the tools, the authority, and now the moral obligation to make that statement real — before another step on the wrong patch of earth turns peace into tragedy.
* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and Director of the Institute of Internationalization and Asean Studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.