Pakistan must not be allowed to evade terror accountability despite escalation risks

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India has to realise that once it takes kinetic action against Pakistan, the world wants a quick cessation of hostilities because it fears escalation. In this process Pakistan's terrorist action takes a back seat for the international community read more
India has to make the world more sensitive to the dangers of Pakistani terrorism and highlight that, notwithstanding the sophistry of the arguments put forward by its generals, India will not absorb terrorist acts or succumb to Pakistan's nuclear blackmail. AFP
The two senior-most defence officers of India and Pakistan — Chairman of Defence Staff Gen Anil Chauhan and Pakistan's Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Gen Sahir Shamshad Mirza — participated in the recently held Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. On the sidelines of the event, they gave separate interviews to Reuters on May 31.
The two generals were on the same page on the absence of nuclear signalling by Pakistan during the course of Operation Sindoor. Reuters quoted Gen Chauhan as saying, 'I think there's a lot of space before that nuclear threshold is crossed, a lot of signalling before that. I think nothing like that happened.' The same news agency then reported Gen Mirza saying, 'Nothing happened this time.' The agency further clarified that Gen Mirza stated that there was no move towards nuclear weapons during this conflict. As India has a no first use nuclear doctrine and Pakistan does not, any signal to get nuclear weapons into play can only come from Pakistan.
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While agreeing that no nuclear signal had been given during Operation Sindoor, Gen Chauhan and Gen Mirza differed greatly in their direct and indirect elaboration on the possibility of escalation during armed conflicts between India and Pakistan. The term escalation, in this context, refers to the possibility of conventional hostilities between nuclear countries leading to the use of nuclear weapons. The remarks of both generals on this subject would be closely studied worldwide by diplomats and scholars of security and strategic issues.
On escalation, Gen Chauhan said, 'It's my personal view that the most rational people are people in uniform when conflict takes place,' he added. 'During this operation, I found both sides displaying a lot of rationality in their thoughts as well as actions. So why should we assume that in the nuclear domain there will be irrationality on someone else's part?' Gen Chauhan implied that as nuclear weapons were meant not for war fighting but to prevent existential crises, it would be irrational and illogical for their use for offensive purposes. Therefore, his conviction remains that the 'rationality' of the Pakistani army would prevent it from using nuclear weapons.
Gen Mirza did not share Gen Chauhan's positive view about the rationality of 'people in uniform'. He stuck to Pakistan's position that India should not take kinetic action in response to terrorist strikes. Therefore, while noting that 'nothing happened this time', he added, 'But you can't rule out any strategic miscalculation at any time, because when the crisis is on, the responses are different.'
Mirza also dwelt on escalation during his participation in a panel on 'Regional Crisis—Management Mechanisms'. What he said in his statement, as well as in response to questions, needs to be carefully evaluated by Indian policy makers and academics. In order to appreciate their significance, it is essential to place them in the context of past Indian responses to Pakistani terrorist acts.
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Until the Uri terrorist attack of 2016, India avoided open kinetic action against Pakistani terrorism. It absorbed these attacks and broke off engagement with Pakistan till the anger of the Indian public subsided. Thereafter the bilateral dialogue process resumed. The major powers encouraged India to pursue such a path because they virtually accepted the Pakistani stand that kinetic action through conventional forces between nuclear powers risked escalation.
What the major powers ignored was that Pakistan had begun to use nuclear weapons as a shield to carry on terrorism against India. In fact, they overlooked their own doctrine that nuclear states cannot undertake provocative acts on each other's territories because it is too dangerous to do so. Indeed, after the heinous Mumbai terrorist attack of November 26, 2008, the Western powers accepted that Lashkar-e-Taiba was behind it. However, they virtually absolved the Pakistan state agencies of having any hand in it.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi changed the policy of absorbing terrorist attacks after the Uri incident. He sanctioned India's special forces to go into Pakistan-held territory of the then state of Jammu and Kashmir to undertake surgical strikes to hit Pakistani terrorist launch pads. Pakistan denied that India had undertaken any such action. This denial was obviously to protect its doctrine that a kinetic response by Indian conventional armed forces was escalatory. By denying the surgical strikes, the Pakistanis thought that the validity of their doctrine would not come into question.
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The luxury of denial was not available to Pakistan after India's Balakot strike in the wake of the Pulwama terrorist attack. It therefore claimed that it had achieved the upper hand by downing an Indian fighter aircraft and capturing Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman on its territory. It thereafter said that the major powers intervened to diffuse the situation and that, in a sign of goodwill, it quickly released the Indian officer. India said that it had also downed Pakistani aircraft and that it was its pressure which led Pakistan to agree to releasing the officer. India did not accept that foreign mediation resolved the situation but agreed that the major powers were in touch with it as with Pakistan.
The important point stressed by Pakistan was that Indian and Pakistani issues could not be resolved bilaterally but required foreign intervention and that hostilities post-Balakot were also diffused through foreign intervention. The significant point that India made through the Balakot action was that kinetic aerial action was possible as a response to Pakistan's terrorism. This meant that India had blown the lid off the Pakistani doctrine that the danger of escalation did not permit such kinetic action. As always, India also noted that it would not allow third parties to intervene in India-Pakistan issues.
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At the Shangri La Dialogue, Gen Mirza spelt out a modified Pakistani doctrine regarding the dangers of India's use of kinetic force. He argued that the post-Pahalgam situation had taken strategic stability between India and Pakistan to dangerously low levels. He said while in the past borders were targeted, on this occasion, cities were attacked. He went on to state that now not only the disputed territory (meaning the UTs of J&K and Ladakh) but the whole of India and Pakistan would be involved. This, he claimed, would be extremely detrimental to 'investments, trading and the development needs of 1.5 billion people'. He obviously implied that this negativity would impact both countries.
Mirza went on to assert, 'In future, given the Indian policies and the polity's extremist mindset and absence of crisis management mechanisms, we may not give enough time to the global powers to intervene and effect a cessation of hostilities. They will probably be too late to avert damage and destruction.' As Mirza had already ruled out the possibility that escalation could be stopped bilaterally between India and Pakistan and needed the intervention of global powers, what he actually signalled was that Pakistan may use nuclear weapons if it was rapidly suffering major losses in a conventional war. Thus, Pakistan was actually, once again, asserting that India should revert to its old policy of absorbing terrorist attacks. Mirza was also perhaps responding to PM Modi's declaration that India would not be deterred by Pakistani nuclear blackmail.
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India's strategic community has to effectively respond to this refined Pakistani doctrine which, at its kernel, is emphasising that a rapid escalation to the nuclear level may occur between India and Pakistan if India again uses kinetic force. And that the quick escalation may not give the international community time to diffuse the conflict during its conventional stage.
The real point that India has to forcefully articulate is that the first step on the escalatory ladder is a terrorist attack from Pakistan. Also, India as the victim cannot be equated with Pakistan, the perpetrator of terror. Hence, for strategic stability, Pakistan has to be compelled to give up terrorism. India will have to patiently and continuously make this point to move the international community to effectively pressurise Pakistan. Many countries may be inhibited from telling Pakistan to stop terror because of the nature of Sino-Pakistan ties.
India has to also realise that once it takes kinetic action against Pakistan, the world wants a quick cessation of hostilities because it fears escalation. In this process Pakistan's terrorist action takes a back seat for the international community. Hence, India has to make the world more sensitive to the dangers of Pakistani terrorism and highlight that, notwithstanding the sophistry of the arguments put forward by Mirza, India will not absorb terrorist acts or succumb to Pakistan's nuclear blackmail.
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The writer is a former Indian diplomat who served as India's Ambassador to Afghanistan and Myanmar, and as secretary, the Ministry of External Affairs. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.