Iran's uncertain place in the Middle East order - World - Al-Ahram Weekly

Al-Ahram Weekly

10-07-2025

For the US and Israel, transforming Iran's regional posture is a critical step towards consolidating a new Middle East order, but it is one fraught by complexities, writes Manal Lotfy
There is a sense of cautious optimism surrounding the prospect of renewed dialogue between Iran and the United States, with preparations quietly underway for talks expected to take place next week.
These would mark the first formal engagement between the two countries since the conclusion of the recent 12-day war between Iran and Israel, a conflict that also saw US airstrikes on three key Iranian nuclear facilities.
Subtle yet deliberate signals from both Tehran and Washington suggest that indirect contacts are already in progress, reportedly facilitated by Oman. Diplomatic sources indicate that efforts are focused on arranging a meeting between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff next week.
US President Donald Trump hinted at this possibility during his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House on Monday.
Earlier that same day, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian expressed Tehran's willingness to engage in talks with Washington but emphasised that trust has been deeply eroded by the recent US and Israeli attacks.
In an interview with conservative political commentator and Trump ally Tucker Carlson, Pezeshkian urged Trump not to be drawn into war by Israel, warning that the region's future hinges on US decisions. He accused Israel of sabotaging previous talks by launching strikes in mid-June that triggered a 12-day air war and killed top Iranian commanders and nuclear scientists.
Pezeshkian also claimed that Israel had attempted to assassinate him during its military strikes on Iran.
Meanwhile, Trump praised the US airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities as a 'tremendous success,' asserting that they had permanently set back Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
'That strike marked the beginning of the end,' he said in front of Netanyahu, adding that the US remains open to dialogue as Iran has 'requested a meeting' to negotiate. He emphasised that Tehran's posture has shifted significantly after the strikes. 'They're in a very different position now than they were two weeks ago,' he said.
While the exact agenda for the talks remains unspecified, the central issues are expected to be Iran's nuclear programme, its missile development, and its regional activities.
Nevertheless, the broader regional context will play a crucial role in shaping the US-Iran dialogue. Trump linked Iran's recalibration to a wider de-escalation across the Middle East, noting that respect for US and Israeli capabilities, has grown.
'Sometimes you need the rough time in order to get results,' he observed. Netanyahu, echoing the sentiment, stressed that security guarantees for Israel remain non-negotiable in any future peace framework.
The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has undergone a profound transformation since Hamas' 7 October 2023 military operations against Israel. From the collapse of former president Bashar Al-Assad's regime in Syria and the emergence of a government inclined towards normalisation with Israel, to the blows dealt to Hizbullah in Lebanon, the region's balance of power appears to be shifting.
With additional strikes on Iran's military and nuclear infrastructure, the 'axis of resistance' has come under immense pressure. Yet one formidable obstacle remains on the board – Iran.
Iran is not merely a regional power. It is the ideological and logistical nucleus of the resistance front opposing the US and Israeli vision for the region. Through its deep influence in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Gaza, Tehran has for decades woven a web of strategic alliances and ideological commitments that have frustrated US efforts to establish a regional order, one that fully integrates Israel regardless of the future of the Palestinians or a just resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
From the US and Israeli perspective, transforming Iran's regional posture is now the final critical step towards consolidating a new Middle East order. But this is no small task. The path forward is fraught with strategic, political, and historical complexities.
The Trump administration, like its predecessors, understands that a full-scale military campaign against Iran would be a Pandora's Box. While targeted strikes such as the recent US-Israeli operation against Iranian nuclear sites send a clear message of deterrence, they fall short of dismantling the broader strategic architecture Iran has constructed. Any direct military campaign risks spiralling into a regional war that could destabilise global energy markets, embolden hardliners in Tehran, and potentially push Iran to accelerate its nuclear programme.
Washington is also constrained by domestic politics. The American public, still scarred by the legacy of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, has little appetite for another open-ended conflict in the Middle East. Israeli leaders, though more aggressive rhetorically, understand the risks of a full confrontation. Their population, vulnerable to missile attacks from the Houthis in Yemen and Iran, may not tolerate a war of attrition with no guaranteed outcome.
Thus, the military track remains one of coercive diplomacy, not conquest. The goal is to degrade Iran's capabilities and coerce it into negotiations. The true endgame is diplomatic: to reshape Iran's behaviour and compel it to disengage from its revolutionary ideology.
It is within this strategic framework that new rounds of talks between Iran and the US are being considered, potentially in the coming few days. The timing is significant. Iran, reeling from economic sanctions, internal discontent, and now military strikes, faces mounting pressure both domestically and internationally.
The Iranians, particularly in urban centres, are exhausted by the economic suffocation of the sanctions and the endless cycle of confrontation. While hardliners dominate many political structures, the reformist movement remains ideologically committed to dialogue and normalisation with the West, believing Iran can preserve its sovereignty while ending its isolation.
Crucially, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, holds the final say. Historically sceptical of US intentions, his stance on engagement is shaped by both ideological conviction and strategic calculation. While Khamenei authorised the 2015 nuclear deal with the West (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA), he remained deeply wary of US promises, seemingly validated by the Trump administration's withdrawal from the agreement in 2018.
The recent US bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities, even if calculated to avoid full escalation, has only deepened this mistrust.
Despite criticism from some hardline factions over Pezeshkian's swift declaration of openness to dialogue, Iranian diplomatic sources told Al-Ahram Weekly that he had secured prior approval from Khamenei before making his remarks to Carlson. Pezeshkian, they affirmed, is acting well within the bounds set by the Supreme Leader.
'While the divisions between reformists and conservatives in Iran are often overstated, a deeper consensus prevails – distrust of the US runs deep across the political spectrum, yet the path to negotiations is ultimately seen as unavoidable,' an Iranian reformist source close to the Pezeshkian government told the Weekly.
He contended that the divergences among Iran's ruling elite do not stem from fundamental ideological rifts but reflect differing strategic assessments of what best serves Iran's national interests.
'Some within the regime may argue that accommodation with the West is not surrender, but survival. Others insist that any compromise is risky. This internal debate is healthy.' he added.
Pezeshkian's reformist allies also argue that diplomacy is pragmatic, given Iran's deepening economic crisis and the rapid, radical transformations reshaping the Middle East. While the president has cautiously framed talks to secure sanctions relief without surrendering core interests, the US and Israel may impose conditions too difficult for Tehran to accept.
For Iran to engage seriously in de-escalation talks with Washington, its demands would be significant and wide-ranging. The most immediate priority would be sanctions relief. No Iranian government, whether reformist or hardline, could justify concessions to its public without tangible economic benefits.
Beyond economics, Tehran would insist on recognition of its regional influence, seeking formal acknowledgement of its strategic interests in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon, potentially through guarantees for its allied factions. Iran would also require robust security assurances to prevent future regime-change efforts or military strikes, possibly through UN-backed agreements or regional security frameworks.
Central to any negotiations would be Iran's nuclear programme. Tehran would likely push for the restoration or modification of the JCPOA, demanding recognition of its right to peaceful nuclear energy under strict international oversight. Without these concessions – sanctions relief, regional legitimacy, security guarantees, and nuclear programme recognition – Iran has little incentive to pursue lasting de-escalation.
Yet, neither side fully trusts the other to uphold its end of any bargain. This is why any forthcoming negotiations will require not only bold diplomacy but also ironclad verification mechanisms, phased implementation, and possibly third-party guarantees from global powers such as the UN, China, and Russia.
Thus, whether Iran becomes the final piece on the Middle Eastern chessboard remains uncertain. The strategic conditions increasingly favour a regional order aligned with the US and Israeli vision. But without Iran's acquiescence or at least strategic recalibration, this order cannot be completed.
The next round of US-Iranian talks may well represent the first move in a historic endgame. Whether it leads to checkmate or stalemate will depend on whether the players can find common ground on the security and political arrangements that the US and Israel seek, despite believing, prematurely, that they have already removed most obstacles in their path.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 10 July, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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