
US military on an adapt-or-perish techno-precipice
The US Air Force's 2050 vision is more than a declaration—it's a stark warning that US military dominance is no longer assured.
In December 2024, the US Department of the Air Force (DAF) released a report envisioning a transformed military force by 2050, emphasizing space, artificial intelligence (AI), autonomy and long-range precision strikes to counter China's growing military challenge.
The report forecasts significant geopolitical, technological and strategic shifts, predicting China's emergence as a global military competitor while Russia remains a hostile but economically constrained power.
The DAF envisions a future battlefield shaped by AI-driven decision-making, autonomous weapons and space-based warfare, with operations increasingly contested in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.
To adapt, the US Air Force plans to shift from large, crewed platforms to a networked force integrating uncrewed systems and stand-off weapons. Simultaneously, the US Space Force will enhance surveillance, missile defense and combat operations to counter adversarial space threats.
The report stresses the urgency of continuous technological innovation to maintain strategic deterrence, particularly as China expands its military capabilities and nuclear arsenal. With traditional military advantages eroding, the DAF calls for decisive investment in new warfighting concepts to sustain US air and space dominance.
Integrating AI-driven battle management with hypersonic weapons aims to enhance US military operations but challenges remain regarding autonomy and system reliability. The DAF report envisions AI-driven battle management as the backbone of future combat.
As Matthew White argues in a December 2024 Wild Blue Yonder article, AI-enhanced systems will revolutionize battlefield awareness by integrating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) data, cutting decision-making cycles and automating targeting processes. However, as a SOFREP analysis warns, these systems remain error-prone and require continued human oversight to avoid catastrophic failures.
The push toward hypersonic weapons, as outlined in a January 2025 report by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS), complements this vision by ensuring that US long-range precision strikes can bypass sophisticated air defenses and neutralize threats before they can respond, reinforcing deterrence in contested regions.
Transitioning to a techno-centric force presents significant challenges, particularly in autonomy, AI and the logistics required to sustain distributed air operations.
A February 2024 Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) occasional paper by Paul O'Neill and others examines the resilience of uncrewed systems in high-intensity conflicts, emphasizing their vulnerability to electronic warfare, which could result in high attrition rates. While autonomy offers some mitigation, alternative navigation methods and target recognition remain limited, affecting engagement effectiveness.
The Agile Combat Employment (ACE) doctrine represents a fundamental shift in US airpower strategy, dispersing forces across a network of smaller, scalable bases to enhance survivability against long-range missile threats. This approach, supported by robust command and control (C2) networks, aims to ensure operational flexibility even in contested environments.
However, Michael Blaser cautions in a July 2024 Proceedings article that the ACE doctrine assumes adversaries—particularly China—cannot disrupt multiple US outposts simultaneously. With AI-enhanced targeting and machine learning algorithms, China is refining its ability to detect, track and neutralize dispersed US forces, forcing a reassessment of how ACE can be synchronized with long-range fires and resilient logistics.
Sustaining operations and deterrence requires countering advances in electronic warfare, counter-space capabilities, and doctrinal misalignment among US and allied forces.
The ACE doctrine reflects a growing shift in US airpower—from centralized air bases to a dispersed, resilient network. As Miranda Priebe and colleagues note in a July 2019 RAND report, dispersing air assets complicates enemy targeting and enhances survivability. However, the logistical burden of this model, particularly for short-range fighters, poses a vulnerability.
Space capabilities must be integrated with ground-based and space-based infrastructure to sustain distributed operations. The August 2023 Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force emphasizes the importance of resilient command, control and communications in contested environments.
These efforts align with the 2022 US National Defense Strategy, which incorporates cyber, space and non-kinetic measures to deter adversaries like China and Russia, strengthening deterrence through multinational coalitions and raising the costs of hostile actions.
While the US prioritizes space dominance, China and Russia actively develop counter-space weapons to challenge American superiority.
According to an April 2024 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, China is integrating jamming, directed-energy weapons and cyber warfare to disrupt US and allied space assets, while Russia's focus on electronic warfare and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems like the Peresvet laser underscores its emphasis on space denial.
These developments signal a broader shift: space is no longer a sanctuary but an increasingly contested domain where adversaries aim to degrade US surveillance, communications and missile defense networks in a future conflict.
Beyond operational challenges, institutional shortcomings in integrated deterrence further complicate strategic stability. In a May 2024 publication by the US Army Command and General Staff College, David Bell argues that strategic empathy—the ability to understand the perspectives of allies and partners—is underdeveloped, leading to misaligned expectations and inefficient resource allocation.
Similarly, Phillip Pattee highlights the absence of clearly prioritized national security interests, which creates operational uncertainty and complicates synchronization across agencies and allied forces. But the US must strategically adapt its military and nuclear deterrence posture to counter China's rising military power and maintain stability in a multipolar world.
The 2020 Elements of the China Challenge report identifies China as the foremost threat to US military superiority, citing the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) ambitions for regional dominance and a new global order. China continues to develop asymmetric capabilities in cyber, space and missile warfare, designed to surpass US technological advantages while deterring intervention in regional conflicts.
At the same time, maintaining a technological edge is central to US strategy. In a September 2024 Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) article, Mohammed Soliman and Vincent Carchidi note that Washington seeks to sustain military and technological superiority through export controls, domestic investments and strategic alliances. This strategy aims to restrict China's access to key technologies, strengthen supply chain resilience and foster a global tech coalition among allies.
The US nuclear deterrence posture is evolving to address the rise of multiple nuclear-armed adversaries, requiring a more flexible and adaptive approach.
An October 2023 US International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) report emphasizes the need for tailored deterrence, ensuring that deterrence strategies remain credible against China's expanding nuclear arsenal and Russia's modernization of its strategic forces. Simultaneously, the US must navigate arms control measures and risk reduction strategies, even as China and Russia resist formal engagement.
The future of US military dominance hinges on technology, policy and leadership. As George Rachman notes in a December 2024 Financial Times (FT) article, the second Trump administration introduces an element of unpredictability into this equation. Combined with intensifying great power competition, the coming years could determine whether the US remains the dominant military force or cedes strategic ground to its adversaries.

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Asia Times
5 days ago
- Asia Times
US plans nuclear buildup to check and deter China, Russia
With the New START treaty set to expire, the US Air Force is gearing up to surge warhead deployments to outmatch and deter nuclear rivals China and Russia. This month, Air & Space Forces Magazine reported that the US Air Force is prepared to expand its nuclear arsenal upon the expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026, according to General Thomas Bussiere, head of US Air Force Global Strike Command. Speaking at an Atlantic Council forum, Bussiere said that, if directed, the service could increase warhead deployments across its Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and bomber fleet. The nuclear arms control treaty, which has been in effect since 2011 and has limited the number of nuclear launchers in the US and Russia, will lapse following Russia's 2023 decision not to extend it. Efforts to modernize US deterrence capabilities, including the Sentinel ICBM, have faced scrutiny due to soaring costs and delays. Lawmakers pressed US Air Force officials to demonstrate urgency in correcting the troubled program, which is projected to cost nearly US$141 billion and fall years behind schedule. Simultaneously, the US Department of Defense (DOD) is assessing the viability of expanding the B-21 Raider fleet beyond the planned 100 aircraft to counter growing nuclear threats from China and North Korea. House Armed Services Committee members remain concerned about funding priorities and nuclear force readiness, while Secretary Troy Meink emphasized that strategic deterrence remains paramount for national defense. Bussiere hinted that future adversarial developments might necessitate a more robust nuclear force posture beyond existing plans. Al Mauroni mentions in a December 2023 War on the Rocks article that the US could increase its readily deployed nuclear warheads beyond New START Treaty limits by utilizing warheads from the nuclear stockpile's active hedge, which are those that are not operationally deployed. Mauroni points out that this effectively means the US could 'upload' additional nuclear warheads onto existing missiles and bombers without building new weapons. Hans Kristensen and other writers mention in a January 2025 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that while the US currently deploys 400 Minuteman III ICBMs, each armed with one warhead, the missiles can carry two or three warheads each. Kristensen and others state that the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) can carry eight warheads each, although they typically carry an average of four to five. In terms of bombers, a March 2025 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states that the US Air Force may require at least 200 stealth bombers to meet operational demands, particularly given the high tempo of Bomber Task Force missions and the reliance on Cold War-era platforms still in frontline use. Putting a number on the potential increase of US warheads, Keith Payne and Mark Schneider mention in an article this month for the National Institute of Public Policy that without New START limitations, the US Trident SLBM force could increase from an estimated 960 to 1,626 deployed warheads, while the Minuteman III ICBM force could increase from an estimated 400 to 1,000 deployed warheads, for a deployed missile force of 2,626 warheads. For bombers, Payne and Schneider estimate that the US could increase its stockpile of 528 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) to 716 to 784 warheads. However, the US nuclear triad is in dire need of modernization. Heather Williams and Lachlan MacKenzie mention in an April 2025 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the US Air Force is currently looking to extend the lifespan of its Minuteman III ICBMs, which are decades past retirement, while its Sentinel replacement is hounded by budget overruns and delays. Regarding the US's undersea nuclear deterrent, a March 2025 US CRS report notes that the US operates 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, which are approaching the end of their service lives. The report states that the SSBNs were initially designed for a 30-year service life but were later recertified for an additional 12 years. The report notes that the Ohio SSBNs will reach the end of their operational lives from 2027 to 2040. While the report states that the US is building 12 Columbia-class SSBNs to replace the Ohio-class fleet, the lead unit is facing a 12- to 16-month delay, which could impact the timely replacement of the Ohio-class fleet. While Williams and MacKenzie note that the B-21 bomber program is on track, a June 2024 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report states that the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) program, intended to replace the AGM-86 ALCM aboard US bombers, faces risks in schedule and cost estimates due to tight timelines and overlapping testing phases. It also mentions that while the LRSO program has made design progress and early manufacturing preparations, challenges remain in software integration and meeting nuclear certification requirements, which could affect the missile's timely deployment and operational readiness. Williams and MacKenzie assert that the US defense industrial base and nuclear enterprise have atrophied since the end of the Cold War, with decades of underinvestment and consolidation eroding its nuclear defense-industrial base, leaving it ill-equipped for renewed great power competition. When New START expires next year, the US must ensure its nuclear deterrent effectively dissuades both China and Russia from nuclear aggression, including if the two US rivals act together. Meanwhile, Russia is deploying new systems, such as the Avangard and Poseidon, and China is expanding its ICBM silo fields and maturing a true nuclear triad—thereby intensifying the arms race that the US appears to be struggling to keep pace with. In an April 2023 Atlantic Council report, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press mention that in a nuclear tripolar world with China, Russia and the US all fielding large arsenals, the US must deter two peer rivals simultaneously, each capable of massive retaliation. However, they point out that the US's current counterforce doctrine, which eschews threats to enemy cities while targeting military assets, requires a large, survivable arsenal capable of retaliating against one adversary while still deterring the other, thereby escalating the risks of an arms race. In addition, they argue that a pure counterforce doctrine increases force demands without improving deterrence. Lieber and Press propose a hybrid US nuclear doctrine, with counterforce options for limited scenarios but threatening countervalue retaliation targeting cities, industrial assets and population centers in extreme ones. They assert a hybrid doctrine would more credibly deter China and Russia while avoiding an excessive force buildup. With New START set to expire in early 2026, the US's nuclear future hinges not just on how many warheads it can deploy but how credibly it can deter two giants bent on intensifying their nuclear threats.


Asia Times
25-05-2025
- Asia Times
The many holes in Trump's Golden Dome
The Trump administration's recent announcement of a 'Golden Dome' strategic missile defense shield to protect the US is the most ambitious such project since President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the 1980s. The SDI program – better known by its somewhat mocking nickname of 'Star Wars' – sparked a heated debate over its technical feasibility. Ultimately, it would never become operational. But do we now have the technologies to realize the Golden Dome shield – or is this initiative similarly destined to be shelved? A completed Golden Dome missile defense shield would supposedly defend the US against the full spectrum of air and missile threats, including long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and those with shorter ranges, any of which could be armed with nuclear warheads. But Golden Dome would also aim to work against cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons such as boost-glide vehicles, which use a rocket to reach hypersonic speeds (more than five times the speed of sound) before continuing their trajectory unpowered. The missile defense shield could theoretically also protect against warheads placed in space that can be commanded to re-enter the atmosphere and destroy targets on Earth, known as fractional orbital bombardment systems. Ballistic missiles arguably pose the biggest threat because of the sheer numbers in the hands of other nuclear-armed nations. ICBMs follow a three-phase trajectory: the boost, midcourse and terminal phases. The boost phase consists of a few minutes of powered flight as the missile's rocket engines propel it into space. In the midcourse phase, the missile travels unpowered through space for about 20-25 minutes. Finally, during the terminal phase, the missile re-enters the atmosphere and hits the target. Plans for the Golden Dome are likely to involve defensive weapons that target ballistic missiles during all three phases of their trajectory. Boost-phase missile defence is attractive because it would only require shooting down a single target. During the midcourse phase, the ballistic missile will deploy its warhead – the section that includes the explosive charge – but could also release several decoy warheads. Even with the best radar systems, discriminating between the real warhead from the decoys is incredibly difficult. One part of the Golden Dome will involve targeting ballistic missiles during their boost phase. US Air Force However, there are big questions over the technical feasibility of targeting ballistic missiles during their boost phase – and there is also a limited time window, given that this phase is relatively short. The weapons platforms designed to target a ballistic missile in its boost phase could consist of a large satellite in low-Earth orbit, armed with multiple small missiles called interceptors. An interceptor could be deployed if a nuclear-armed ballistic missile is launched at the US. One study conducted by the American Physical Society suggested that, under generous assumptions, a space-based interceptor platform might be able to destroy a target from 530 miles (850km) away. This measure is known as the weapon's 'kill radius.' Even with a kill radius of this size, a space-based interceptor system would require hundreds or even thousands of satellites, each armed with small missiles to achieve effective regional coverage. It might be possible to get around this constraint, though, by using directed-energy weapons such as powerful lasers or even particle beam weapons, which use high-energy beams of atomic or subatomic particles. A critical vulnerability of such a system, however, is that an adversary could use anti-satellite weapons – missiles launched from the ground – or other offensive actions such as cyberattacks to destroy or disable some of the interceptor satellites. This could establish a temporary corridor for an adversary's ballistic missile to pass through. An idea for a space-based boost-phase defense system called Brilliant Pebbles was proposed towards the end of the 1980s. Rather than having large satellites with multiple missiles, it entailed having around 1,000 small individual missiles in orbit. It would have also used about 60 orbiting sensors called Brilliant Eyes to detect launches. Brilliant Pebbles was cancelled by President Bill Clinton's administration in 1994. But it provides another template for technologies that could be used by Golden Dome. Options for destroying ballistic missiles during the midcourse of their trajectories include existing weapons systems such as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system and the US Navy's ship-based Aegis platform. Unlike midcourse-phase missile defense (which must cover a large geographical area), terminal-phase interception is a last line of defense. It usually involves destroying incoming warheads that have re-entered the atmosphere from space. A plan for destroying single warheads during the terminal trajectory phase could use future versions of existing weapons platforms, such as the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 Missile Segment Enhancement or the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. However, while there has been progress in this technology in the decades since Star Wars was proposed, the debate continues over whether these systems work effectively. Ultimately, it is the huge costs, as well as political opposition, that could pose the biggest hurdles to implementing an effective Golden Dome system. Trump's proposal has revived the idea of missile defense in the US. But it remains unclear whether its most ambitious components will ever be realized. Jack O'Doherty is a PhD Candidate in nuclear strategy, University of Leicester This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.


South China Morning Post
16-05-2025
- South China Morning Post
China's J-10C vs French Rafale, fans defend Blackpink's Lisa: SCMP 7 highlights
We have selected seven stories from this week's news across Hong Kong, mainland China, the wider Asia region and beyond that resonated with our readers and shed light on topical issues. If you would like to see more of our reporting, please consider subscribing Reports that France's advanced Rafale fighter jet came off second best against the China-made J-10C Vigorous Dragon in a dogfight between the Indian and Pakistan air forces on May 7 attracted global attention. After their first set of talks since US President Donald Trump's sweeping 'Liberation Day' tariffs turned Washington's trade war with China into a world-spanning conflagration, both Beijing and Washington – perhaps unsurprisingly – hailed the resultant removal of most of those steep import duties as a victory for their side. The F-47 fighter jet and the YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A combat drones are being developed under Washington's Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) initiative. Photo: US Air Force The US has unveiled more details about its sixth-generation fighter, including the aircraft's expected range, as competition intensifies with China for future air combat superiority.