
Billions lost, nothing gained: The strategic collapse of Iran's nuclear program
Iran's nuclear infrastructure – the physical sites, centrifuge arrays, underground bunkers, laboratories, and research facilities – has been systematically crippled. These were not minor tactical strikes but a calculated, technologically sophisticated campaign designed to render key facilities inoperable for the foreseeable future. The Isfahan Nuclear Technology Research Center, long considered a linchpin in Iran's uranium enrichment chain, was among the most severely hit. Satellite images reveal scorched tunnel entrances, collapsed roof structures, and targeted penetrations deep underground. Experts who have reviewed the aftermath suggest that centrifuge production lines, command control systems, and clean room laboratories have been wiped out or rendered unusable. In effect, what took decades to build – with precision engineering, international procurement efforts, and highly trained scientific teams – was largely eliminated in under two weeks. It is not merely a symbolic setback; it is a material and operational catastrophe for the program.
Rebuilding this infrastructure is not a matter of weeks or months. It will require a minimum of two to three years under ideal conditions – assuming there are no more foreign strikes, no new sanctions, and no loss of technical expertise. And those assumptions themselves are increasingly unrealistic. Iran would need to reconstruct centrifuge production sites from scratch, secure the highly specialized components needed for uranium enrichment, and establish the high-purity conditions needed for functioning nuclear research. Even more critically, the government would need to reassemble a team of scientists, engineers, and technicians with the unique experience necessary to safely and secretly run such a program. All this must be done while under the close scrutiny of Israeli intelligence, US surveillance, and likely sabotage efforts from multiple intelligence agencies.
While the infrastructure lies in ruins, a separate question remains: what happened to Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium? Before the attacks, Iran had accumulated a considerable reserve – over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, according to international watchdogs and leaked intelligence assessments. This level of enrichment brings Iran close to weapons-grade material, although it still falls short of the 90 percent threshold typically needed for a bomb. There have been some reports suggesting that a portion of this uranium may have been hidden or moved prior to the strikes. However, even if some of this material remains intact, it is of limited strategic value without the ability to further refine, convert, and weaponize it.
Weaponization is not a matter of simply having enriched uranium. It requires an entire industrial and scientific apparatus. Iran would need functioning cascades of advanced centrifuges to continue enrichment. It would require weapon design expertise – knowledge of implosion methods, neutron initiators, and detonation mechanics. Then there is the challenge of developing a reliable delivery mechanism, typically a missile or other launch platform, capable of housing and delivering a nuclear warhead. Every one of these steps requires testing, verification, and expert oversight. Without the infrastructure, none of this is feasible. The enriched uranium, if it even exists in usable form, is now essentially inert.
Compounding the damage to Iran's material assets is the staggering loss of human capital. At least 14 nuclear scientists and technicians were reportedly killed in the Israeli airstrikes. These were not replaceable technicians or anonymous bureaucrats. They represented the intellectual engine of the nuclear program – experts in isotope separation, nuclear metallurgy, weapons design, and high-level engineering. Training new personnel to this level of specialization takes years, sometimes decades. Moreover, in a climate of growing fear, surveillance, and instability, it will be increasingly difficult for Iran to attract young scientists to this field, especially when the risks of assassination, targeted strikes, or internal betrayal are so high. The loss of this brain trust may be even more devastating in the long term than the physical destruction of buildings and machines.
All of this comes against the backdrop of a resurgent Israeli military policy toward Iran. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made it abundantly clear: if Iran makes any move to rebuild its nuclear capabilities or pursue a weapon, Israel will strike again. Israel's doctrine is preemption, not deterrence. This recent operation demonstrated not just Israel's air superiority, but also its precision strike capability deep inside Iranian territory. The use of advanced drones, bunker-busting missiles, and real-time intelligence reflects a level of surveillance and access inside Iran that is extraordinary. It suggests that Israeli agents or cyber networks have most likely infiltrated even the most secretive elements of Iran's nuclear and military programs. In short, Iran is being watched continuously and closely – and any revival attempt will likely be identified and neutralized before it can gain momentum.
This brings us to the sobering reality of what Iran's nuclear program represents today: a cautionary tale. The Islamic Republic has poured tens of billions of dollars over the decades into this endeavor. It has isolated itself diplomatically, suffered under relentless economic sanctions, lost countless opportunities for trade and cooperation, and placed the Iranian people under constant threat of war – all in pursuit of a nuclear deterrent that, in the end, may never materialize. Iran engaged in high-stakes brinkmanship with the West, negotiated and then violated nuclear agreements, and maintained a narrative of resistance and national pride centered on its nuclear ambitions. And yet, all of that has now been nearly erased in a matter of 12 days. The centrifuges, the research sites, the scientists, the material – it has all been shattered.
This outcome offers deeper lessons beyond military and technical implications. It underscores the immense danger of provoking powerful enemies with vastly superior military capabilities. It highlights the cost of allowing ideology and rivalry to dictate national policy. Instead of building bridges with its neighbors, Iran pursued influence through proxies, militias, and nuclear threats. Instead of investing in prosperity, innovation, and regional peace, it spent its resources on uranium enrichment and missile development. And now, after decades of effort, what remains is rubble and mourning.
The Iranian leadership must now face a critical decision point. If it attempts to rebuild its nuclear program, it is almost certain to face further Israeli attacks – possibly even deeper and more lethal. The infrastructure is gone, the scientific talent has been decimated, and the world is watching with heightened attention. Rebuilding is not just a technical challenge – it is a geopolitical dare to those who have already demonstrated their willingness to act decisively. There is no illusion of secrecy anymore. There is no diplomatic cover left. The message is clear: another move toward weaponization, and the next wave of strikes will follow.
In the final assessment, there can be little doubt that Iran's nuclear program has been dramatically and significantly damaged. Its foundational elements – machines, minds, and material – have all been compromised. What took decades to build was dismantled in less than two weeks. The future of Iran's nuclear ambitions now lies under heavy surveillance and even heavier consequences. Whether Iran chooses to escalate, rebuild, or pivot to diplomacy will determine not only the fate of its nuclear program, but potentially the future of the region.
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Asharq Al-Awsat
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Asharq Al-Awsat
37 minutes ago
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Al-Qirbi to Asharq Al-Awsat: Saddam Told Me Iraq Fight Was for Arab Dignity
When al-Qaeda's planes tore through New York's skyline on September 11, 2001, Yemen's then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi cut short a visit to Berlin and rushed back to Sana'a, confronting a moment that would reshape global politics and Yemen's foreign policy for years to come. The attacks – among their many repercussions – pushed Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to fully align with the United States in its war on terror. One of Saleh's first moves was to seek an urgent meeting with President George W. Bush, hoping to convince the White House that Yemen was not a breeding ground for al-Qaeda. In the first part of an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, al-Qirbi, who served as Yemen's top diplomat from April 2001 until 2014, recounts his experience navigating regional upheaval, from the USS Cole bombing off Aden in October 2000 to the US-led invasion of Iraq. He also reflects on Saleh's last-ditch attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to cooperate with the United Nations – a message the Iraqi leader rejected, declaring instead: 'This is a battle for the dignity of the nation, and we will pay the price.' Below are excerpts from the interview: Q: Your first major test as foreign minister was the September 11 attacks. Where were you when they happened, and how did you react? A: I was on an official visit to Berlin, having lunch with the German foreign minister at the time. We were preparing for a river cruise and a reception with German officials and Arab diplomats when we were stunned by the news. We gathered around the television and immediately cancelled the event. Q: How did President Saleh respond to the 9/11 attacks? A: I wasn't in Yemen at the time, so I can't speak to his immediate reaction. But it was deeply concerning for all of us, especially coming so soon after the USS Cole bombing. That incident had already cast Yemen as a hub for al-Qaeda and terrorism. We knew the attacks in New York would only intensify that perception. Q: When you returned from Berlin and met President Saleh, was the potential fallout from 9/11 your main concern? A: Absolutely. We were not only concerned about Yemen but also the wider region. Our priority was to shield Yemen from the consequences. That's why our first step was to arrange a swift visit for President Saleh to Washington. He was among the first Arab leaders to arrive there after the attacks, meeting President Bush in November of that year. Saleh's Confrontation with Bush at the White House Q: How would you describe the meeting between President Saleh and President Bush? A: It was, in many ways, a confrontation – but a diplomatic one. Saleh aimed to convince Bush that Yemen was not a terrorist haven and should not be punished for the 9/11 attacks. Q: Did Bush accuse Saleh directly? A: No, he didn't. But he did emphasize the importance of fighting terrorism and acknowledged the presence of extremists in Yemen. In the end, President Saleh defused the situation by pledging Yemen's cooperation with the international community in combating terrorism. That marked the beginning of a new chapter in Yemen-US relations. Q: Did the US make specific demands during President Saleh's visit to Washington in late 2001? A: Not at that time. But eventually, the main concern became how to cooperate in combating al-Qaeda operatives within Yemen. Q: Did Yemen take serious action on that front? A: Absolutely. We launched operations to pursue the group responsible for the USS Cole bombing, and our security services arrested some of them. Investigations began shortly thereafter. The US requested direct participation in those interrogations, but Yemen declined, insisting that the investigations were the government's responsibility. However, we allowed US observers to attend the sessions and submit questions through Yemeni investigators. Q: Did the investigations uncover anything significant about 9/11? A: I can't recall specific details from the security files, but there was definitely intelligence exchanged between the two countries' agencies. From Security Cooperation to Military Invasions Q: Intelligence cooperation between Yemen and the US became more structured. As foreign minister, did you anticipate that the US would launch military campaigns in Afghanistan and then Iraq? A: We knew the US was deeply wounded by 9/11, but I didn't expect it to act so hastily. In my view, the rush into war dragged the US into complications later on. Q: Did President Saleh view the US as both a powerful partner and a potentially dangerous one? A: Definitely. During his visit to the US, Saleh recognized how volatile the American position was for Yemen and the wider region. That was reflected in his positions on many Arab issues—whether the Palestinian cause or later the Iraq war. We were constantly trying to avoid provoking the US Our main concern was to spare Yemen from becoming a target. Saleh's Final Message to Saddam Hussein Q: After the US invaded Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban, did you grow concerned as Washington turned its focus to Iraq? A: The Iraq campaign came later, around 2003, and stemmed from different motives. It wasn't directly linked to Afghanistan. The US seemed determined to expand its influence in the region—politically, strategically, and economically. After 2001, there was a clear shift toward targeting Arab regimes, including through initiatives like the 'Greater Middle East Project' and what former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called 'creative chaos.' That deeply unsettled many Arab governments. In the Arab League, we foreign ministers discussed how to send clear messages to Washington—that Arab states were not sponsors of terrorism and that we supported political and economic reform. Q: As the US prepared to invade Iraq, how did President Saleh and the Yemeni government respond? A: Our role was first through the Arab League. We wanted a unified Arab position to confront the looming US aggression, but unfortunately, the region was divided. The second step was to try to convince Saddam Hussein to avoid war. I was the last Arab official to visit Iraq carrying a personal message from President Saleh to Saddam—this was about six to eight weeks before the invasion. Q: Was that message directly from President Saleh? A: Yes, it was. Q: And you personally handed it to Saddam Hussein? A: Yes, I delivered it to him in person. The message urged Saddam to preserve Iraq and its achievements and avoid dragging the country into a destructive war. Saddam, however, refused. He thanked President Saleh for his concern and support. But he said: 'This is a battle for the dignity of the Arab nation. We must pay the price to defend it.' Saddam's only request was that Saleh protect Yemen's national unity. Saleh's Plea Rejected Q: What exactly did Saleh's message to Saddam Hussein contain? A: It urged him to comply with United Nations demands—demands largely driven by the United States at that point. Q: Did Saddam show any willingness to compromise? A: No. He saw meeting American demands as a humiliation to the Arab nation. Q: As a foreign minister hearing that this was about Arab dignity, did you feel Iraq was in danger? A: Absolutely. After I delivered the message in an official capacity, I asked to speak to him as an Arab citizen speaking to an Arab leader. I told him: yes, this may be a battle for dignity, but it also requires wisdom. Iraq had built institutions, achieved development, and possessed military capabilities—those gains could be lost. I warned that the war wouldn't end with an invasion and that all Arabs might pay the price. Saddam replied: 'We in Iraq will bear that responsibility.' Q: Did you meet with any Iraqi officials on that trip? A: No, only President Saddam Hussein. Q: When you relayed his response to President Saleh, how did he react? A: He was pained by it. He sensed Iraq was heading toward war and feared the consequences. Q: What is it like for an Arab foreign minister to sit face-to-face with Saddam Hussein? A: You're sitting with a leader who achieved much for his country. But in the Arab world, decisions of war and peace are often made by one man. That's a core problem in our region—decisions are taken unilaterally, without consultation with military, security, or political institutions. Q: Did you have the same feeling about Saddam's 1990 invasion of Kuwait? A: Certainly. Much of what we suffer from today stems from that same tragedy: the concentration of power. Q: Do Arab leaders feel they are entrusted with historic missions? Was Saleh also a unilateral decision-maker? A: Sometimes, yes. But Saleh evolved. After years of war and political conflict, he initiated a national dialogue to bring political forces together. Still, some decisions remained personal. Q: Did Saleh ever describe Saddam as stubborn or autocratic? A: He didn't say that explicitly, but I believe he thought Saddam had made a grave mistake. Preparing for the Inevitable Q: As the invasion of Iraq loomed, how did Saleh respond? A: For months, the Arab League debated ways to avert war. Some states tried to contain the conflict, while others, I wouldn't say encouraged it, but refrained from opposing the US. Yemen believed war was inevitable. We viewed it as a disaster and sent several envoys to Iraq before I went personally. Q: After Saddam's regime collapsed, did Saleh fear for his own future? A: No. Q: Yet when Saddam was executed, Saleh was visibly affected. What do you recall of that? A: I remember it well—I was in Amman at the time. His execution on Eid had a strong emotional impact on Saleh. He felt it was vengeful and driven by deep hatred. We had hoped for a fair trial and a more humane process. Q: In an Arab summit, Saleh made a comment: 'Before they shave your head, shave it yourself.' Was that a reference to Saddam's fate? A: Yes, that was his phrasing. He meant: before others impose their will on you, take the initiative and fix things yourself. A Bond Forged in Shared Causes Q: What was behind the strong personal bond between Saleh and Saddam? Was it Yemen's support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War? A: That support stemmed from an already close relationship between the two leaders. They shared a pan-Arab stance, a firm position on Israel, and solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Their chemistry was real—and they were very close. Saddam's Support for Yemen? 'I Don't Know' Asked whether Saddam Hussein ever provided concrete support to Yemen, al-Qirbi said he was not aware of such assistance. Yemen, however, joined Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq in the so-called 'Arab Cooperation Council,' a bloc seen by some as an effort to reshape regional balances. 'Unfortunately, the Arab world was facing one crisis after another,' he said. 'Some leaders formed new councils either to escape collective Arab action or to strengthen it. In reality, these councils achieved little on the ground.' A Trusted Ally: Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah Among Arab leaders, Saleh's closest relationship in the 2000s was with Saudi Arabia's then-Crown Prince and later King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz. Their bond deepened after Yemen signed a border agreement with the Kingdom. 'That trust translated into tangible support,' al-Qirbi said. 'With Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, we worked to strengthen Yemen's position, alongside Qatari FM Hamad bin Jassim and UAE's Abdullah bin Zayed.' But the relationship began to sour around 2008 during the war with the Houthis. Miscommunication, al-Qirbi suggested, led Saudi Arabia to question Saleh's stance on ending the conflict. Outside the Gulf, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was another key ally. Both he and Saleh viewed Eritrea's actions—particularly its threats to Yemeni islands and its war with Ethiopia—as destabilizing to the region. Post-Eritrea Tensions, Quiet Mediation Saleh also had cordial ties with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki until territorial disputes soured the relationship. Yemen later attempted to mediate between Eritrea and Ethiopia, with al-Qirbi visiting both countries several times in an effort to mend relations. Syria, Iraq, and the Perils of Foreign Intervention During his tenure, al-Qirbi said Yemen maintained only limited ties with Hafez al-Assad. But when Syria plunged into conflict years later, Saleh opposed any external military intervention. 'Saleh believed—whether in Iraq or Syria—that foreign intervention ultimately destroys the country,' he said. Saleh and Gaddafi: A Strained Arab Brotherhood The relationship between Saleh and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi was marked by what al-Qirbi called 'political sparring.' 'Gaddafi saw himself as the heir to Nasser's Arab nationalist mantle,' he said. 'Saleh thought he exaggerated his role as a pan-Arab leader.' Q: Did Saleh mock Gaddafi privately? A: No. He didn't mock him but did criticize his frequent calls for Arab unity, especially after so many failed attempts. Q: Why did Gaddafi support the Houthis? A: I don't know his motives. Perhaps to pressure Saleh—or to put pressure on Saudi Arabia. Q: Did Gaddafi send weapons or money to the Houthis? A: I have no information, but he did have contact with them. Putin, China, and Yemen's Future In 2008, al-Qirbi accompanied Saleh on a visit to Russia, where he met President Vladimir Putin amid growing unrest in Yemen. 'The atmosphere was very warm. Putin understood Yemen's political situation,' he said. 'Yemen relied heavily on Russian military equipment, and the two leaders discussed ways to strengthen that cooperation.' Putin invited Saleh to a military parade showcasing advanced weaponry. 'It was clear that Putin saw Saleh as one of the Arab leaders closest to Moscow,' al-Qirbi said, adding that Saleh greatly admired the Russian president. 'He said Putin would restore Russia's global role.' While Saleh held some admiration for Western leaders like France's Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and US President George W. Bush—whom he met multiple times—his primary focus remained the Arab world. China was another rising partner. In one of Saleh's final visits to Beijing, he sought to open Yemen to Chinese investment. The Chinese agreed to lend Yemen $1 billion for development projects as part of their Belt and Road Initiative, but Yemen's parliament ultimately stalled the agreement over repayment terms. Arab Diplomacy Through Al-Qirbi's Eyes Reflecting on fellow Arab diplomats, al-Qirbi spoke warmly of Saudi Arabia's late foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal. 'He was known for his wisdom and patience, even when hearing views he didn't like,' al-Qirbi said. 'He always sought consensus.' Other standout figures included Oman's Yousef bin Alawi, Sudan's Mustafa Osman Ismail—'a leading figure during the Iraq crisis'—and Libya's Ali Treki, a staunch Arab nationalist often at odds with Gaddafi's more erratic stances. Q: Did you know Libya's former foreign minister Abdel Rahman Shalgham? A: Yes. A cultured man. I remember once in Cairo, during a dinner gathering, he played the oud and sang for us. Q: What about Amr Moussa? A: I admired him when he was Egypt's foreign minister—especially his firm stance on the Palestinian cause. That admiration only grew when I worked with him at the Arab League. I consider him among the League's best secretary-generals during my time—not just as foreign minister but as an observer of the League's work. He always held firm to Arab principles. Unfortunately, decisions at the Arab League are shaped by powerful member states and their foreign ministers—not the secretary-general. From Medicine to Diplomacy... and Arabic Poetry A physician by training, al-Qirbi's love for classical Arabic poetry has endured. Q: Who is your favorite poet? A: Al-Mutanabbi. Q: Why him? A: His verses are full of timeless wisdom and values. To me, they are like proverbs for life.


Asharq Al-Awsat
37 minutes ago
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Abubakr Al-Qirbi to Asharq Al-Awsat: Ali Abdullah Saleh Anticipated His Fate at the Hands of the Houthis
Former Yemeni Foreign Minister Dr. Abubakr Al-Qirbi reflected on the unraveling of Yemen's political landscape following 2004, the year that marked the beginning of a complex and eventually fatal relationship between the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthi movement. Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat in the second and final part of an in-depth conversation, Al-Qirbi shares personal insights on the war, Iran's influence, the Arab Spring, and how Yemen's long-time ruler foresaw his tragic end. According to Al-Qirbi, Saleh first began to see the Houthis as a threat around the year 2000, when they started building external alliances, including with Iran and Libya, and shifting from religious activism to overt political mobilization. This culminated in the first armed conflict between the Yemeni government and the Houthis in 2004. Al-Qirbi believes the Houthis' turn toward Iran was a direct consequence of the wars waged against them in Yemen. 'They sought a protector, and they found one in Iran,' he said, noting that Tehran's support came not only from the government but also from religious institutions. He recounted that he personally visited Iran twice to address Yemen's concerns, meeting both President Mohammad Khatami and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 'We stressed three things: Yemenis—Sunnis and Zaydis—had coexisted peacefully for centuries; regional peace depended on non-interference; and Iran needed to stop supporting the Houthis, even indirectly.' Tehran, for its part, assured him of its commitment to Yemen's stability but, Al-Qirbi implied, offered little practical restraint. Talk of Succession Reflecting on the 2006 elections, Al-Qirbi described them as a turning point: 'It was the first time Saleh truly earned his win, receiving 60 percent of the vote in a competitive race.' He insisted the process was largely free and fair, with credible international observers in attendance. These elections, however, intensified internal political strife. There was growing suspicion that Saleh was preparing his son for succession, a rumor that dogged his later years and stirred discontent among Yemenis and international stakeholders alike. The Arab Spring: Shock and Opportunity Yemen, like much of the Arab world, was caught off-guard by the speed and ferocity of the Arab Spring. Al-Qirbi acknowledges that while the regime anticipated regional change - particularly after 9/11 and increased US civil society activity - the spark from Tunisia was unexpected. 'Saleh wasn't surprised by the demands for reform,' Al-Qirbi noted, 'but he questioned the method. His position was that change should come through democratic institutions, not by toppling governments.' During the mass youth sit-ins and growing opposition movements, Al-Qirbi believes Saleh recognized the West's shifting stance. 'He realized that the US and others were now saying plainly: Saleh must go.' Despite this, the president insisted any transition should occur constitutionally, not through force. One of the most poignant moments in the interview comes when Al-Qirbi addresses Saleh's reaction to the downfall of fellow Arab leaders like Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi. 'It deeply affected him,' Al-Qirbi said. 'These were men he knew personally. Watching them fall, especially so brutally, had a profound impact.' Saleh, according to Al-Qirbi, was aware of the cost of clinging to power. 'He could have crushed the protests with force. He had the means, but he chose not to, fearing the chaos it might unleash.' Ultimately, Saleh agreed to a Gulf-brokered deal to step down in 2011, ushering in Vice President Abed Rabbuh Mansour Hadi as his successor. From Vice President to Rival: The Hadi Transition Al-Qirbi was a strong supporter of Hadi's elevation to the presidency, arguing that his long service as vice president and his lack of overt political ambition made him a natural and unifying choice. But the relationship between the two men quickly deteriorated. 'Saleh began to feel that Hadi was sidelining him from the General People's Congress (GPC),' Al-Qirbi said. 'He felt betrayed, especially when Hadi began appointing his own loyalists to represent the party in the National Dialogue Conference.' This rift widened dramatically as Houthi forces advanced through northern Yemen. While some accused Saleh of allying with the Houthis to settle scores with political rivals, Al-Qirbi disputes this characterization. 'He never truly allied with them. At best, there was a tactical understanding, and even that crumbled once they reached Amran.' Al-Qirbi confirms that Saleh had urged Hadi to stop the Houthi advance before they reached Sana'a, a warning that went unheeded. 'Saleh expected the government to act, but it didn't. That was a pivotal moment.' The Fall of Sana'a and Saleh's Final Days When the Houthis seized Sana'a in 2014, Al-Qirbi was in the city. He recalls the shock that swept through the capital as government forces surrendered without resistance. 'Nobody expected it to happen so easily,' he said. Despite forming a brief partnership with the Houthis, Saleh grew increasingly uneasy. Al-Qirbi recounts how Houthi supervisors effectively controlled ministries, sidelining GPC ministers and eroding Saleh's influence. By 2017, tensions reached a breaking point. As Saleh prepared to commemorate the anniversary of the GPC's founding, Houthi forces viewed the event as a political threat. That same year, they killed him. 'Saleh anticipated it,' Al-Qirbi admits. 'He understood the risks of engaging with the Houthis and sensed early on that they were not true partners.' Al-Qirbi speaks of Saleh with a mix of admiration and reflection. 'He was a flexible leader, willing to engage with enemies, and he preferred dialogue over violence. Had he been a man of force, he could have crushed the protests. But he chose restraint.' Asked whether Saleh's long rule prevented the building of a true Yemeni state, Al-Qirbi acknowledges both internal constraints and missed opportunities. 'There were moments - after reunification, after the 1994 war, and especially after 2006 - where a stronger state could have been built. But like many revolutionary leaders, Saleh became too focused on power and too cautious to make drastic reforms.' On Yemen's famously complex tribal and political fabric, Al-Qirbi supports Saleh's infamous quote likening governance in Yemen to 'dancing on the heads of snakes.' He agrees, 'It's an accurate description. Balancing tribal, regional, political, and external interests is an impossible act.' Hope for Unity? Despite everything, Al-Qirbi remains cautiously optimistic about Yemen's future. 'Yemen must return to unity. Without it, there can be no long-term stability,' he insists. But he warns that foreign interference remains a significant obstacle. 'The day Yemenis are left to negotiate among themselves is the day peace becomes possible.' Asked whether the Houthis could be brought under the authority of a national government, he offers a realist's view: 'There are now three centers of power: Sana'a, Aden, and the internationally recognized government. None are truly sovereign in their decisions. But if dialogue is given a real chance - without outside manipulation - Yemenis will find a solution.'