‘To protect the Druze': Why Israel bombed Syria

Indian Express

18-07-2025

Israel hit Damascus with powerful airstrikes on Wednesday, ostensibly to 'protect' Syria's Druze minority which has borne the brunt of ongoing sectarian clashes in the country.
'We will not allow the terrorist regime of radical Islam in Syria to harm the Druze… We are committed to our Druze brothers in Israel to do everything to prevent harm to their Druze brothers in Syria…,' an official Israeli statement said.
Who are the Druze? Why does Israel want to 'protect' them? What happens next?
'The righteous people'
The Druze, also known as Banu Ma'ruf ('the righteous people'), are an Arabic-speaking ethno-religious minority from the Levant.
While the origins of their faith can be traced to Ismaili Shi'ism, most Druze themselves do not identify as Muslims, and among orthodox Islamists, the Druze are seen as heretical.
There are some fundamental differences between Islamic and Druze theology.
The Druze believe in reincarnation, an idea that is incompatible with almost all mainstream readings of the Hadith and the Quran. Central to the Druze faith is the divinity of Fatimid ruler al-Hakim, which is unacceptable to Islam. And the personal status of Druze women is considered much higher than women of other societies in the Middle East.
The Druze do not permit conversion, into or out of their religion, and marriage outside the community is rare and strongly discouraged. Many Druze teachings and practices are kept secret, and are accessible only to a religious elite known as uqqal (literally 'knowers').
Persecuted minority
Since their emergence as a sect in the 11th century, the Druze have historically been a persecuted minority in the predominantly Muslim Levant. Contemporary estimates suggest a Druze population of roughly 500,000 in Syria, around 250,000 in Lebanon, and 152,000 in Israel, including the occupied Golan Heights. (Figures from Nissim Dana, The Druze in the Middle East (2003), and Israel Bureau of Statistics)
In Syria, the Druze population largely resides in Jabal al-Duruz ('the Mountain of the Druze') to the south of Damascus, near the border with Israel. In fact, most of the world's Druze population lives in border areas near the Syria-Lebanon-Israel trijunction (See Map).
A number of Druze militias operated during the Syrian civil war, fighting a 'defensive' war against Sunni extremist groups. While the Druze community's views on Syria's former President Bashar al-Assad varied, in practice, these militias and the now-deposed dictator aligned in their war goals: both were fighting defensive battles against a common enemy.
Since the ouster of al-Assad last December, the Druze have been extremely wary of the new regime in Damascus. After all, the Salafi jihadist al-Nusra front of Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria's current leader, fought not only al-Assad but also the Druze. In 2015, al-Nusra massacred at least 20 Druze villagers in the Idlib province.
While al-Sharaa as President has repeatedly promised to 'protect' Syria's minorities and put up a moderate face to garner support from the West, extremist Sunni groups loyal to him have gone after minority communities, especially those seen to be loyal to the previous regime.
In March, hundreds of Alawites (a Shia minority group which al-Assad belonged to) were killed in the western city of Latakia, and in April, clashes between pro-government Sunni militias and Druze fighters left at least 100 people dead.
Al-Sharaa has also tried to exert control over the Druze-dominated Suweida governorate in southern Syria, which had long been under de facto control of a number of Druze militias. He has implored the Druze to give up arms and integrate with his new Syrian army. But faced with the prospect of continuing persecution under a Sunni Islamist regime in Damascus, the Druze have refused to agree to al-Sharaa's terms.
The Israeli angle
Israel bombed Damascus after al-Sharaa sent in Syrian troops to quell ongoing fighting between Druze and Sunni Bedouin militias in the city of Suweida. Instead of being neutral, however, the Syrian troops ended up clashing with Druze fighters. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the fighting in Suweida has killed at least 350 people since Sunday.
For Israel, there are two primary reasons for intervening in Syria.
* Israel has long sought to create a demilitarised zone in southern Syria. Amid ongoing sectarian fighting in the region, Israel is extremely wary of the buildup of hostile Islamist forces on its northern borders.
'When Syrian tanks began advancing into the area, Israel acted not only to defend the Druze but also to enforce its demand to keep the region demilitarised,' Carmit Valensi, an Israeli expert on Israel-Syrian affairs at the Institute for National Security Studies, a research group in Tel Aviv, told The New York Times.
The imperative to keep southern Syria demilitarised is borne out of Israel's historic experience with the region being a springboard for hostile forces, most notably the now-decapitated Hezbollah. This is also why Israel first occupied the two-thirds of the Golan Heights after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, and the rest of the strategic region in 2024, amid its offensive against Hezbollah.
The occupation of Golan Heights is not recognised internationally, and the Syrian government has rejected Israel's declaration of a demilitarised zone in its sovereign territory.
* Unlike almost every other ethnic group in the region, the Druze have long had close ties to the state of Israel. Although comprising slightly more than 1% of Israel's total population, the Druze have attained high positions in the Israeli bureaucracy and military, and have had some influence politically. There are two conventional reasons given for the unique position of the Druze in the Jewish state.
The first, as explained by historian Eduardo W Aboultaif, relies on the compulsions of the Druze as a minority community. Aboultaif argues: 'the Druze fought Zionism in 1948 and later accommodated the Israeli state as the only viable choice to survive in the land of their ancestors.' ('Druze Politics in Israel: Challenging the Myth of Druze-Zionist Covenant', 2015).
The second commonly-stated reasoning for the Druze loyalty to the Israeli state is that centuries of persecution in the hands of Muslims has driven the minority to the arms of the modern Jewish state. Aboultaif argues that this narrative has 'constructed Israel as a protector of the Druze community'.
But reasons aside, there is a vocal, highly integrated Druze community in Israel which has, in recent months, been clamouring for Israeli intervention amid al-Sharaa's crackdown on their Syrian brethren. As one Israeli Druze told Reuters, 'I expect my state and the Jewish people to reciprocate for everything we've done for it and defend our brothers in Syria'.
What next?
Israel's decision to strike Damascus was its most significant military action after the regime change in Syria. Notably, it came amid back-channel negotiations between the two governments over a diplomatic resolution to decades of tensions, likely prompted by Washington, which has sought to normalise Israel's relations with al-Sharaa's Syria.
While an immediate escalation is unlikely, and some reports already suggest that al-Sharaa is pulling troops out of southern Syria after a call from Washington, the strikes are likely to hinder the progress of an Israel-Syria thaw.
For al-Sharaa, struggling to pick up the pieces of a 14-year long civil war in Syria, the Israeli strikes will only complicate things domestically.
In his speech after Israeli attacks, al-Sharaa blamed 'the Israeli entity' for trying to sow discord in his country, and called for national unity. 'The building of a new Syria requires all of us to stand united behind our state, to commit to its principles and to place the interest of the nation above any personal or limited interest,' he said.