
Kerala minister boycotts event over ‘Bharat Mata' photo
Kerala minister P Prasad boycotted a sapling plantation event at the governor's house in Thiruvananthapuram on World Environment Day on Thursday over floral tributes to a Bharat Mata portrait, which he insisted is associated mainly with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)'s ideological fount, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).
The row comes days after both the ruling Left Democratic Front (LDF) and the Opposition United Democratic Front (UDF) criticised the presence of RSS ideologue S Gurumurthy at an event related to Operation Sindoor, India's cross-border anti-terror strikes last month, at the governor's house.
Prasad said the plantation programme schedule was changed on Wednesday with the addition of the floral tributes. 'Such a ritual has never been part of official events at the Raj Bhawan [governor's house]...,' said Prasad, who planted saplings separately after skipping the Raj Bhawan event.
Prasad, a Communist Party of India (CPI) leader, said they told the officials that such a portrait must not be used at a government event, especially in a constitutional office. 'It is against the Constitution. The governor's office insisted on it. We are not against Bharat Mata...we often have children dressing up as Bharat Mata at government events and official Onam celebrations,' said Prasad.
CPI leader Binoy Viswam, too, criticised the Raj Bhawan for using the photograph of Bharat Mata carrying a saffron flag for the event. 'Will the photograph of Bharat Mata be complete only if she holds the RSS flag? Will it be complete only if she stands by a lion? The Raj Bhawan should never have become a platform for such adamant stands of the RSS,' Viswam said.
Opposition Congress leader VD Satheesan echoed Viswam. 'Raj Bhawan should never become a stage for such events and actions. It is the office of the head of state. We raised the issue when Gurumurthy was invited to the governor's house,' he said, adding the Raj Bhawan should have invited defence experts and former ambassadors to the event.
Responding to the row, BJP leader Kummanam Rajasekharan said, 'I do not understand why Prasad or CPI leaders are reacting this way. The photograph of Bharat Mata should not be seen as a religious symbol.'
Governor Rajendra Arlekar, reacting to the controversy, said his office cannot remove the photo of Bharat Mata.
'I was told that a minister wanted the photo of Bharat Mata removed from the dais. I said we will do everything possible but we cannot remove (the photo of ) Bharat Mata. These are ideals for which we are living and we cannot do away with these. That was probably the reason why both ministers have not come here. I don't know what sort of thinking we have in our minds.'
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Time of India
31 minutes ago
- Time of India
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Indian Express
42 minutes ago
- Indian Express
Pakistan secures key roles in UNSC committees: Should India worry?
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Adopted unanimously by the UNSC after the 9/11 terror attacks, the Chapter VII Resolution — these are binding on all UN member states — extensively laid down the responsibilities of states to counter terrorism. How did Pakistan secure these positions? What do they mean substantially? And does India need to worry? Pakistan's Chairmanship/Vice-Chairmanship of these Committees was procedurally inevitable. Each of these committees are considered 'subsidiary organs' of the Council, according to Article 28 of the UN Charter. Hence, both the 1988 TSC and 1373 CTC comprise all 15 members of the Council at any given time. By virtue of its two-year UNSC membership, any elected non-permanent member invariably takes the helm of at least one of the Council's several subsidiary bodies, at some point in their tenure. This possibility is made more inevitable statistically, since the UNSC's permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) do not chair sanctions committees, to avoid conflicts of interest — given their significant roles in enforcing key sanctions against designated individuals and entities. For instance, the United States holds significant influence over the international financial system which is crucial for sanctions implementation. and has its own extensive unilateral OFAC sanctions on the Taliban. But it has never Chaired the 1988 Committee. However, this design of non-permanent members as Chairs has also resulted in an overburdened system. The 2018 Annual Briefing of the UNSC (by Committee Chairs) for instance, emphasised the need for 'a new system that ensures a fair distribution of chairmanships among permanent and elected members'. While this older system continues, the Council also looks to select its Committee Chairs in a 'balanced, transparent, efficient and inclusive way' — an effort explicitly acknowledged in a UNSC Presidential Note from July, 2016. Pakistan being voted as a UNSC non-permanent member from the Asia-Africa grouping in June 2024 already set it up for eventual committee chairmanships. However, there is sufficient evidence to show that the capabilities, willingness, and political positions of a state influence the decision of the Council (expressed through its President) to appoint a member as the Chair of a certain committee. It would thus seem that Pakistan has the confidence of the current Council to serve as the Chair of the 1988 Committee — and thus to hold the power to propose and prepare (with consultations) the Committee's agenda. That said, the position of Chair does not bring with it any special substantial powers, and Pakistan's space to harm India's interests is limited. Here's why. One, the 1988 Committee has had to work with a significant change in context vis-à-vis its list of sanctioned individuals and entities. Unlike in 2011, the Taliban have been Kabul's de-facto rulers for at least four years, and are working hard to gain international legitimacy. And unlike in 2022, when India (as 1988 Committee Chair) oversaw the cancellation of waivers to key Taliban leaders such as Amir Khan Muttaqi (currently Acting Foreign Minister), New Delhi now engages the same individuals directly as it attempts engagement-without-recognition with the Taliban. The group's own relationship with Pakistan has also significantly deteriorated, but remains steady, with Muttaqi meeting both Indian and Pakistani officials since August, 2021. Strictly within the context of the 1988 Committee — which oversees just over 130 Taliban-linked sanctioned individuals — the Chair's role is to monitor sanctions verification and consider modifications of the list. In any case, even without a consensus-based model, Pakistan would not be able to unilaterally push through the listing or de-listing of new individuals. Two, unlike the UNSC itself, its subsidiary bodies like the CTC, are technical bodies with an ambit to ensure implementation by member states of UNSCR 1373 and linked resolutions. A majority of the CTC's tasks, along with that of its assisting body, the Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate, are focused on building states' capacity to counter terror, offer technical assistance, and promote best practices to ensure the implementation of UNSCR 1373. The Global Implementation Surveys that the CTC conducts, show that the Committee has no role in investigating terror attacks, recommending sanctions on entities, or designating any individual or entity for terrorism. Pakistan's Vice Chairmanship of the CTC itself serves as proof of the Committee's design — one focused on working with states directly for capacity building rather than implementing punitive measures against violating parties. This is especially as Pakistan has evidently continued to violate multiple operational clauses of UNSCR 1373, including those provisions obligating states to deny safe haven to terrorists or to ensure that those involved in terrorism are brought to justice. Three, in the UNSC's subsidiary committees, Pakistan's instrument of influence has primarily been disabling and indirect — to prevent Indian efforts at designating key Pakistan based terrorists, with China's backing. This was recently evident in 2022, when India proposed sanctions on Abdul Rauf Azhar (then JeM Deputy Chief) in the 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions committee. The proposal fell through with China the only hold out among the 15 UNSC members. On the other hand, Pakistan has limited enabling or direct influence. It holds neither the Chairmanship nor the Vice Chairmanship of the 1267 Committee, where at least 50 sanctioned individuals are linked to Pakistan. So, should India worry? Pakistan's willingness and intent to leverage UN positions for its own ends, has long been evident. However, Pakistan's Chairmanship and Vice Chairmanship roles at the UNSC's subsidiary bodies do not represent a direct diplomatic threat to Indian interests at the UN. Rather, Pakistan's continued preference for cross-border terrorism as a policy instrument against India, reflects the larger structural failures of both the Council and its subsidiary committees as effective instruments to check terrorism. Moreover, the lack of substantial debate in these committees, as well as its consensus model — where every member has to agree for a proposal to go through — has been cited even by past Chairs, such as Gerard van Bohemen of New Zealand in 2016, as the 'single biggest inhibitor to Committee effectiveness'. It is Pakistan's membership in the Council as a whole — especially when it takes over the rotational Presidency in July — which presents a larger issue. In 2013, Pakistan attempted to use its rotational Presidency of the UNSC to redirect the UN's focus towards Kashmir. It also sought to gloss over its own inadequacies in countering terrorism, by successfully initiating a ministerial debate on counter-terrorism presided over by then Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, less than two years after US Navy Seals killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. Again, while the UNSC Presidency does not give Pakistan any special substantive powers, there are procedural advantages which Pakistan can use to its benefit. For example, the Presidency can bolster Pakistan's ability to convene closed door/informal consultations of the Council, given the UNSC President's sole authority to convene meetings in the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure.

The Hindu
an hour ago
- The Hindu
Sri Lanka's 13th Amendment at a Crossroads: Can the NPP Deliver on Minority Rights and Devolution?
Published : Jun 11, 2025 14:42 IST - 5 MINS READ Until a new, inclusive constitution is developed, Sri Lanka should implement the provisions of the 13th Amendment to its Constitution and hold elections to the provincial councils in the island nation, an academic study has said. The study, titled 'Divided and weakened: the collapse of minority politics in Sri Lanka', has been authored by Sri Lankan-British scholar Farah Mihlar and was released on June 11 by the Minority Rights Group, an international human rights organisation, and Oxford Brookes University. According to the study, the need of the hour was 'constitutional reforms that strengthen minority rights and non-discrimination'. The study also wanted the Sri Lankan government to find 'a political solution to the ethnic conflict acceptable to all communities that involves devolving power to minorities beyond the Thirteenth Amendment.' Also Read | Anura Dissanayake: The outsider with a difference The report acknowledged the fact that the Anura Kumara Dissanayake-led National People's Power (NPP) government, with its two-thirds majority, has a unique opportunity to transform the national narrative. Historic opportunity for NPP It said: 'The NPP historic opportunity to produce a constitution that represents all communities in Sri Lanka. Considering the many rights and justice claims that have a long history and were causes of the conflict, earnestly resolving them should be a priority for all political parties, mainstream national and ethnic minority ones alike, to ensure a just and lasting peace in Sri Lanka.' The 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution devolves powers to the Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern provinces, and was part of an accord signed by Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayawardene and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1987. That accord still remains the only hope for some autonomy for the Tamils of Sri Lanka. Rajiv Gandhi's defeat in the 1989 general election and the subsequent instability in India's polity for the next few years gave Sri Lanka the escape route it was looking for. The killing of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and the lack of interest in the Sri Lankan solution during Narasimha Rao's tenure as Prime Minister (1991-96) ensured that India did not push forward the implementation of the accord. However, many Sri Lankan politicians, across the ethnic divide, find the 13th Amendment unacceptable. Sinhala politicians consider it Indian interference in Sri Lankan affairs, while Tamil politicians say that the amendment will be of no effective consequence because power will only be transferred from the Sinhala majoritarian government in Colombo to the Governors appointed by the same federal government to the provinces. The NPP government, which was propelled to power because of people's disenchantment with the established political parties, has held elections to the local bodies. But so far, it has not announced a firm date for elections to the provincial councils. In the local body elections, NPP won a huge majority, winning over 250 of the 339 local body councils, but its vote share dropped by an alarming 34 per cent compared to the 2024 parliamentary election. In April 2025, when Dissanayake met Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi, Modi urged him to hold provincial elections. Collapse of minority politics The Farah Mihlar study noted that 'ethnic minority parties from all three minority communities [Tamils, Muslims and plantation Tamils] have splintered into several factions, and the larger, more popular ones are internally deeply divided. These divides have been caused in part as a consequence of majoritarian nationalism, but also due to weak leadership and allegations of corruption within parties.' The study concluded that minorities in the country have 'lost almost all space in the big political parties in Sri Lanka'. These parties cater to Sinhala nationalism and view this as the one and only route to political power. Minority politics in the nation is collapsing because of a host of factors ranging from corruption to minority political parties taking extreme positions. Since the end of the civil war in 2009, prominent minority parties, including the largest party, the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), have struggled to define their political path, given the prevalence of Tamil ultranationalism in the areas formerly affected by the civil war. The study said: 'Ethnic minority parties from among the second largest minority, Muslims, and the smaller Malaiyaga Tamil community (of recent Indian origin), present a story of disarray, division and lost credibility. These parties have erratically switched allegiances with nationalist mainstream parties trying to capitalise on shifting alliances and coalition formation, which eventually damaged them deeply. Their own lack of openness to new leadership and progressive reforms, amidst allegations of corruption, has not helped their cause.' Change in strategy At the national level, the study noted that there has been a change in strategy on minority representation: instead of fielding minority candidates, these parties are forming alliances and coalitions with ethnic minority parties while offering less space inside their own parties for both minority representatives and minority issues. Also Read | Is Sri Lanka witnessing a shift in its ethnic politics? It added: 'Minority representatives who have been elected from the former two major parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), and their various fronts have felt isolated, with little opportunity to take up minority issues in national party agendas.' It is in this context that recent NPP actions in many councils need to be seen. In Batticaloa, for instance, ITAK joined hands with the main opposition party, the Samagi Jana Balawegaya. to win the post of Mayor. The NPP, which stands for clean politics, joined hands with Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal, whose leader, Pillayan, is in jail on a kidnapping and killing charge. He is also accused of aiding and abetting those behind the April 2019 Easter attacks. Shanakiyan Rasamanickam, MP and ITAK leader, said: 'Given that Pillayan remains in custody over multiple serious allegations, the NPP's willingness to align with such a figure in pursuit of power has raised serious concerns.' As of today, with 159 MPs NPP's dominance in parliament is absolute. But it is increasingly under attack for its policies and what is seen as a lack of competence in governance. Despite the setbacks in governance, NPP has the unique opportunity to go beyond what other ruling combines have attempted on the political reconciliation front so far.