Who benefits from war?

Al Arabiya

17-02-2025

Whenever a murder occurs, the first suspicion falls on whoever stands to benefit from the victim's death. Investigations start from this premise and expand until the perpetrator is identified.
If we apply this simple and direct premise to the war in Sudan, it clearly leads us to the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated party, known in Sudan as the Islamic Movement. This group ruled the country with an iron fist for three decades, restructuring state institutions to serve its interests and embedding its ideologically driven members into every sector – including security, the judiciary, civil service, banks, and trade licensing. This process, known in the Islamic Movement's doctrine as Tamkeen (empowerment), was their comprehensive project to seize control of the state once and for all. They have the most direct interest in igniting this war.
During the three decades of Islamist rule in Sudan, despite their total control over state institutions, opposition movements remained active – especially among students, labor unions, and professionals. These groups continuously reorganized, maintaining ties with political parties that had suffered brutal repression, including imprisonment, persecution, infiltration, and division – often through bribery and the offer of government positions.
Despite these challenges, labor and political movements patiently organized themselves with deep knowledge of Sudanese society. This led to the December 2018 uprising, which lasted five months despite the extreme violence used against it. This strong and well-organized movement exhausted the ruling party's political and security apparatus, forcing it into major errors. These missteps encouraged more Sudanese – who had remained neutral – to join the uprising, which ultimately triumphed and ended a 30-year dictatorship.
The state's excessive use of violence failed to break the civil movement or push it toward abandoning its peaceful approach. Movement leaders were committed to nonviolence, recognizing Sudan's fragility and long history of civil wars. They understood that without a peaceful approach, the country could descend into total chaos.
The victory of the civilian revolution led to the formation of a transitional government with a set of critical tasks outlined in the transitional constitutional document. This document identified 16 key demands, focused on three main objectives: achieving peace, reviving the economy to improve people's livelihoods, and dismantling the one-party state in favor of a government representing all Sudanese.
However, the Islamists resisted the civilian-led project through multiple coups, culminating in the war that erupted on April 15. This war was primarily designed to eliminate the civilian political movement and erase the legacy of the December revolution, which had undermined Islamist rule in Sudan.
From the very first shot fired in the April 15 war, Islamist militias re-emerged on the political scene, operating from within the army's general command. They openly threatened political forces and youth-led committees that had spearheaded the civilian movement, vowing to eradicate the December revolution and its political legacy.
In contrast, from the first day of the war, the civilian forces consistently called for a political process to halt the conflict before it escalated into a full-scale war. Given Sudan's long history of civil wars, prolonging the conflict would deepen ethnic divisions and devastate the country's civil and security infrastructure.
A crucial question arises: why do Islamists persistently claim in their media narratives that the civilian forces of the December revolution threatened war and pushed the parties toward confrontation? Some still believe this claim, despite its weakness and lack of credibility.
Historical facts and recent events indicate that the civilian movement achieved victory through nonviolent political action – this was its fundamental strength. If the political landscape shifts toward militarization, the civilian movement risks losing this advantage.
Meanwhile, the Islamists, with their long history of armed conflict and deep experience in military operations, would thrive. They have well-trained militias alongside their entrenched presence in the state security apparatus, a structure they deliberately reinforced throughout their years in power. Choosing war would mean playing by their rules, in a field where they have the upper hand.
The second key point is that the civilian forces had already won twice through mass mobilization. First, in 2019, they ousted the Islamist-led government of Omar al-Bashir. Then, in October 2021, they thwarted a coup against their civilian government through sheer public pressure, forcing the military to negotiate an agreement that would have returned them to their barracks and established a new civilian government by April 2023.
That agreement would have restored civilian rule, raising a fundamental question: Why would a political movement ignite a war that would block its own path back to power? The logical answer is that the true instigators of the war were the political losers of that agreement – those with deep expertise in waging war.