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Myanmar's civil war: Rohingya Muslims to fight the Arakan Army, fighters to be recruited from...

Myanmar's civil war: Rohingya Muslims to fight the Arakan Army, fighters to be recruited from...

India.com19-06-2025
Myanmar's civil war: Rohingya Muslims to fight the Arakan Army, fighters to be recruited from...
Myanmar's civil war: The ongoing civil war in Myanmar has affected Rakhine state the most. In Rakhine, the Arakan Army (AA) has steadily gained ground against the junta regime in the past months and has captured most of the state. The AA's stance has been against the local Rohingya Muslims. Due to this, Rohingyas have been forced to migrate in large numbers. The result is that many rebel groups have joined the junta in the fight against the AA in Rakhine. This may increase the crisis of Rohingyas taking refuge in Bangladesh. These groups are recruiting fighters in Bangladesh itself.
According to the report, a new report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) says that Rohingya rebel groups have stopped the years-long war to control refugee camps in Bangladesh to focus on the fight for Rakhine. These factions are fighting against the AA with junta troops or allied militias.
Junta suffered the most losses in Rakhine
Rakhine state in Myanmar is the place where the military government has lost the most ground in the past 18 months. The Arakan Army has taken control of much of northern Rakhine and is preparing to take over the entire state. The junta is bombing resistance-controlled towns and cities with air strikes and trying to mobilize a former archenemy against the AA. In this effort, it seems to be getting support from Rohingya groups.
The Rohingya are a predominantly Muslim ethnic group with a long history of persecution in Myanmar. In recent times, the Arakan Army has been accused of committing genocide and trying to expel the Rohingya. Thomas Keane, Melbourne-based ICG advisor to Myanmar and Bangladesh, has said that in the past six months, Rohingya armed groups have stopped their infighting in the camps in southern Bangladesh and have intensified the recruitment of refugees. These groups believe that the only way to return home is to fight the Arakan Army.
ARSA will challenge AA
A major group challenging the AA is the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). ARSA has become a major force in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. This is a huge camp on the Bangladesh border, where most Rohingya refugees live. ARSA has fought Bangladeshi security forces and other armed groups for control of the camps.
Despite the long-standing opposition of the Myanmar military, over the past year, ARSA forces have fought against the AA in local media and ARSA representatives have joined forces with the junta in several operations. This has led to a rise in hate speech on social media, which could pose a new challenge to Bangladesh.
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If handled recklessly, the Rohingya crisis could well transform from a humanitarian burden into a geopolitical calamity. The writer is an author and a columnist. His X handle is @ArunAnandLive. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. tags : bangladesh Rohingyas view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: June 27, 2025, 14:56 IST News opinion Global Watch | How Not To Deal With The Rohingya Issue: Lessons From Bangladesh Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.

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