Japan to export used destroyers to Philippines to deter China, report says
The export plan involves six Abukuma-class destroyer escorts in service with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force for more than three decades, the Japanese daily said, citing multiple unnamed government sources.
Defense Ministers Gen Nakatani and Gilberto Teodoro agreed to the destroyer export when they met in Singapore last month, the Yomiuri said, adding that the Philippine military will inspect the ships this summer as part of the final preparations.
A delegation of naval experts from the Philippines will conduct an in-depth assessment of the ships, the Philippine Navy said in a statement on Sunday, following an official invitation from Japan's Defense Ministry.
"The outcome of this inspection will guide further deliberations on the potential acquisition and its alignment with the Philippine Navy's modernization efforts," it said, adding that the initiative reflects the deepening strategic partnership between the Philippines and Japan.
A Japanese Defense Ministry spokesperson declined to comment on the report and China's Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Tokyo and Manila say they face challenges from Beijing's increasingly assertive moves in waters including the South China Sea for the Philippines and the East China Sea for Japan.
Bilateral military cooperation has included joint exercises, a Japanese radar aid package and a high-level strategic dialogue. Last year they signed a reciprocal access agreement, the first such for Japan in Asia, allowing deployment of forces on each other's soil.
To clear military equipment export restrictions for the destroyers under Japan's pacifist mandates, Tokyo will treat the installation of equipment and communication systems requested by Manila as a joint development project, the Yomiuri said.
The Abukuma-class destroyer escort, a relatively small type of destroyer with a 2,000-ton standard displacement, is operated by a crew of about 120 and is armed with anti-submarine and anti-ship missiles, torpedo tubes and guns, according to a Japanese navy website.
The Philippine Navy does not have destroyers, only frigates and corvettes, which are typically smaller and lighter armed.
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