Preserving America's Air Battle Edge: Why Canceling The E-7 Would Be A Strategic Mistake

Forbes

18-06-2025

An artist's depiction shows an E-7A in flight.
The Pentagon's recent questioning of the Air Force plan to purchase 26 E-7 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft in favor of an option to use five Navy E-2s during a transition of the mission to space raises significant concerns about America's ability to achieve and maintain air superiority. Modern air combat takes a team, with the sensor and battle management expertise on board AEW&C aircraft a key part of that enterprise. They serve as the quarterbacks for the broader air superiority effort. Built on the Boeing 737 airframe and equipped with Northrop Grumman's advanced multirole electronically scanned array radar, the E-7 is the lynchpin for modern air battle management.
Modernization Long Overdue
The AEW&C mission is currently executed by the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. First fielded in the 1970s, it is based on the 1960s-era Boeing 707 airframe. Fifty years later, the aircraft and its associated mission systems are increasingly unsustainable. Today, E-3s require hand-crafted, aircraft junkyard, or 3D-printed parts due to absence of a supply base—the 707 airframe was retired by the airlines over 40 years ago. Commanders around the globe frequently call upon the AWACS, but more often than not, they are broken. Maintaining these aging aircraft through the mid-2030s is projected to cost nearly $10 billion.
The E-3 recapitalization crisis is not new. In 2001, then-Air Combat Command Commander Gen. John Jumper proposed the E-10 Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft to consolidate and replace multiple sensor aircraft that included the E-3, E-8, and RC-135. However, the E-10 program was cancelled in 2007 due to technical integration challenges, underfunding of the Air Force amidst an excessive focus on counterinsurgency operations, and a mistaken belief that China would not become an adversary. Since then, no serious AEW&C recapitalization was pursued, and the E-3 inventory grew older.
A decades-long vulnerability is now acute. Threats from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran demand modern, robust and resilient airborne command and control. Air Force Chief of Staff General David Allvin testified to Congress to that effect on May 6, 2025, when he explained that the E-3 is a 'dying platform,' and that only the E-7 can effectively replace it.
The E-7 is becoming the free-world's standard with Australia, United Kingdom, South Korea, and Turkey operating it. That makes the aircraft an export success—with allies funding a significant portion of the aircraft's development. The Department of Defense (DOD) should capitalize on this reality, not abandon it.
Moving the Mission to Space
A key rationale of those who support terminating the Air Force E-7 plan is the prospect of transitioning the airborne moving target indicator (AMTI) mission to space-based sensors, which may ultimately offer a more secure and persistent solution. While that solution path holds much promise, the scale and scope of the technical challenges involved with engineering, testing, and fielding an operationally relevant space-based AMTI enterprise will take many years if not decades.
The transition of the AMTI enterprise from air to space is an incredibly challenging mission evolution that requires significant technical invention. Cutting edge innovation takes time and therefore it is important to pursue a careful handoff. The reality is that combatant commanders require reliable AEW&C solutions today. It comes down to assuring air superiority capability at sufficient capacity to deter conflict. Failing deterrence, we must ensure that we can fight and win.
Even with a fully functioning space-based AMTI enterprise, there are limitations inherent with a space-based only solution. The optimal plan involves a collaborative multi-domain approach. That is why when asked about the AEW&C mission, Chief of Space Operations Gen Chance Saltzman explained: 'No one system is going to be perfectly optimized to take care of the full spectrum of ops. And so that's where I think you need a mix of systems.'
Advocates of the move to a space-based AMTI architecture acknowledge the need to bridge from the E-3 to space-based AMTI and have proposed the idea of pursuing the Navy's E-2 airborne early warning aircraft (AEW) as an alternative to the E-7. While the E-2 is effective in its intended role for aircraft carrier strike group defense, it was not designed for large-scale, multi-theater air battle management. Its smaller mission crew—three versus the E-7's complement of eight air battle managers, and two additional electronic warfare officers—limits its capacity for complex operations. Its radar, constrained by lower flight altitudes, offers less range and fidelity across the vast Indo-Pacific theater. The E-2's size hampers future upgrades, and its probe-and-drogue refueling system is incompatible with most Air Force tankers.
Furthermore, the proposed acquisition of just five E-2s is insufficient to backfill an E-3 inventory that recently numbered over 30 aircraft. U.S. combatant commanders require far more than five AEW&C aircraft dedicated to theater air battle management to fulfill the demands of the National Defense Strategy. Matching one E-7's capability would require multiple E-2Ds per mission—inefficient, impractical, and insufficient.
Human Capital is Overlooked in Proposed DOD Alternative
Absent in the Pentagon's latest proposal is the most important element of the AWE&C mission: human capital. Raw sensor data—whether coming from a space-based AMTI constellation or a handful of E-2s—does not manifest effective command and control. The actual mission—air battle management—requires highly trained personnel to interpret the various data inputs, correlate it into actionable information, and task various mission aircraft in accordance with operational and tactical objectives. This is a highly complex job that takes years of training and realistic practice to execute. It involves real-time surveillance, force direction, and coordination—not simply the transmission of data.
Future space-based AMTI concepts have yet to define where and how air battle managers integrate into the overarching mission. Thus far, the effort has been focused on technical solutions. That is only half the equation. This mission requires trained air battle managers who can translate sensor data into actionable information and direct it to the right combat elements—often within seconds—to achieve operational effects. The same challenge exists for the E-2 option given its smaller mission crew capacity.
The need for persistent air battle management is real and growing. The Indo-Pacific, European, and Central Command theaters all face threats from adversaries growing in capability. Ironically, China recognizes the value of modern AEW&C aircraft. That is why they field their own KJ-500 and are in the process of building more advanced versions.
The E-7 is Key to Keeping America's Air Battle Management Edge
Golden Dome is a result of a very appropriate increase in focus on homeland defense given the dangers posed by growing air and missile threats. This concern is validated by the attacks that Ukraine and Isreal are now experiencing—the U.S. could soon face similar challenges. The E-7 is central to Golden Dome's success in detecting and tracking cruise missiles, hostile aircraft, and drones. That is why U.S. Northern Command and NORAD Commander Gen. Gregory Guillot testified that the E-7's AMTI capability is essential to layered defense against these potential threats.
For those who argue the E-7 should be sunset given survivability concerns, yes, non-stealth aircraft like the E-7 are vulnerable to advanced adversary weapon systems—but so is the E-2, as are satellites, ships, armor, infantry, etc. Chinese and Russian anti-satellite weapons, jamming capabilities, and cyber threats could rapidly neutralize U.S. space assets in wartime. Survivability is best achieved through a diversified mix of platforms in both air and space, along with robust offensive and defense offensive measures—not only by placing AMTI capability in space.
Canceling the E-7 now would be a costly and strategic blunder. The Air Force has already invested $2.56 billion in the program. The insufficiency of a five-aircraft unit to meet combatant command requirements, the limitations of the proposed alternative for theater-wide air battle management, and the immaturity of the AMTI move to space all point to one conclusion: the DOD must move forward with E-7 acquisition. History is clear: air battle management, paired with modern fighters, is essential to achieving air superiority.
Pentagon leadership should reconsider terminating the E-7 program, and if not, Congress must fund its continuation and deployment. The consequences for U.S. national security of not moving forward with the Air Force E-7 program could be dire and are simply not worth the risk that the proposed DOD alternative entails.