Row over Hindi: Marathi literary body opposes three-language formula for Classes 1 to 5
'It is clearly mentioned (in NEP) that a third language should be introduced from Class 6,' a release from the Sahitya Mahamandal said.
The Mahamandal's statement came amid opposition from Congress and Raj Thackeray-led Maharashtra Navnirman Sena to an amended government order which said Hindi would 'generally' be a third language for these classes.
Pune, Jun 18 (PTI) The Akhil Bharatiya Marathi Sahitya Mahamandal, an apex Marathi literary body, on Wednesday opposed the Maharashtra government's decision to adopt a three-language formula for Classes 1 to 5, and said the New Education Policy does not recommend it.
It also questioned the need to teach a third language when many schools do not have enough teachers, and students of higher classes struggle to read Marathi books of Class 2 level.
'Instead of improving the quality of education, attempts are being made to make a third language compulsory,' it stated.
Though the state government has provided that students can opt for any other Indian language instead of Hindi, it would be practically impossible as teachers of these languages will have to be brought from a respective state which is very difficult, it said.
Its opposition to Hindi is for cultural reasons as Hindi's 'invasion' of Marathi was increasing, the Mahamandal said.
It also asked why the Maharashtra government has adopted such a policy when Hindi is not compulsory from Class 1 in any other state.
A government resolution (GR) or order issued on Tuesday said Hindi will 'generally' be a third language, instead of being mandatory, but gave an option to opt out if 20 students per grade in a school express the desire to study any other Indian language.
Speaking to reporters in Pune earlier in the day, Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis said, 'We had earlier made Hindi compulsory, but in the GR issued yesterday, that compulsion has been removed…. students can now opt for any Indian language as a third language.' PTI SPK KRK
This report is auto-generated from PTI news service. ThePrint holds no responsibility for its content.
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