China ups tariffs on American goods to 125%, will ‘ignore' future US hikes
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Beijing will 'simply ignore' any further tariff escalations from the US in the future, if Washington 'persists with its tariff number games,' according to a statement from the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council, China's cabinet.
At current duty rates, American goods exported to China already have no market viability, the commission said.
'Even if the US further raises tariffs to even higher levels, it would be economically meaningless and would ultimately become a laughingstock in the history of global economics,' it added.
'However, should the US insist on continuing to substantially harm China's interests, China will resolutely institute countermeasures and see them through to the end.'
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After a series of back-and-forth tariff salvoes, as it stands, Washington has imposed a 145 per cent duty on Chinese imports this year, bringing the effective rate to about 156 per cent. Meanwhile, Beijing's new levies on US goods have risen to 125 per cent, also on top of previous tariffs.
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