US to send upgraded long-range bombs to Ukraine
The GLSDB, jointly developed by Boeing and SAAB AB, combines the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb with the M26 rocket motor, creating a weapon with a range of approximately 100 miles (161 kilometers).
The administration of former President Joe Biden sent an undisclosed number of GLSDB units to Kiev, but it has been 'months' since Ukrainian forces last used the bomb against Russia after it proved ineffective last year, sources told Reuters.
Russia's electronic warfare capabilities rendered precision-guided Western munitions – including GLSDB and GPS-guided Excalibur artillery shells – 'useless,' the Wall Street Journal reported in July. With their guidance systems scrambled, some of these weapons were reportedly retired within weeks of being deployed.
Since then, Boeing has introduced several upgrades, including reinforced internal connections to enhance resistance to jamming. According to Reuters sources, at least 19 GLSDBs were test-fired in 'recent weeks' to assess the effectiveness of the modifications. The US has stockpiled a significant number of these relatively inexpensive bombs in Europe and is 'poised' to resume shipments to Kiev within days, the publication reported.
The potential replacement comes amid reports that Ukraine has depleted its stockpile of US-supplied Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), which have a longer range of 300 km.
Kiev began using ATACMS missiles for strikes into internationally recognized Russian territory in the autumn of 2024, particularly targeting the border regions of Kursk, Bryansk, Belgorod, and Rostov. However, the stockpile was fully exhausted by late January, the Associated Press reported on Wednesday.
Moscow has repeatedly warned the US and its allies against permitting long-range Ukrainian strikes, arguing that such attacks would make NATO a direct participant in the conflict due to Kiev's reliance on Western-supplied weapons.
In response to Ukraine's first ATACMS strikes in November last year, Russia launched its new hypersonic Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile at the Yuzhmash military-industrial facility in the Ukrainian city of Dnepr.
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