C Raja Mohan writes: Eurasian powers must find political answers to security problems

Indian Express

4 hours ago

Having shaken the Middle East by bombing Iran's nuclear facilities and facilitating a fragile ceasefire between Tel Aviv and Tehran, US President Donald Trump has turned his disruptive energies to Europe. This week's NATO summit in The Hague is a pivotal moment for the transatlantic alliance and the broader European security order. But the implications of Trump's disruptive interventions are not confined to the Middle East or Europe. They reverberate across the Indo-Pacific, and could herald a wider transformation in Eurasian geopolitics.
As Washington becomes an agent of profound structural change in both the Middle East and Europe, new centres of gravity are beginning to emerge. Among them is Germany, which is repositioning itself from a 'reluctant power' into the strategic anchor in Europe. A German-led Europe could, in turn, become a key player in the future of Eurasia.
This year's 32-member NATO summit takes place amid deepening anxieties about the alliance's future. The basic assumptions of NATO look increasingly unsustainable. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, persistent transatlantic tensions, and Trump's repeated questioning of NATO's utility have pushed the alliance into uncharted territory. Trump's insistence that Europe take full ownership of its security is compelling a long-overdue geopolitical reckoning on the old continent.
The search for new strategic leadership within Europe has turned to Germany — its economic dynamo and geopolitical core. When NATO was founded in 1949, its first secretary-general, Lord Ismay, famously declared its goal: 'To keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.' In the post-War order, this formula made sense: A divided Germany had to be contained; the Soviet threat loomed large; and American military and economic might underwrote Western Europe's security.
But the present moment demands a very different configuration. For decades, Germany embraced constitutional pacifism and avoided hard power politics. Even after reunification and its rise as a global economic force, Berlin remained content to rely on American security guarantees. This solidified its image as an 'economic giant' and 'geopolitical dwarf'.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shattered that wisdom about Germany. Chancellor Olaf Scholz's declaration of a Zeitenwende —a historic turning point —marked the beginning of Germany's strategic reorientation. A €100 billion special fund was set aside to modernise the Bundeswehr, the German armed forces. Berlin pledged to meet NATO's defence spending target of 2 per cent of GDP, and took the unprecedented step of supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine.
That transition is now being consolidated under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, whose firmer stance on defence reflects a broader consensus in Berlin about the need for German leadership in a turbulent Europe. Under Merz, Germany has not only accelerated military modernisation but has also taken on frontline roles — leading NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence in Lithuania and pledging to permanently deploy a combat-ready brigade there.
Germany is emerging as a 'security provider' at a time when the Russian threat looms and America is not reliable. The urgency of Europe's strategic recalibration is underscored by Trump's warmth towards Vladimir Putin, his refusal to acknowledge a Russian threat to Europe and repeated calls to reintegrate Russia into the G8, and his pressure on Ukraine to trade territory for peace with Moscow. But the bigger question is this: If Trump does not view Russia as a threat and seeks reconciliation with Moscow, Europe will need more than higher defence spending. It will need to recalibrate its regional relations.
Trump's actions in the Middle East mirror this disregard for traditional threat perceptions and a penchant for breaking geopolitical taboos. His first term saw the brokering of the Abraham Accords between Israel and some Arab states. He is now seeking to extend these to include Saudi Arabia. Some in Trump's inner camp are dreaming of 'Cyrus Accords' that will promote normalisation of relations between Iran and Israel when Tehran breaks loose from the stranglehold of the present theocracy. The name comes from Cyrus the Great, the Persian king who liberated the Jews from the Babylonian captivity 2,500 years ago. Meanwhile, the weakening of Iran is bound to rejig regional balances in the Middle East.
As Trump rethinks US relations with Russia and China, major powers in Europe and Asia will have to rethink their great power relations and look beyond the US security alliances. The same doubts about US commitments to Eurasia that haunt European capitals now resonate in Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra, and Wellington. The absence of Asian leaders from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea at this year's NATO summit marks a stark shift. In recent years, these nations sought to strengthen Asia-Europe coordination through NATO.
None of America's European or Asian allies can really meet the 5 per cent of GDP defence spending goal being demanded by Washington. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, eager to please Trump by signalling a new consensus in favour of spending 5 per cent, glosses over the differences with the US. The US President is, however, not affirming the American commitment to defend the Europeans against Russia. The uncertainty triggered by Trump's approach is bound to compel Europe to eventually seek 'strategic autonomy' from Washington. Merz recognises this when he says the higher spending on defence is not just about accommodating Trump but of dealing with the existential threats to European security, especially from Russia.
Eurasian powers can't simply solve their security problems by throwing money at the military. They will have to find political answers to their security problems. Such solutions will inevitably involve rethinking their current fraught relations with their neighbours. From the war in Ukraine to the bombings to restructure Iran's regime, and from the questioning of NATO to the shadow over America's Asian alliances, there is the unmistakable sense that we are at the birth of a new geopolitical order in Eurasia.
For Europe, this means a more assertive Germany at the heart of NATO. For the Middle East, it could mean a gradual shift away from US military guarantees towards regional reconciliation. And in the Indo-Pacific, it implies a growing need for independent strategies and deeper political and military coordination among US allies and partners. The transitions will not be easy, but an America that is turning inwards should help concentrate the minds of Eurasian decision makers.
India, which straddles the three regions, must adapt. Delhi's growing strategic engagement with Europe, its openness to partnerships with all major actors in the Middle East, and its recent effort to stabilise ties with China and strengthen independent engagement with ASEAN, Australia, Japan, and South Korea, while deepening ties with Trump's America, should position it well to navigate this emerging world of diminished certainties.
The writer is a visiting professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Strategic and Defence Studies in Delhi and a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express