Conflict undermines cooperation
Let me be clear, there is no treasure chest to be won here. The land in dispute has little intrinsic value. The most sensitive issue is the ownership of relatively small pieces of land that contain the ruins of two Hindu temples. I am sure I am not the only person to wonder what the priests who served the temples would think of their ruins being the centrepiece of armed conflict.
The broader issue is that, in today's world, we increasingly face problems that can only be solved through collective action. This was not so true even a few decades ago. Then, South Korea, Taiwan, or Singapore could, with the right mix of policies, invite investors to build manufacturing or assembly centres that would produce consumer goods for Western markets, paying good wages. Factory Asia required considerable work on the part of the governments, but not necessarily the cooperation of their neighbours.
Today, there is still room to join Factory Asia; however, emerging problems will make development harder, problems that require worldwide, coordinated action. Climate change is one such challenge. Without a collective shift in our behaviour and a globally coordinated effort, we will continue to suffer from heatwaves, more intense storms, and higher sea levels, which will degrade seaports and coastal agricultural areas. We will only turn back this present danger if we have global cooperation on an unprecedented scale. Conflict of the type seen at the border of Cambodia and Thailand will inhibit public collaboration between the two countries, weakening Southeast Asia's voice in any global effort.
Climate change is only one of the problems we face that requires an international effort to solve. Across Southeast Asia, fish stocks are collapsing. This imperils the food security of many people in the region. But, as is often said, fish do not need passports; they travel from one part of the oceans to another, and without a general agreement to reduce overfishing, the stocks will not recover. Hostile relations between any of the countries in Southeast Asia will make any effort to address this much harder.
I'm sure every reader has a list of problems they worry about, such as a new pandemic. Some of these will demand a coordinated multi-country effort. It is possible to have this. In an earlier dustup between Cambodia and Thailand, in 2009, as a Director for the Asian Development Bank (ADB), I was privileged to chair a meeting in Bangkok of the transport sector of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) programme. This initiative brings together the governments of mainland Southeast Asia, including Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Thailand, as well as China, which participates through Yunnan Province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.
These governments have come together to jointly plan and carry out cross-border projects that enhance the potential for sustainable development. Transportation is a key element, especially for the interior areas of these countries. Without access to the coast, the people of these areas are unable to participate in the international trade that has driven regional development. Cross-border road systems enable trucks to transport goods from factories to ports in neighbouring countries. At the local level, improved roads ease travel to markets, schools, and health facilities.
At the time of the Bangkok meeting, the GMS had mobilised roughly $10 billion (324.7 billion baht) to fund transportation projects. The government officials had gathered to consider how to move forward in the sector. As the teams reviewed project proposals, news arrived of a fight at the border between Cambodia and Thailand. We understood that at least one person had died and many were injured.
I watched as the teams agonised over whether they could continue collaborating. Fairly quickly, however, the decision was made by all to continue. It was explained to me that, although the relationship between the two countries was strained, the officials at our meeting had been tasked with working together. They understood that the quality of life and the livelihoods of literally millions of people in the region depended on improved transport, something that could not occur without meaningful collaboration.
This decision required political courage, and I don't know if even the most dedicated official could have sustained that position if the effort had needed more than a few days and had been more in the public eye. Unfortunately, the problems that face the countries of Southeast Asia, indeed the problems that face the global community, will require both sustained and very public cooperation. The ceasefire in place is welcome, but it should be viewed as a first step towards building a relationship that will enable Cambodia and Thailand to collaborate meaningfully in addressing the broader problems that face us.
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Bangkok Post
a day ago
- Bangkok Post
A difference of opinion
When the moment of truth came -- that Thailand had been slapped with a 19% tariff by the US, down from the originally threatened 36% -- several implications for the government were spelt out by experts, both positive and cautionary. The fact that the government successfully negotiated the tariff rate down to 19% allows it to claim a diplomatic and economic victory. It positions the government as competent in international negotiations and responsive to economic threats, especially after an extended period of vulnerability from the Trump administration's tariffs, according to supporters. Public and business confidence in the government, particularly among exporters and investors, may temporarily improve. The government can exploit this as protecting national economic interests in a fragile post-pandemic and post-border conflict environment, experts said. Government supporters insisted the outcome of the negotiations has enhanced the stature of noted technocrats like Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira or government adviser Dr Prommin Lertsuridej as effective economic stewards, and shored up the beleaguered government's image. It has, in turn, helped stabilise an increasingly fragile coalition government under heavy scrutiny for lacking strong economic leadership or a long-term plan. Also, the concessions made to the US -- elimination of import duties on more than 10,000 American products -- may trigger criticism from domestic industries that now face heightened foreign competition. This includes agriculture and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) at risk of being undermined by cheaper US imports. Critics have framed the deal as capitulating to American pressure, portraying it as a win for Washington but a loss for Thailand's long-term competitiveness. The tariff issue also indicates a tilt towards the US at a time when Thailand must perform a careful diplomatic balancing act amid the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict, where regional alliances are under scrutiny. Pro-Beijing elements, or nationalist factions, are questioning the wisdom of relying too heavily on Western markets, according to observers. The tariff deal still requires parliamentary approval, which means the legislative process could revive political tensions if the opposition exploits the deal to question the government's transparency or economic strategy. At the same time, intra-coalition differences could emerge over how the tariff concessions align with broader industrial and agricultural policies. The experts agreed that while the lower US tariff is a strategic, diplomatic and economic relief, it is not without political cost. The government must play its cards right and manage the domestic industrial fallout, sell the deal politically, and prepare for parliamentary scrutiny -- all while navigating geopolitical sensitivities in a shifting regional order. Meanwhile, former finance minister Korn Chatikavanij has warned of long-term risks from the US tariff, urging the government to invest more in sharpening the country's competitive edge. Mr Korn has issued a sobering analysis of the 19% import tariff, which directly impacts Thai exporters. While acknowledging that Thailand avoided harsh penalties with the 36% tariff, he noted the compromise came at a high price and that urgent domestic reforms are needed to prevent the country falling further behind in a hostile global trade environment. In a post titled "What Will 19% Mean?", published on his Facebook page, Mr Korn expressed some relief that Thailand secured a tariff rate comparable to other Asean countries, despite the diplomatic challenges that led up to the outcome. "The 19% came at the cost of Thai people's blood and sweat," Mr Korn wrote. "There had been no indication that Trump saw value in our proposals -- until he seized the opportunity to play the hero in ending the [Thai-Cambodian] standoff. That's why some have called the outcome a 'Peace Dividend'." Notably, Mr Korn pointed out that the US did not distinguish between Thailand and Cambodia in assigning tariff rates, despite Cambodia initially facing a 49% rate. Both now face the same 19%, showing Washington's strategic rather than moral calculus. While Thailand managed to hold its ground diplomatically, Mr Korn stressed that international perceptions remain a concern and that there is more work to be done in communicating Thailand's position to the global community. The former finance minister warned that Thai exporters will inevitably suffer lower profit margins under the new tariff structure. The added costs, compounded by the potential drop in American consumer demand due to rising prices, could dampen Thailand's export performance. He also highlighted the indirect consequences of the US tariffs on global trade dynamics. With China facing growing difficulty rerouting its exports via transshipments to evade tariffs, Thailand may see a surge of cheap Chinese goods flooding into its domestic market, posing an additional hardship for local manufacturers. Mr Korn applauded Mr Pichai for outlining the correct policy direction -- preparing relief measures through low-interest credit packages for affected businesses and pushing for long-term competitiveness enhancements. He also hammered home the importance of transparency, urging the government to disclose the terms of its negotiations with the US under Section 178 of the Constitution, which requires parliamentary oversight of international agreements. "Trump is the clearest winner," Mr Korn concluded. "He has succeeded in extracting US$300–500 billion annually in tariffs from global trade partners. The message is clear: in this era, friendship is irrelevant -- only mutual interests matter." Mr Korn closed his analysis with a warning: Thailand must not rely on diplomatic luck or external protection. The only sustainable path forward is internal development, reform, and innovation. "If we don't adapt," he warned, "we'll only become more disadvantaged." Waiting in the wings? With tensions along the Thai-Cambodian border showing no sign of easing and the prospect of a general election looming, observers now see the possible rise of a new political force. They envisage a fresh conservative party capable of tackling political, economic and security problems while putting forward a prime ministerial candidate who can stand shoulder-to-shoulder with those from existing political parties. Such a candidate need not be a career politician, but must possess an unblemished record, free of any links to Cambodia's leadership. And with many in the conservative camp increasingly dissatisfied with existing conservative parties, speculation is rife that any new party aligning itself with the armed forces could have an advantage at the polls. Stithorn Thananithichot, a political science lecturer at Chulalongkorn University, said a great deal of public support is directed towards the armed forces for its handling of the border conflict with Cambodia. And while such a party and candidate have yet to step up, existing political parties are likely to court the military and position themselves as its allies to capitalise on public sentiment as they prepare for the polls, he noted. While Bhumjaithai appears to be the most trusted option for conservative voters -- as opposed to the ruling Pheu Thai Party -- the party, as well as the United Thai Nation Party (UTN) and the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP), have fallen short of expectations despite having been in the government for the past two years, he said. He said Bhumjaithai has seen a slight increase in popularity after withdrawing from the coalition government, which suggests that there are still millions of conservative voters up for grabs if the right strategy is in place. "When they see this significant voter base, all conservative parties will scramble for a strong prime ministerial candidate and economic policy, as well as a military reform plan that the public actually wants. But so far, no one has emerged," the analyst said. However, he said that outgoing central bank governor Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput appears to fit the bill. He is widely considered capable, committed to national interests, and did not bow to political pressure to safeguard the central bank's independence and maintain the country's international fiscal credibility. "Even if he is politically inexperienced, I don't think that voters will look at it as a problem. They're all too familiar with smooth-talking politicians with vested interests. The only question is whether Mr Sethaput has any interest in politics," he said. Mr Sethaput's five-year term at the central bank ends on Sept 30, and he will be succeeded by Vitai Ratanakorn, currently president and CEO of the state-owned Government Savings Bank (GSB). Thanaporn Sriyakul, director of the Political and Public Policy Analysis Institute, said a new conservative party will need figures like Mr Sethaput or former central bank governor Veerathai Santiprabhob to win over voters. Both have earned a lot of trust from technocrats and have shown that they have had no vested interests while in the jobs they occupied. This is in stark contrast to some towering figures who pull strings in politics, he said. However, he said if conservative voters feel deeply attached to the military, the chief of the defence forces, Gen Songwit Noonpakdee, who is scheduled to retire at the end of September, could be among their top choices for prime minister. Gen Songwit is regarded as a forward-thinking individual, as illustrated in his handling of Thai-Cambodian tensions, he said. "He's the first and only supreme commander to unify all branches of the armed forces under a strategic plan. In the past, each branch operated separately," he said. Whether the general harbours any political ambitions will only become clear after his retirement, he said. As for the Bhumjaithai Party, which is the most popular among the existing conservative parties, it still has much work to do if it wants to secure substantial support, according to Mr Thanaporn. First and foremost, it will have to come up with a military reform proposal to streamline the armed forces to make them lean, yet effective. However, Bhumjaithai will be competing with the People's Party (PP), which is reportedly devising its own ambitious reform platform, he said. According to the analyst, the PP's military reform plan is said to include trimming excess military spending and restructuring the armed forces to address not only the Cambodian border situation but also other potential flashpoints.
Bangkok Post
3 days ago
- Bangkok Post
Rare earths are definitely China's trump card
China's weaponisation of rare earths has emerged as a major flash point in US-China trade negotiations. These critical materials, especially the high-performance magnets they make possible, are vital components in electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, industrial robotics, and advanced defence systems. In response to China's strict rare-earths export controls, the United States has quietly lowered tariffs, relaxed export controls on AI chips, and even softened visa restrictions for Chinese students. At the same time, the US is scrambling to secure alternative supplies. In July, the Department of Defense announced a landmark multi-billion-dollar investment package to boost MP Materials, the company behind America's flagship rare-earths project. But what if, despite massive subsidies and years of effort, the US still can't escape its dependence on Chinese rare earths? Japan offers a cautionary tale. In 2010, following a maritime standoff over the Senkaku Islands, China abruptly cut off exports of rare-earth to Japan. In response, the Japanese government pursued a series of strategic measures: investing in Lynas Rare Earths, an Australian producer; boosting domestic research and development in recycling and substitution; forging its own commercial partnerships with Chinese magnet manufacturers; and building strategic stockpiles to cushion future supply shocks. More than a decade later, Japan still sources over 70% of its imports of rare-earths from China. China's rare-earths dominance wasn't built overnight, and it won't be easily eroded. Its strength does not lie in hoarding raw materials, but in the industrial capacity to refine, process, and produce at scale. Today, China controls between 85% and 90% of global rare-earths refining capacity, and produces roughly 90% of the world's high-performance rare-earths magnets. It is the only country with a fully vertically integrated rare-earths supply chain -- from mining to chemical separation to magnet fabrication. China's manufacturing edge has given it not only an industrial lead, but also a technological moat. Between 1950 and 2018, China filed more than 25,000 rare earths-related patents, more than twice the number filed in the US. Decades of hands-on experience in the complex chemistry and metallurgy of rare-earths processing have yielded a depth of expertise that Western firms cannot easily replicate. Moreover, in December 2023, China's government moved to cement its lead, imposing sweeping export bans on the technologies behind rare-earths extraction, separation and magnet production. China's lax environmental regulation has also given its firms a powerful advantage over their Western competitors. In 2002, the Mountain Pass Rare Earth Mine in California was forced to halt refining operations after a toxic waste spill. By contrast, China's more permissive regulatory environment has allowed rare-earths production to expand rapidly, with fewer delays and far lower costs. Importantly, rare-earths chokepoints are not fixed; they evolve with technology. China understood this, waiting patiently as Western dependence on rare-earths magnets increased exponentially with the global green transition, which created massive demand for EVs and wind turbines. Even if the West succeeds in building a parallel supply chain for today's rare-earths needs, tomorrow's chokepoints may lie elsewhere. Quantum computing, for example, increasingly depends on rare isotopes like ytterbium-171, as well as on elements such as erbium and yttrium. These emerging applications could become the next pressure points, leaving the US and its allies once again racing to catch up. The US therefore must confront an uncomfortable truth: China's dominance in rare earths is likely to endure for the foreseeable future. Defensive strategies like supply-chain diversification may address some vulnerabilities, but true resilience demands an offensive strategy that enhances American leverage. The US still holds many valuable cards. As long as it retains control over technologies or infrastructure that China cannot live without -- be it advanced chips, frontier AI models, and access to the dollar-based financial system -- China has a strong incentive to keep rare earths flowing. For years, though, the US has pursued the opposite course: gradually decoupling and restricting key technology flows to China. Since the first Trump administration, the US playbook has been to blacklist leading Chinese tech firms and tighten export controls on cutting-edge chips. While these measures initially hobbled Chinese firms such as Huawei and ZTE, slowing the country's AI development, they have proved difficult to enforce. Riddled with loopholes, they created opportunities for enforcement arbitrage. As outgoing US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo conceded in December 2024, "Trying to hold China back is a fool's errand." At the same time, US export controls have galvanized efforts in China to build indigenous alternatives, effectively accelerating the rise of national champions like Huawei. Far from strengthening American leverage over China, US policy is steadily eroding it. If you are Nvidia, losing access to the Chinese market doesn't just mean forfeiting billions in revenue. It means losing influence over the most important AI ecosystem for developers outside the US. Recent policy shifts suggest that this realisation is starting to take hold. The Trump administration's decision to relax restrictions on sales of Nvidia's H20 chips to China signals a move away from blanket bans and toward more calibrated engagement. Counterintuitively, such engagement may be a smarter form of de-risking. The more that China relies on American technology, the more deeply the two sides' supply chains will become entangled, and the harder it will become for China to weaponise its own strategic assets, including rare earths. ©2025 Project Syndicate Angela Huyue Zhang, Professor of Law at the University of Southern California, is the author of 'High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy' (Oxford University Press, 2024) and 'Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism: How the Rise of China Challenges Global Regulation' (Oxford University Press, 2021).
Bangkok Post
08-08-2025
- Bangkok Post
Malaysia minister to seek clarity from Myanmar on election
KUALA LUMPUR - Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan will seek details from Myanmar's military leadership about a planned election when he leads a four-nation delegation to the war-torn country next month, Malaysian state media reported on Friday. Myanmar has been in chaos since a 2021 military coup against an elected civilian government plunged the country into civil war. Last week, the junta lifted a nationwide state of emergency and nominally transferred power to a civilian-led government ahead of the election, although the junta chief remained in charge of the country in his other role as acting president. "I want to obtain a clearer picture (of the elections) to bring to the attention of Asean leaders in October," Mohamad said, referring to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations grouping, Malaysian state news agency Bernama reported. Mohamad, who will be accompanied by his counterparts from Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia for the trip on Sept 19, wanted clarity on whether Myanmar would hold a comprehensive election, Bernama reported. Myanmar state media has reported that martial law and a state of emergency would be imposed in more than 60 townships across nine regions and states, with voting to be held in December and January. Last month, Mohamad said Asean had agreed that an election in Myanmar was not a priority and urged the junta to adhere to the grouping's "five-point consensus" peace plan instead. Myanmar is an Asean member, but its generals have been barred from attending the bloc's key meetings since 2022 for failing to honour the peace plan. Malaysia is the current chair of Asean. Myanmar's election has been dismissed by Western governments as a sham to entrench the generals' power and is expected to be dominated by proxies of the military, with opposition groups either barred from running or refusing to take part.
