‘Yoon Again': calls for ousted South Korean president's return as political rift deepens
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'Fraudulent impeachment! Null and void!' the crowd shouted, as Yoon hugged younger supporters, shook hands and exited the grounds shortly after 5pm local time. He waved to the crowd and raised a clenched fist before leaving.
The couple returned to their private home in southern Seoul, exactly one week after the Constitutional Court unanimously upheld Yoon's impeachment over his attempt to impose martial law in December – a move it ruled unconstitutional and based on unsubstantiated claims of election interference by China and North Korea.
Yet for Yoon's core supporters – many of them older, deeply conservative and staunchly anti-communist – the ruling only deepened mistrust towards the judiciary, the opposition and even members of his own People Power Party.
Supporters of Yoon Suk-yeol hold 'Yoon Again' signs in Seoul, South Korea, on Friday. Photo: Kim Jung-yeop
Seventy-year-old retiree Moon Keun-chan echoed a common refrain: that Yoon's downfall was not just a political misstep, but also a setback in the country's battle against communism.
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AllAfrica
19 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Putin-Trump talks shift focus from ceasefire to peace deal
If you read the headlines in American and European newspapers, you would conclude that the Alaska Summit failed. It did not. Washington changed direction and abandoned its support for a ceasefire. Here is Trump's official statement: A great and very successful day in Alaska! The meeting with President Vladimir Putin of Russia went very well, as did a late-night phone call with [Ukrainian] President Zelensky of Ukraine, and various European Leaders, including the highly respected Secretary General of NATO. It was determined by all that the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a peace agreement, which would end the war, and not a mere ceasefire agreement, which often does not hold up. President Zelensky will be coming to DC, the Oval Office, on Monday (August 18) afternoon. If all works out, we will then schedule a meeting with President Putin. Potentially, millions of people's lives will be saved.' The summit's major outcome was that the push for a ceasefire agreement, a non-starter for the Russian side, has been taken off the table. This will come as a big shock for Zelensky and Europe, although Zelensky has already announced he will be in Washington on Monday to meet with Trump. The agenda is an actual peace agreement, not a ceasefire. We don't know anything about the terms Trump will suggest, but it will involve territorial adjustments. Trump will try and convince Zelensky to cooperate, but it is a good bet that he won't. Nor will his backers in Europe. Should the above prediction hold, Trump will have to figure out what to do next. He could go back to trying to squeeze the Russians with more sanctions or other punishments. But that would require yet another reversal and won't achieve anything. The foreign policy crowd has been betting that the Russian economy is so bad that the whole Russian enterprise might collapse if the West jacks up the pressure on Russia. A good result, in this estimation, would be for Russia to surrender or for Putin's government to collapse. Even under dire circumstances, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the ruble, with massive unemployment, shut-down factories and crazy-high inflation, Boris Yeltsin, then president, found a way forward, and Russia did not have a civil war, and government institutions started to restore their authority. Yeltsin's administration lasted eight years and was replaced by a more conservative and authoritarian leader, Vladimir Putin. It is very hard to accurately read sentiment in Russia. Generally speaking, the Russians like order and certainty, and dislike war. If there was a hard sense in the Russian public, especially the top echelons of Russian society, that the Ukraine war was a disaster, then one would expect to see evidence that this was the case. When the Russian invasion of Afghanistan went sour, the Russian people, especially the nomenklatura, demanded that Russia's military involvement come to an end. After nearly ten years of war in Afghanistan, the Russian army began to pull out in May 1988, and all the Russian troops were gone by February 1989. Russians objected to the Afghan war mainly because of casualties. Russia suffered some 26,000 killed and 35,000 wounded, far less than the casualties in Ukraine. In the Chechen wars, on Russia's territory, the Russian army perhaps lost 15,000 troops, although official numbers are not available. Regarding Chechnya, research outfits such as the Jamestown Foundation argue that the Russian public supported a negotiated settlement and were against continuation of the fighting. In the end, the Russian army flattened the Chechen resistance and the Russian public remained mostly passive. One of the asymmetries of the Ukraine conflict is the political impact of Ukrainian drone and missile strikes on Russian territory. These attacks presumably are designed to answer Russia's relentless aerial strikes on Ukraine's critical infrastructure, on military targets and in limited cases on civilian targets. But the other side of the coin is the impact of Ukraine's drone and missile strikes in garnering public support for the Russian 'Special Military Operation' in Ukraine. Ukraine's attacks reinforce public opinion in favor of the SMO. It is noteworthy, as illustrated by a recent Gallup poll in Ukraine, that despite the Russian drone and missile strikes, public opinion in Ukraine is turning decisively against continuing the war without a political settlement. Young men and women, in large numbers, are leaving Ukraine to escape the war and military conscription. According to the London Telegraph, at least 650,000 Ukrainian men of fighting age have fled the country since the conflict with Russia escalated in 2022. This number does not include the thousands who are currently hiding from the authorities or paying bribes to stay out of the Ukrainian army. A Ukrainian soldier and a militia man help a fleeing family. Image: Emilio Morenatti / AAP Zelensky hews to a tough no-compromises line on any settlement with Russia. He rejects any territorial deal. So when he bargains with Washington, he likely will do two things: try and get his supporters here in Washington to back up his position on no territorial concessions; and attempt to refocus Trump on providing security guarantees for Ukraine, demanding a Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territory. He will most certainly ask Trump for more weapons and money, and for heavy sanctions on Russia. It isn't clear after the summit with Putin how Trump will respond. As for security guarantees, despite some who support sending troops to Ukraine, the sad reality is that no European state, let alone the UK, France or Germany, is going to send even one soldier unless they go there as a backup to US forces. Trump has previously said no US boots on the ground in Ukraine, so any security guarantee would have to be virtual, not with troops, or limited to flyovers and satellite surveillance. It is unlikely Zelensky will like a virtual security guarantee, even one with flyovers. Of course, Trump could change his mind, but it would risk his presidency if the net result is US physical involvement in the Ukraine war. It is too bad we do not have a detailed readout on the actual conversation at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson. Trump's use of provocative symbols, F-35s and a flyover involving a B-2 stealth bomber, and the lack of the usual protocols (no honor guard and no national anthems), was hardly conducive to a diplomatic encounter of heads of state. Moreover, the use of a military base, explained as a 'security measure,' was inappropriate, but the Russians, anxious to state their case to Trump and intent on showing deep respect for the United States, accepted the venue and the conditions, even the escort of Putin's presidential aircraft by US fighter jets. The view from Putin's window. The bottom line is, at least for now, US policy has shifted. The US and Trump no longer support a ceasefire but want to settle the Ukraine war through negotiations. How long that will take, and even if it is possible, remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the war continues, and for the most part, Russia will continue pushing to take Pokrovsk and to expand the contact line further to the west. Ukraine, already stretched and now with uncertainties on military supplies, is facing a crisis. Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared in his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.
AllAfrica
a day ago
- AllAfrica
India's hand in Trump tariff row stronger than it looks
On August 6, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order doubling tariffs on most Indian exports to the United States, raising the rate from 25 to 50%. The decision, set to take effect later this month, was justified on grounds of trade imbalances and New Delhi's continued discounted purchases of sanctioned Russian oil. The escalation marks the sharpest deterioration in US-India trade relations in decades. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has denounced the measures as 'unfair and unjustified,' noting that other major buyers of Russian crude have not been penalized. 'We will protect our farmers and our domestic interests, even if we must pay a heavy price,' he told a rally in Gujarat in response to the tariffs. Within days, India announced a pause on planned US defense acquisitions — a not-so-subtle signal that its strategic options extend far beyond the Pentagon's procurement lists. Senior officials have begun mapping out a menu of counter-moves, from limited retaliatory tariffs to deeper integration with BRICS partners and other non-Western economies. To understand why India is in no rush to fold, it is worth taking stock of how the balance of power has shifted. First, BRICS itself has shaped into a US$32.5 trillion economic coalition after the addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Indonesia. The enlarged group now represents roughly 30–40% of global GDP and accounts for over a fifth of world trade. This is not yet a substitute for the G7 ($46.8 trillion), but it is a credible alternative pole. Second, while the US dollar remains dominant, accounting for around 58% of global reserves and cross-border transactions, its share has been steadily declining, from 72% in 2000. India's trade with Russia, which surged to around $65–69 billion last fiscal year, is increasingly settled in rupees and rubles, bypassing the dollar entirely. Similar currency-swap arrangements with the UAE and other partners are quietly expanding. Third, India's role in critical global supply chains gives it built-in leverage. The country produces about 60 percent of the world's generic medicines and exported $28 billion worth of pharmaceuticals in 2023–24. Its IT and ICT services exports, worth roughly $150 billion annually, are heavily embedded in US corporate operations, from Silicon Valley's software pipelines to Wall Street's back-office systems. Tariffs on Indian goods thus risk boomeranging onto American companies and consumers. Modi's real advantage lies in what analysts such as Nishant Rajeev call 'multi-alignment' or 'optionality,' the skill of pivoting among multiple partners and platforms without locking into any single one. India's External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar framed this strategic agility in Foreign Policy as the freedom to choose partners based on interests rather than on emotion or prejudice. India's $3.4 trillion economy and 1.4 billion market give it scale; its BRICS membership, combined with Quad, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and G20 roles, gives it reach. This unique positioning allows New Delhi to keep one foot in the Western security architecture while cultivating deep ties to Russia, Iran, the Gulf, and Central Asia. Optionality has a financial dimension too: the more India settles trade in local currencies, the less exposed it is to US financial leverage. That, in turn, blunts the coercive edge of both sanctions and tariffs. Washington's wager appears to be that punitive tariffs will force India into strategic compliance. History suggests otherwise. Sustained tariff wars often prompt global supply chains to reroute, and the early signs here point to a similar outcome. Rather than isolating India, higher tariffs may accelerate the very multipolarity the US seeks to contain. Trade diversion toward BRICS partners, the Gulf and ASEAN could deepen alternative payment systems and standards. Politically, the optics of coercion from Washington may play into Modi's domestic narrative of sovereign resilience, especially in the run-up to state elections. There are domestic costs for the US as well. More expensive Indian pharmaceuticals could raise healthcare costs, while disruption in IT services risks operational headaches for US firms. In a tight labor market for STEM talent, alienating a country that produces over half a million new engineering graduates each year is a questionable move. Seen through this lens, Trump's tariff escalation risks becoming a strategic own goal. It undermines the bipartisan effort of the past two decades to position India as a counterbalance to China. It also introduces uncertainty into defense cooperation, just as Washington is seeking to strengthen maritime deterrence in the Indo-Pacific via essentially the Quad. More fundamentally, it sends a message that US economic statecraft is increasingly zero-sum, a framing that will nudge other swing states toward hedging strategies. In that world, India will not stand alone: it will be joined by BRICS and several mid-sized powers seeking insulation from great-power coercion. If Trump's goal is actually to keep India close, a more sophisticated approach would blend incentives with calibrated pressure. That could mean reviving stalled trade talks, offering targeted supply-chain co-investment in sectors like semiconductors and AI and easing market-access irritants in agriculture and services. Such engagement would not preclude firm conversations about Russia, but it would avoid the trap of punitive measures that push India further into BRICS and alternative coalitions. Modi's India will not back down from a challenge; it will build around it. The more the West applies pressure, the more New Delhi is likely to deepen its ties with BRICS and other non-Western coalitions that offer strategic autonomy in a multipolar world. Ricardo Martins holds a PhD in sociology with a specialization in geopolitics and international relations and an advanced studies certificate in international trade. He is based in the Netherlands.
AllAfrica
2 days ago
- AllAfrica
Don't write off the Putin-Trump summit just yet
Like many such confabs before it, the August 15, 2025, Alaska red carpet rollout for Russian President Vladimir Putin is classic Donald Trump: A show of diplomacy as pageantry that seemingly came out of nowhere, replete with vague goals and hardened expectations about the outcome from Trump supporters and opponents alike before the event has even taken place. Trump is seemingly trying to dial down expectations, billing the summit as a 'feel-out meeting' with the Russian leader to try to reach a diplomatic solution to the more than 3-year-old Russian war in Ukraine. The event follows a recent period where Trump had become more critical of Putin's role in continuing the war, giving the Russian leader a 50-day deadline to end the war or else face new US sanctions. Trump subsequently reversed course on military support for Ukraine and stepped up weapons shipments. However, he has always made it clear that his priority is to restore a good relationship with Russia, rather than save Ukraine from defeat. Trump's track record of admiration for Putin, and the summit format that excludes both Ukraine and its European allies, has provided ample fodder for critics of U.S. policy under Trump. Military scholar Lawrence Freedman expressed a common critical refrain in expressing fears that Trump will concede Putin's core demands in Ukraine in return for a ceasefire. Likewise, CNN's international security editor, correspondent Nick Paton Walsh, said 'it is hard to see how a deal emerges from the bilateral that does not eviscerate Ukraine.' Indeed, few mainstream establishment commentators in the U.S. or European capitals are supporting Trump's initiative, though Anatole Lieven, at the anti-interventionist Quincy Institute, was one of the few giving at least a lukewarm endorsement. Meanwhile, in Moscow, despite Trump's vague talk of a 'land swap' that implies Ukraine could regain some lost territory, the uniformly pro-government Russian press is already hailing the upcoming summit as a victory for Putin and a 'a catastrophe for Kyiv,' as the MK newspaper declared. Still, as a long-time observer of Russian politics, I believe it would be premature to write off the summit as an exercise doomed to fail. Respected Russian emigre journalist Tatyana Stanovaya, for one, has argued that the meeting offers the 'first more or less real attempt to stop the war.' And there are several important developments that mainstream commentary has overlooked in arguing against prospects for the Alaska summit. Despite Trump's repeated pledge to end the war in Ukraine, there has been no progress to that end thus far. Trump's earlier efforts to broker a ceasefire, in February and April, were both rebuffed by Putin. But since then, a number of factors have shifted that could allow Trump some leverage in talks this time around. Seven months into his second term, Trump appears flush with confidence and has shown more willingness to project power to advance American interests. In June, he joined Israel's airstrikes against Iran, Russia's biggest ally in the Middle East. On Aug. 8, he hosted the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan at the White House to sign a historic peace deal – a huge diplomatic defeat for Russia, which historically has dominated the politics of the south Caucasus region. Trump's ongoing global trade war is also alarming for Russia. On Aug. 7, Trump slapped punitive new tariffs on 90 countries that failed to make deals before his deadline. Trump has shown himself willing to use American power to bully trade partners who cannot effectively retaliate — such as Brazil, Canada, Switzerland and now India. Indeed, Trump noticed that India bought US$80 billion of Russian oil last year — more than China. On Aug. 6, the same day that Trump announced the Alaska meeting, he imposed 50% tariffs on India, which will not come into effect for 21 days unless India cuts back on imports of Russian crude. That creates real leverage for Trump against Putin should he want to use it in Alaska. With the Russian economy under strain and with global oil prices falling, Russia risks losing critical revenue from selling oil to India. That could conceivably be the tipping point for Putin, persuading him to halt the war. As significant as those shifts could be, there are still several grounds for skepticism. First, India may ignore Trump's oil sanction. Key Indian exports to the US, such as iPhones and pharmaceuticals, are exempt from the 50% tariff, and they account for about $20 billion of India's $80 billion annual exports to the U.S. Second, the global oil market is highly adaptable. Russian oil not bought by India could easily be picked up by China, Turkey, Italy, Malaysia and others. Even if Russia lost $10 billion to 20 billion as a result of the India sanctions, with overall government revenue of $415 billion a year, that would not derail Moscow's ability to wage war on Ukraine. Ukrainian firefighters work to put out fires stemming from Russian artillery shelling of the city of Kostiantynivka, a sign of the nearly constant toil of the conflict. Photo by Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu via Getty Images / The Conversation It remains unclear what Trump actually wants to achieve in Alaska. The details of the deal he is trying to persuade Putin to accept are unclear. For the Trump administration, the basic idea for ending the conflict appears to be land for peace: an end to military action by both sides and de facto recognition of the Ukrainian territory currently occupied by Russian forces. One glaring problem with this formulation is that Russia does not control all the territory of the four Ukrainian provinces that it claims. They occupy nearly all of Luhansk, but not all of Donetsk, and only 60% of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. If Russia insists on taking all of Donetsk province, for example, Ukraine would have to hand over about 2,500 square miles (6,500 square kilometers), with 200,000 people, mainly in the cities of Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. It is hard to imagine President Volodymyr Zelensky agreeing to such a concession. Yet it is equally hard to see Putin giving up his claim to all four provinces, which were formally incorporated into the Russian Federation in October 2022. In a June 2024 speech to the Russian foreign ministry, Putin laid out his most thorough analysis of the 'root causes' and course of the conflict. He stated that the legal status of the four provinces as part of Russia 'is closed forever and is no longer a matter for discussion.' Clearly, the territorial question is the biggest hurdle facing any would-be peacemaker, including Trump. Other issues, such as Ukraine's request for security guarantees, or Russia's demands for the 'denazification' and 'demilitarization' of Ukraine, could be dealt with later through negotiation and third-party mediation. There are other factors that play into the chances of peace now. Both Ukrainian and Russian societies are tired of a conflict that neither of them wanted. But at the same time, in neither country does most of the public want peace at any price. If Trump can persuade Putin to agree to give up his claims to the entire territory of the four provinces in Ukraine's east, that would be a substantial concession – and one that Zelenskyy may be well-advised to pocket. Putin would also expect something in return — such as the lifting of international sanctions and restoration of full diplomatic relations with the U.S. Then Putin could fly back to Moscow and tell the Russian people that Russia has won the war. If such a deal transpires in Alaska, Trump would then face the challenge of persuading Ukraine and the Europeans to accept it. However, given Putin's apparent confidence that Russia is winning the war, it remains unlikely that he will be persuaded by anything that Trump has to offer in Anchorage. Peter Rutland is professor of government, Wesleyan University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
