America First, Allies Always: securing the Asia-Indo-Pacific together

UPI

15-07-2025

South Korean marines aim weapons in a landing drill with the United States in Pohang, South Korea, in 2023. The two nations held the amphibious assault exercise for the first time in five years amid a growing threat from North Korea. File Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI | License Photo
July 15 (UPI) -- Editor's note: This speech was presented to the Asia-Pacific Policy Strategy Dialogue, House of Lords, United Kingdom and the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea at the U.K. Parliament on July 1, 2025. It presents a comprehensive strategic vision for United States and allied engagement in the Asia-Indo-Pacific region.
Arguing for a paradigm built on "America First, Allies Always," the address emphasizes that alliances are the United States' and its partners' asymmetric advantage in countering authoritarian threats from the China-Russia-Iran-north Korea axis (CRInK).
It calls for rejecting false dichotomies in regional prioritization (for example, Taiwan versus Korea) and instead advancing simultaneous and integrated strategies anchored in deterrence, influence operations, and human rights.
Key proposals include the institutionalization of a "Two Plus Three" strategy for the Korean Peninsula (that results in a free and unified Korea), the deployment of Strategic Agility Platforms across the region, and the elevation of human rights as a frontline strategic tool. The speech concludes with a call to avoid the strategic ambiguity of the past and embrace collective defense and moral clarity to prevail in this era of multidomain ideological competition.
The entire report from the Center for Asia-Pacific Strategy can be accessed here: https://apstrategy.org/2025/07/13/appsd/
Introduction
My lords, ladies and distinguished guests -- especially the U.K. All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea and its chairs, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Sir Iain Duncan Smith, MP.
It is a great honor to speak before this historic body on the future of a region that may well determine the course of the 21st century. The Asia-Indo-Pacific is no longer a distant geopolitical theater. It is the central arena of strategic competition, ideological confrontation and alliance cooperation.
Today, I bring a message of unity and resolve: the United States and its allies possess the strategic agility and collective strength to face and overcome multiple simultaneous security challenges in the region.
But we must act with clarity. We must act together. We must act now.
As a former serving U.S. Army officer, I am no longer constrained by military doctrine, government funding or a chain of command, so I can give you my objective assessment. That said, if I were asked to do so, I would provide this as my best military and national security advice for my country and our allies.
Except for those who are actually from or have lived there, there are no experts on North Korea. I am merely a student of one of the most complex strategic challenges we face. Although I may sound like I am speaking with authority based on my years of study and internalization of the problem, the fact is North Korea is a "hard target" and that anything I say can and should be challenged.
I come to you with a simple, but powerful, message: Our organizing principle must be: "America First, Allies Always." We possess the strategic agility to manage multiple security challenges in the Asia-Indo-Pacific simultaneously, and we must do so in concert with our allies.
Our strength is not only in our forces, but in our friendships. "America First" does not mean America alone. It means "Allies Always" -- because alliances are America's asymmetric advantage. At the same time, alliances are the asymmetric advantage for our allies. The silk web of alliances allows all to punch above their weight. They cannot be matched by any authoritarian bloc.
But, let me also add that I know U.S. domestic politics are challenging and frustrating for our allies. I would like to offer that in my many discussions with U.S. officials that there is absolute certainty that allies are critical to U.S. national security, and that every military and civilian professional I have spoken with will advocate for our alliances. I know there are many who would agree with this construct, "Allies First, America Always." I know I certainly do.
To overcome these challenges from our domestic politics, my recommendation is to adopt the concept that already exists -- "burden owning." We all must own the burden of our own defense, and then together we can develop alliance strategies to address the mutual threats that face us in the Asia-Indo-Pacific and around the world.
Strategic environment in the Asia-Indo-Pacific
Let us begin by examining the terrain we are navigating. I use Asia-Indo-Pacific quite deliberately because I do not believe we can neglect Asia in our description. I know the policymakers will argue Asia is within the Indo-Pacific. But Asia is at the center of the Indo-Pacific, and it is where the military, political and economic power reside. Although beyond the scope of this presentation, I would argue that due to the increasing interconnectedness and the shrinking of the globe, we should also always talk in terms of Eurasia.
The Asia-Indo-Pacific region today is shaped by the contest among three categories of powers:
First, modern nation-state powers, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These states uphold the international system based on individual liberty, liberal democracy, free markets, the rule of law and universal human rights. We have values based alliances and partnerships from the QUAD to AUKUS to the Indo-Pacific Four with NATO. (Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea).
Second, revisionist powers like China and Russia, who seek to reshape that international order to better serve authoritarianism.
Third, revolutionary or rogue powers -- North Korea, Iran and violent extremist organizations -- that aim to destroy and replace the existing global order altogether.
In actuality, the new descriptor that some scholars are using, the "CRInK" (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) might itself be considered the revolutionary power that seeks to destroy the rules based international order that was conceived after World War II.
This axis of authoritarians, or Dark Quad as Christopher Ford has named them, are creating crises around the world that challenge the countries who seek stability and security so that all can share in prosperity. Robert Kaplan, in his recent book, Waste Land, describes the current geopolitical challenges and issues best in this excerpt:
"This is certainly not a world governed by a rules-based order, as polite gatherings of the global elite like to define it, but rather a world of broad, overlapping areas of tension, raw intimidation and military standoffs. Indeed, there is no night watchman to keep the peace in this brawling, tumultuous world defined by upheaval.
"Globalization, which is based on trade, the large-scale movement of people by jet transportation and rapid technological advances in the electronic and digital realms, fits neatly together with a world in permanent crisis. That is because the permanent crisis demands a dense webwork of interactions between crisis zones across the Earth, which globalization produces."
The real threat might be what the U.S. intelligence community's Annual Threat Assessment describes as "adversarial cooperation." Although the United States considers China as the "pacing threat," I argue that U.S. alliances and partnerships must recognize and address the larger threat of cooperation, collaboration and collusion among the so-called "CRInK."
At the heart of this strategic competition between the "CRInK" and the modern nation-states is an ideological contest. This requires deft use of the diplomatic and informational instruments of power and not only the military and economic tools. The permanent crises Kaplan describes are a result of the conflict between open and closed societies.
We should ask ourselves what brings the "CRInK" together and how is it like our alliances? There are four reasons for their cooperation: Fear, weakness, desperation and envy.
They fear the strength of our alliances, as despite our current frictions time and again, we have demonstrated the power of alliances. They have inherent weaknesses within their political systems that make them vulnerable -- Putin's weakness is highly visible in his war in Ukraine, his inability to keep Assad in power and the support he is currently unable to provide to Iran.
They are desperate for support, particularly Russia and North Korea, as seen in their current military cooperation. Lastly, they envy our alliances. However, they will never share the values and trust that we do, and their relationships can never be more than transactional. This is playing out with Iran who is receiving very little support if any from the members of the "CRInK." There are already cracks in the "CRInK" that we should exploit.
These threats require a strategy of comprehensive deterrence, agile response, seizing the initiative, and unified resolve. We cannot fight yesterday's wars. We must prepare for tomorrow's contingencies while addressing the ongoing crises throughout the world.
Taiwan and Korea: Not either-or, but both-and
There is an unstated policy debate that focuses on the question: If we must choose, is Taiwan or Korea more important to U.S. national security? This is a false choice.
The answer is unequivocal: we must prepare to deter war and defend in both.
Weakness in one part of the theater invites adventurism in the other. China watches the Korean Peninsula for signals of American resolve. North Korea watches Taiwan for signs of distraction. We cannot afford to let one crisis unravel the deterrence architecture of the other.
That is why the United States must optimize its posture across the region. This includes:
• Strengthening joint force integration and command relationships in Korea and Japan
• Enhancing the rotations of U.S. forces in Australia and the Philippines
•- Prepositioning equipment and expanding access agreements with trusted regional partners; and ensuring that all U.S. forces are ready for simultaneous contingencies, not just sequential crises.
We must remember that strategic competition is not linear. It is concurrent, multi-domain and ideological.
Strategic agility platforms across the region
To support this level of preparedness, the United States and its allies must invest in and deploy Strategic Agility Platforms throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific. These are not merely forward bases or logistics hubs.
They are modular, adaptive and resilient platforms -- physical, digital and doctrinal -- that enable rapid projection of power, engagement and influence across contested and uncertain environments.
They are built on existing military bases throughout the region but also require development of others in strategic locations throughout the region in concert with our friends, partners and allies.
Strategic agility platforms include:
• Prepositioned equipment and munitions in dispersed, survivable facilities across Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands and in Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Australia-
• Mobile command and control nodes that can relocate dynamically and maintain operational tempo during cyber or kinetic disruptions
• Interoperable logistics and sustainment networks built in cooperation with allies and capable of supporting multi-domain operations from Australia to Korea
• Digital infrastructure for defensive and offensive information warfare, enabling coalition-wide influence operations, cyber defense and real-time strategic communications. Underpinning all of this is the absolute requirement for deep investments in integrated missile defense.
The purpose of these platforms is to avoid a single point of failure, enhance decision-making speed and ensure our ability to operate from a network of locations rather than a handful of vulnerable bases. SAPs will allow us to impose multiple dilemmas on our adversaries, complicating their targeting calculus, while reinforcing our own flexibility and initiative.
In short, strategic agility must be more than a concept. It must be built into our physical infrastructure, our planning assumptions and our alliance integration.
The two-plus-three strategy for Korea
To address the unique security challenge of the Korean Peninsula, we advocate a two-plus-three strategy. This strategy is founded on two enduring pillars and three transformative components.
The first pillar is military deterrence to prevent war. Deterrence remains the most vital national interest of the United States on the peninsula. The permanent stationing of U.S. troops, combined with the Republic of Korea's advanced military, has been the backbone of peace for 70 years.
The second pillar is strategic strangulation -- a deliberate use of economic sanctions, law enforcement, diplomatic pressure, cyber defense and cyber offense, and financial actions to cut off North Korea's access to illicit revenue, proliferation networks and international legitimacy. We must target the regime's lifelines, from weapons sales to Iran and Russia, to overseas slave labor and cybercrime.
But these two pillars are not enough. The North Korean threat cannot be restrained indefinitely. It must be solved. That is where the three transformative components come in:
• A human rights upfront approach. We must put the human rights of the Korean people on every agenda. The regime commits crimes against humanity to stay in power. These abuses are not only moral outrages, but the also are indicators of regime vulnerability. Information about universal human rights is an existential threat to Kim Jong Un.
• A comprehensive information and influence campaign. The most dangerous weapon against a closed society is the truth. We must equip the Korean people in the north with the knowledge, tools and networks to organize, communicate and ultimately seek their own destiny. As history shows, regimes built on lies collapse when their people learn the truth.
• Support for Korean self-determination. The "Korea question," the unnatural division of the peninsula as described in paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, must be solved by the Korean people. Our role is not to dictate unification, but to enable it. A free and unified Korea, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK) is the only path to true denuclearization, permanent peace and justice.
While these three components are not new ideas, what makes this transformative is that all three must be combined and prioritized for action in ways that have never been tried. This is a radical departure from the long-held belief that we must be single focused on the nuclear threat.
Linking freedom in Taiwan to unity in Korea
There is an ideological connection between the defense of Taiwan and the liberation of the Korean people in the north. Both stand as flashpoints between open and closed systems. Both are test cases of our credibility.
Taiwan is a thriving democracy facing relentless pressure from Beijing. If Taiwan falls, it will embolden authoritarian regimes everywhere. But a free Taiwan is of little strategic value if, in the same breath, the Korean Peninsula is lost to a combined North Korean and Chinese sphere of influence.
That is why our strategy must be whole-of-theater, not piecemeal. As the U.K. understands from its global maritime legacy, freedom of navigation, access to sea lanes and open trading systems depend on regional stability in East Asia and throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific.
Allies as asymmetric advantage
Allies are not liabilities. They are our force multipliers, intelligence enhancers, logistics enablers and moral compass. This is why our posture must be anchored in our alliances. And allies gain as much asymmetric advantage from owning their defense burden while operating within a silk web of alliances.
Japan's evolving defense policy and closer U.S.-Japan command integration are game-changers. Australia's rotational hosting of U.S. Marines enhances southern theater readiness. AUKUS will boost our strategic capabilities. The Philippines' access agreements expand operational reach. South Korea remains a global pivotal state and a top-tier contributor to the rules-based order and is a partner in the arsenal of democracies.
Let us be clear: Authoritarian powers have no real allies. China has client states. Russia has enablers. North Korea has customers. But the free world has partners.
That is why we must say: "America First, Allies Always."
The moral imperative of human rights
As we pursue hard power strategies, we must not neglect the moral dimension. The crimes committed by the Kim family regime are the worst since the Holocaust. Gulags. Starvation. Slave labor. Repression. And our silence is complicity.
A human rights upfront approach is not a distraction from security. It is integral to it. As President Reagan said, "A bird cannot fly with only one wing." Military strength must be matched with moral clarity.
Human rights are not only a moral imperative; they are a national security issue. The Kim family regime must violate human rights to build its nuclear weapons. The regime derives hard currency from its overseas slave labor. It survives only through the denial of the human rights of the Korean people in the north.
By empowering the Korean people with truth, solidarity and hope, we undermine the regime's legitimacy from within. As Gandhi inspired Martin Luther King, and as the American Declaration of Independence inspired Korea's 1919 March 1st movement and Declaration of Independence, so too must we complete the virtuous circle of liberty and unification.
I describe a Korean strategy in 12 words: "Unification first, then denuclearization, the path to unification is through human rights."
Strategic recommendations
To sustain peace and secure freedom in the Asia-Indo-Pacific, I offer these strategic recommendations:
• Elevate Korea policy to a strategic priority equal to Taiwan. Simultaneity must replace sequential, or worse, stove-piped or compartmented planning.
• Institutionalize the two-plus-three strategy with full alliance coordination.
• Expand rotational access and interoperability across Australia, the Philippines and Micronesia.
• Restructure U.S. forces for dual-apportioned missions to respond to both Korea and Taiwan.
• Fund and empower political warfare capabilities to expose and defeat China's and North Korea's subversion -- China's unrestricted warfare and its "three warfares" and the Kim Family regime's political warfare with Juche characteristics.
• Support South Korea's 8.15 Unification Doctrine, which offers the clearest path to resolving the Korean question.
• Adopt whole-of-society information campaigns to support human rights, fight censorship and enhance digital resistance and resilience.
• Invest in strategic agility platforms to ensure flexible, survivable and scalable operations throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific.
• Sustain the "silk web" of alliances and partnerships from the five bilateral treaty alliances to QUAD and AUKUS and support security arrangements directly among allies.
Conclusion
Let me close with a historical caution: In 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech that excluded Korea from America's defense perimeter. Six months later, war broke out. Miscalculation thrives in strategic ambiguity.
Today, let us not repeat the Acheson mistake. Let us draw the line of defense boldly, through unity, strength and purpose. Or perhaps we should draw no line at all.
The Asia-Indo-Pacific is not America's burden alone. It is the shared responsibility of all free nations. With strategic agility, trusted allies and unshakeable values, we will prevail.
America First, Allies Always.
Thank you.
David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society, and is the editor-at-large for the Small Wars Journal.