
China's BYD to nearly triple South Africa dealers' network by next year
BYD's move comes at a time of growing competition in Africa's largest automotive market, where sales of new energy vehicles are rising and other Chinese companies - such as GAC , Chery and GWM - are also making inroads. Launched in 2023, with its BYD battery electric ATTO 3 vehicle, the automaker has about 13 dealerships.
'By the end of the year, we will have about 20 dealerships around the country. The aim is to expand that to about 30, 35 the next year,' Steve Chang, General Manager of BYD Auto South Africa told Reuters in an interview on Wednesday.
BYD currently offers six models in the South African market, with its plug-in hybrid Shark pick-up, hybrid SEALION 6, and pure electric SEALION 7 SUV models launched in April, completing its hybrid and electric dual-powertrain strategy.
The dealership expansion will help BYD become a fairly known brand and capture more buyers across a country that is slowly transitioning to electrified vehicles.
In 2024, sales of new energy vehicles - a term that describes battery-powered fully electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid cars - rose to 15,611 units from 7,782 units in 2023, according to data from automotive industry body NAAMSA.
While the share of NEVs to total car sales is still low, BYD is hoping to capture the market early on, in preparation for a meaningful transition, Chang said.
'We want to educate and cultivate the market of South Africa and make sure that the South African consumers can catch up with the rest of the world,' Chang added.
China's BYD says it is against import of 5-year-old used vehicles
The uptake of electric vehicles and investment in Africa is quite slow relative to emerging market peers due to limited charging infrastructure, unstable power supply and high import duties compared to fossil-fuelled cars.
But BYD sees potential. 'South Africa is actually one of the most important automotive markets in the southern Hemisphere.
It's probably the biggest market in all of Africa, so it's a market that we have to look at and see how we can develop the market,' Chang said.
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