The foreign hand in the India-Pakistan face-off

Hindustan Times

13-05-2025

Although military tensions and clashes between India and Pakistan since the Pahalgam terrorist attack on April 22 were a bilateral affair between the two principal antagonists, the varied roles played by external actors in this crisis offer insights into the kind of world we live in.
No war, quasi war or armed confrontation can be completely localised because it triggers high stakes considerations such as alliances and strategic partnerships, the regional balance of power, the efficacy and sales of weaponry, the norms and doctrines governing the use of force, and ripple effects in security in other parts of the world. Particularly in the present global context of renewed great power competition or the new Cold War, the conduct of the US and of China in the India-Pakistan crisis deserves close examination.
While Washington's claims to have mediated a ceasefire between New Delhi and Islamabad are unfounded, speculation about the ever-controversial American hand is rife. Given that the US has a comprehensive global strategic partnership with India and America's principal adversary, China, is Pakistan's 'all weather friend', many expected Washington to squarely stand in New Delhi's corner and apply overwhelming pressure on Islamabad. The Donald Trump administration did declare its solidarity with India and its right to defend itself after the Pahalgam attack. The American green signal for an Indian counterattack, not that New Delhi needed one, was visible in plain sight. Washington may have also used its financial leverage on debt-ridden Islamabad, which depends on loans from the American-dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF), to force it to step back from escalation.
Yet, the foreign policies of great powers have wider canvases and calculi. The mixed messaging from Washington from the Pahalgam attack until Operation Sindoor about the need for both New Delhi and Islamabad to exercise restraint and avoid escalation into a broader regional conflict reflected decades-old American fears of a nuclear holocaust in South Asia. The possibilities of India directly striking Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, degrading or destroying Pakistan's American-supplied fighter jets, and longer-term concerns that India might get bogged down in a long-drawn-out war with Pakistan that could cede the advantage to China in the overall Asian and Indo-Pacific theatres, must have weighed on American policymakers. Counterbalancing China through allies and partners has been a byword of American strategy, and it would have influenced calls for mutual restraint from Washington as the India-Pakistan crisis unfolded. President Trump's offer to broker a permanent solution to the Kashmir dispute was a non-starter and fell on deaf ears in India, but it reflected the typical great power anxieties and ambitions of the US. In fact, Delhi has emphatically said that in the new normal only Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is up for discussion in bilateral talks.
And Beijing unhesitatingly sided with Islamabad and manoeuvred to weaken New Delhi. With a whopping 81% of Pakistan's weapons imports in the past five years coming from China, and mindful that an Indian rout of Pakistan à la 1971 can cause reputational damage to Chinese weaponry and tilt the balance of power in Asia against China, Beijing issued public assurances to Islamabad that it stands firmly in defence of its 'sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national independence.'
Notwithstanding boilerplate statements by China that it would like India and Pakistan to engage in dialogue, the fact is Beijing materially and ideationally backed Islamabad during this episode. Military encounters may be shrouded in the fog of war, but they also clarify loyalties. China proved that it remains Pakistan's guarantor and aims to stay as its primary weapons salesman. Without the assurance of steady Chinese backing, the Pakistani military establishment would not have recklessly stepped up the escalatory ladder against India.
Apart from the two great powers, the India-Pakistan crisis also revealed interesting patterns among regional powers. The diplomatic and military support that Turkey offered to Pakistan was open, reconfirming Ankara's Islamist orientation in its foreign policy and demonstrating that common religious identity overrides other considerations for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. On the other side of the ledger, Israel was the only notable country that adopted an unambiguously pro-India and anti-jihadi posture and whose weaponry proved handy as India retaliated against Pakistan.
It is noteworthy that not all Islamic countries sided with Pakistan. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates attempted to do quiet interlocution between India and Pakistan. As the Gulf monarchies have developed strong strategic partnerships with India and tend to see Pakistan as a problem State spreading radical jihad, they took the nuanced stance that while countering terrorism was necessary, war must be prevented.
Even Russia, whose showcase weapons in India's arsenal were vital for repelling and counterattacking Pakistan, took a hard line on terrorism but switched to advising mutual restraint and peaceful resolution as the clashes mounted. For Russia, the prospect of its two 'great friends', China and India, getting embroiled in an indirect war via Pakistan, and of India strategically inching even closer to the US, would be unpalatable as Moscow's preference is to form a united front against Washington and sustain weapons sales to New Delhi.
The main takeaway from the range of responses and positions of foreign players is that it is a self-help world and every country approaches a military situation from its perceived national interest lenses. Even though a financially broke and dysfunctional Pakistan has far fewer friends compared to an economically booming and dynamic India, the widely shared preference for war avoidance resulted in many nations appearing to advocate for a middle path. But beneath the official cliches about negotiated solutions and escalation reduction lay cold reasoning driven by realpolitik and national identity. Every crisis is an opportunity and what transpired between India and Pakistan was a stage on which foreign actors strove to look noble while pursuing their self-interest.
Sreeram Chaulia is dean, Jindal School of International Affairs. The views expressed are personal