The man behind Scotland and Corsica's enduring link
Many will know Boswell only for his biography of Samuel Johnson but during an earlier period he was nicknamed 'Corsica Boswell' around London because of his love for the island.
James Boswell It was expressed in An Account of Corsica, a history of the island inspired by his stay there and centred on his admiring portrait of the 18th-century nationalist leader Pasquale Paoli.
Paoli was famous throughout Europe in his time and is still revered in his own land, where he is commonly referred to as the Father of the Nation and has a status akin to that of Wallace or Bruce.
At the age of 25, Boswell made his acquaintance when he deviated from the standard grand tour young noblemen were expected to undertake.
Before reaching Italy, the real goal of such journeys, he managed to make the acquaintance of Voltaire and Rousseau. The latter advised him to visit Corsica, the centre of European attention at the time because of its nationalist struggle against its overlord, Genoa.
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Boswell set sail from Livorno for Corsica. The journey across the island to meet Paoli was perilous both because of the threat of bandits and the precariousness of roads over the mountainous terrain. But Boswell was young and healthy, and also wealthy enough to be able to hire guards and porters.
Corsica had endured centuries of foreign domination. It had been Papal territory but the Pope granted it to Pisa, who later ceded it to Genoa. The Genoese were oppressive rulers and in 1735, after decades of turbulence, Corsica declared independence.
Paoli's father was a prominent figure among the rebels but the movement suffered various setbacks, causing the Paoli family to seek refuge in Naples. However, the movement grew in strength and a constitution was drawn up.
In 1754 Paoli was invited to return in a leadership role and set about establishing the institutions of a state. In the commune of Corte, he founded a university that still bears his name; reformed criminal law; created a navy and established a currency. Corsica was an independent state between 1755 and 1768.
The Corsican cause received international attention. Voltaire issued an enigmatic statement, still blazoned on placards at bus stops on the island, that 'Europe is Corsica'.
In his tract The Social Contract, Rousseau wrote that 'the valour and constancy with which this brave people has been able to recover and defend its liberty would make it well worthwhile for some wise man to teach it how to preserve it.'
Paoli was that man, and Boswell was keen to make his acquaintance. In 1765 he spent a month in Corsica and it had a deep impact. However, as with Johnson, Boswell got off to an unpromising start.
Paoli feared this strange young foreigner was a spy but he was eventually reassured. Boswell explained that he was on his travels and, having been in Rome, he had come 'from seeing the ruins of one brave and free people to see the rise of another'.
He reports that Paoli received the compliment graciously but observed that Corsica's 'situation and the modern political system' made it unthinkable that the island could never be 'a great conquering nation', although he was convinced 'it may be a very happy country'.
Boswell won Paoli over with his candour, charm and intelligence. The two men formed a deep and lasting friendship, including on Boswell's side the element of deferential near-worship which was part of his character. The two met on a daily basis and, as he would do with Johnson, Boswell made notes of what was said, sometimes during the conversation, sometimes afterwards.
These formed the basis of his work An Account of Corsica, The Journal of a Tour to That Island; and Memoirs of Pascal Paoli, published in London in 1768. It is not a relaxing read, with the earlier part an unremittingly serious historical study of Corsican history from classical times, including long quotations in ancient Greek and Latin.
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But it bursts into life with the closing autobiographical Journal where Boswell records his travels. These sections are written with the verve, wit and vigour which mark his later Life of Johnson. The work was immediately translated and was an international success.
However, independent Corsica's enemies now included France, which had been called on to support Genoa but which eventually, and permanently, succeeded Genoa as ruler of the island.
One independence supporter was Carlo Bonaparte, father of Napoleon. What if Napoleon had been born in an independent Corsica and had never been French, and thus could never have become Emperor of France? But that is a question for dreamers, not historians.
Boswell immersed himself in Corsican ways, and even acquired Corsican dress. Other topics included the oppression Corsica had endured, crime and punishment, the nature of God, and the possibility of intelligence in animals. There were also lighter moments, although mainly with servants and the military, not Paoli himself: 'They asked me a thousand questions about my country, all of which I cheerfully answered as well as I could.'
The period of independence was brought to close when Corsican forces were routed at the Battle of Porto Novu in 1769.
Paoli was forced into exile in London. There, he renewed his acquaintance with Boswell who in turn introduced him to the leading figures in the worlds of literature and politics – including the king, who awarded him a pension, as well as Johnson and Pitt the Elder.
Boswell also accompanied Paoli on a visit to Scotland but there is no account of that tour.
Paoli made a brief return to Corsica in 1790 when the chaos following the French revolution made Corsican independence seem again possible. But three years later he was accused of treason and had to flee back to London, where he died in 1807. There is still a bust of him in Westminster Abbey.
He was buried in St Pancras churchyard but his body was returned to Corsica in 1889 and interred in Morosaglia, where he was born. This tiny village is at the top of a mountain and its inaccessibility has acted as a deterrent to all but the most ardent admirers.
The house has been transformed into a chapel-cum-museum, which celebrates Boswell alongside Paoli.
Boswell is credited as being responsible for the creation and diffusion of the 'Paoli myth' in Europe. Boswell remains a well known figure in Corsica and, thanks to him Scotland's history and status now is of interest to Corsicans.
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