China's Great Wall opens Brazil car plant, seeks site for second
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The Iracemápolis, São Paulo facility was opened August 15, four years after Great Wall bought it from Daimler. Three models will be produced there – the Haval H6 and H9 sport utility vehicles, and the Power P30 pickup truck.
While it has the capacity to produce 50,000 vehicles a year, GWM International Chief Executive Officer Parker Shi said the company eventually aims to sell between 250,000 and 300,000 cars in the country, including locally made and imported vehicles.
Great Wall has been in talks and already received proposals from several states, including Santa Catarina, Paraná, São Paulo and Espírito Santo, Ricardo Bastos, director of institutional affairs at GWM Brasil, said in an interview at the factory opening.
'We may eventually consider the option of a larger factory through consolidation, but there is also the opportunity to build a factory from scratch,' Bastos said. A final decision on a second factory would be made from mid-2026 onwards, he added.
Brazil's President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (centre), Vice President and Minister of Industry and Trade Geraldo Alckmin (left) and Great Wall Motor CEO Mu Feng pose for a picture during the inauguration of the plant on August 15, 2025. Photo: AFP
A new plant could be used as a production hub for a new family of vehicles to plug a hole in GWM's range. While most cars in Brazil are priced around the 150,000 reais (US$27,700) mark, GWM's line-up is priced above 200,000 reais.
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AllAfrica
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