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‘Leftover men' fuel trafficked bride boom in China

‘Leftover men' fuel trafficked bride boom in China

Asia Times19-03-2025

China's marriage rate is in steep decline. There were 6.1 million marriage registrations nationwide in 2024, down from 7.7 million the previous year. This decline has prompted Chen Songxi, a Chinese national political adviser, to propose lowering the legal marriage age from 22 to 18.
The drop in China's marriage rate has been driven by a combination of factors. These include increased economic pressures, evolving social attitudes towards marriage, and higher levels of education.
Urban Chinese women, in particular, are increasingly pushing back against traditional gender expectations, which emphasize marriage and childbearing as essential life milestones. Rising living costs are also making it increasingly difficult for many young people to afford to get married.
At the same time, China is grappling with a longstanding gender imbalance, a legacy of the country's sweeping one-child policy and cultural preference for male children. In the early 2000s, when the imbalance was at its peak, China's sex ratio at birth reached 121 boys for every 100 girls. For every 100 girls born in some provinces, there were more than 130 boys.
The gender imbalance is particularly pronounced among those born in the 1980s, a generation I belong to. This is due to the widespread use of ultrasound technology from the mid-1980s onward, which offered parents the ability to terminate pregnancies if their child was female.
Unmarried men in China have become part of the so-called 'era of leftover men' (shengnan shidai in Chinese). This is an internet term that loosely refers to the period between 2020 and 2050 when an estimated 30 million to 50 million Chinese men are expected to be unable to find a wife.
A Chinese couple walks through Beijing with their child in 2015. Photo: TonyV3112 / Shutterstock via The Conversation
The conundrum is that many of these 'leftover' men want to marry – I know this firsthand. Some of my peers from primary and secondary school have been desperately searching for a wife, but have struggled to find a spouse. A widely used phrase in China, 'difficulty in getting married' (jiehun nan), encapsulates this struggle.
Unable to find a domestic spouse, some Chinese men have turned to 'purchasing' foreign brides. The growing demand for these brides, particularly in rural areas, has fuelled a rise in illegal marriages. This includes marriages involving children and women who have been trafficked into China primarily from neighboring countries in Southeast Asia.
According to a Human Rights Watch report released in 2019 on bride trafficking from Myanmar to China 'a porous border and lack of response by law enforcement agencies on both sides [has] created an environment in which traffickers flourish.'
The Chinese government has now pledged to crack down on the industry. In March 2024, China's Ministry of Public Security launched a campaign against the transnational trafficking of women and children, calling for enhanced international cooperation to eliminate these crimes.
'Purchased' foreign brides
These marriages are often arranged through informal networks or commercial agencies, both of which are illegal, according to China's State Council.
Human Rights Watch says that women and girls in neighboring countries are typically tricked by brokers who promise well-paid employment in China. They find themselves at the mercy of the brokers once they reach China, and are sold for between US$3,000 and $13,000 to Chinese men.
Determining the extent of illegal cross-border marriages in China is challenging due to the clandestine nature of these activities. But the most recent data from the UK's Home Office suggests that 75% of Vietnamese human trafficking victims were smuggled to China, with women and children making up 90% of cases.
The Woman from Myanmar, an award-winning documentary from 2022, follows the story of a trafficked Myanmar woman who was sold into marriage in China. The film exposes the harsh realities faced by many trafficked brides.
It captures not only the coercion and abuse many of these women endure but also their struggle for autonomy and survival in a system that treats them as commodities. Larry, a trafficked woman who features in the documentary, explained that she saw her capacity to bear children as her pathway to survival.
The Chinese authorities constantly warn of scams involving brides purchased from abroad. In November 2024, for example, two people were prosecuted over their involvement in an illegal cross-border matchmaking scheme. Chinese men were lured into extremely expensive 'marriage tours' abroad with promises of 'affordable' foreign wives.
There have also been cases where the undocumented brides themselves have disappeared with large sums of money before marriage arrangements are completed.
Most of the foreign brides are trafficked into China from neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. MuchMania / Shutterstock via The Converation
China's marriage crisis has far-reaching implications for the country's demographic future. A shrinking and aging population is often cited as the greatest challenge for Chinese economic growth and social stability. Beijing has resisted this characterization, saying that constant technological innovations will continue to drive economic growth.
The labor force is undoubtedly important when it comes to economic growth. However, according to Justin Lin Yifu, a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference advisory body, what matters more is effective labor – the product of both the quantity and quality of the labor force.
China has increased its investment in education continually over recent years in anticipation of future challenges surrounding its aging population.
But, notwithstanding this, an even greater concern is the large number of leftover men, as this could pose a serious threat to social stability. Studies have found a positive correlation between high male-to-female sex ratios and crime rates both in China and India, where there is also a significant gender imbalance.
In China, research has found that skewed male-sex ratios have accounted for around 14% of the rise in crime since the mid-1990s. And in India, modeling suggests that a 5.5% rise in the male-sex ratio would increase the odds of unmarried women being harassed by more than 20%.
The question of who China's leftover men will marry is becoming a pressing issue for Beijing. The government's response will shape the country's future for decades to come.
Ming Gao is research scholar of East Asia studies in the History Division, Lund University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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The end of Taiwan's strategic flexiblity
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Taiwan's historical success has been built on being globally connected while preserving its distinct identity. Forced economic bifurcation threatens this model at its foundation. The island risks becoming highly proficient at producing yesterday's technology for an increasingly narrow customer base. Taiwan urgently needs to develop what might be called 'strategic polycentrism'—building capabilities and relationships that don't require either Washington's or Beijing's approval. This approach demands: Diversifying technological partnerships beyond the US-China axis, particularly with Europe, Japan, and emerging economies that offer growth potential without the complications of great power competition. Creating new institutional frameworks that allow Taiwan to maintain economic engagement with China while preserving security relationships with the US—perhaps through multilateral mechanisms that provide political cover for all parties. Investing heavily in indigenous innovation capabilities that reduce dependence on either American technology transfers or Chinese market access. Building specialized advantages that larger powers cannot easily replicate, focusing on high-value niches rather than attempting to compete in mass markets. The most unconventional aspect of Taiwan's current predicament is this: the island's long-term survival may require developing the capacity to disappoint both Washington and Beijing when their demands conflict with Taiwan's fundamental interests. This isn't about choosing sides—it's about choosing survival. Taiwan's leadership must recognize that both great powers view the island primarily through the lens of their own strategic competition, not Taiwan's welfare. When American officials speak of Taiwan primarily as a strategic asset against an 'imminent' Chinese threat, and when Beijing responds by framing Taiwan as an 'internal affair' that brooks no foreign interference, Taiwan's own voice gets lost in the escalating rhetoric. Genuine strategic autonomy requires the political courage to occasionally frustrate allies and the wisdom to understand that Taiwan's interests aren't always identical to America's interests, regardless of how aligned they may appear. The current trajectory leads Taiwan toward becoming a heavily fortified, economically isolated garrison state. While this may serve American strategic objectives, it's unclear how it serves the Taiwanese people, who deserve both security and prosperity, not a forced choice between them. Taiwan's greatest asset has always been its adaptability and strategic acumen. 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