China's restaurant owners look forward to Spring Festival after tough year
Bookings for family reunion dinners on Lunar New Year's Eve – the centrepiece of Spring Festival celebrations – are booming across China, offering a ray of hope to struggling restaurant owners following a year of weak demand.
It is traditionally the most important meal of the year for Chinese families, and to secure more business on Lunar New Year's Eve – which falls on January 28 this year – many restaurants are competing on price and innovation.
At Mrs Yung's Restaurant in Guangzhou, the capital of southern China's Guangdong province, founder Vivian Wai Tong Ng is offering a 10-dish reunion dinner for eight to 10 people for 1,999 yuan (US$274).
Premium fish, shrimp and crabs from the brackish waters at the Pearl River estuary, traditional Hong Kong-style roast goose and Cantonese clay pot rice made with imported Spanish pork will be included on the menu.
The price of 1,999 yuan is roughly equivalent to one-third of an average Guangzhou office worker's monthly salary. Ng, who has been running restaurants in the city for 20 years, said similar set menus in previous years were offered at twice the price.
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