Russia's FSB foils planned car bombing near Moscow
Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested a dual Russian-Ukrainian national accused of plotting a car bombing in the Moscow region.
According to a statement on Tuesday, the suspect, born in 1989, was allegedly an agent of Ukrainian intelligence operating under the codename 'Voron' and recruited in a third country. 'He followed instructions sent via the Telegram messaging app to build an improvised explosive device, hide it in a vehicle purchased with foreign funds, and prepare to detonate it near a senior Russian Defense Ministry officer.'
The car, containing more than 60 kilograms of explosives, was to be parked at a designated location and triggered as the target passed.
Investigators said he admitted working with Ukrainian intelligence and claimed he was promised an exemption from military service in Ukraine in return for carrying out the attack.
The FSB said the man has been placed in pre-trial detention and could face a life sentence if convicted.
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Shafaq News
3 hours ago
- Shafaq News
Kocho massacre 11 years later: Wounds remain, justice awaits
Shafaq News — Sinjar Eleven years after one of ISIS's worst atrocities, grief still hangs over the Iraqi village of Kocho — etched into its soil and carried in the memories of survivors. The massacre was part of ISIS's 2014 campaign against the Yazidis, which the United Nations later recognized as genocide for its systematic killings, mass enslavement of women and girls, and the forced displacement of thousands. In Kocho, the assault followed a 12-day siege, when ISIS militants overran the village, and herded residents into the local school. The men were executed, while the women and children were taken away to be enslaved. For Huzni Murad, a village elder and brother of UN Goodwill Ambassador Nadia Murad, this day marks 'a deep wound in Kocho's memory' — the day he buried his brother. From hiding, survivor Khedr Ismail listened to the deafening bursts of gunfire and watched friends and relatives collapse, including his father and two brothers, whose remains have yet to be found. For him, the massacre did not end with the gunfire; its echo lingers in years of waiting, unanswered questions, and the absence of justice. Nineteen mass graves in and around Kocho hold the remains of more than 500 villagers, yet only 169 victims have been identified and reburied. Murad faults the authorities for failing to complete exhumations and return the dead to their families. Both Murad and Ismail called on the Iraqi government and the international community to accelerate the search for the missing and return them to their families — steps they say are essential "if Kocho is to close a chapter that has haunted it for more than a decade."
Shafaq News
8 hours ago
- Shafaq News
UN: Violence in Syria's Alawite areas may be war crimes
Shafaq News – Geneva War crimes may have been committed in predominantly Alawite areas of Syria in a wave of deadly violence earlier this year, top UN human rights investigators stated on Friday. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria reported that the acts included killings, torture, and the inhumane treatment of the dead. 'Bodies were left in the streets for days, while families were prevented from burying them according to their religious rites,' the commission stated, noting that widespread looting and the burning of homes were also documented as part of the violence. 'In terms of scale and brutality, the violence detailed in the report is extremely alarming,' said Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Chair of the Commission. Earlier, a Syrian investigative committee formed by the Syrian government, documented 930 testimonies related to the coastal incidents and confirmed the deaths of 1,426 individuals, including civilians and former military personnel.
Shafaq News
11 hours ago
- Shafaq News
ISIS regroups in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon: a new strategy?
Shafaq News ISIS remains active across the Syria–Iraq and Syria–Lebanon border belts, primarily through dispersed sleeper cells that stage low‑signature attacks to prove presence, test security responses, and cultivate new recruitment streams. Recent field reporting and official statements point to a tactical adjustment: fewer mass‑casualty operations, more pinprick bombings, assassinations, and roadside attacks in remote terrain—especially the Syrian Badia, the Deir ez‑Zor countryside, and eastern Hasakah—along with infiltration corridors that abut Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon's rugged frontier. Coalition and local security services warn that pressure lapses could open space for an escalation. From territorial defeat to cellular reconstitution Since the loss of its territorial 'caliphate,' ISIS has relied on clandestine networks and permissive geography: the Badia's vast desert, the Hamrin and Makhoul ranges in Iraq, and rugged cross‑border wadis (Valleys) and smuggling paths. Monitoring by independent conflict trackers and local security partners shows an oscillating tempo of ISIS activity in 2025, including IED attacks in Syria's Suwayda periphery (May 22 and 28), a pattern consistent with a desert‑to‑south connective strategy linking the Badia to restive southern pockets. The Rojava Information Center likewise recorded recurring, small‑unit attacks and counter‑raids in northeast Syria, underscoring the group's reliance on covert cells rather than territorial control. Where The Threat Concentrates Observers tracking regional security continue to place ISIS activity in: -Syria's Badia and eastern axis (Deir ez‑Zor/eastern al‑Hasakah), where cells exploit desert cover and local grievances. -Iraq's border‑adjacent deserts and mountain belts (notably Hamrin), intermittently targeted by Iraqi forces with US support to blunt planning hubs. -Syria–Lebanon borderlands and nearby rural zones, where security vacuums and smuggling economies enable facilitation and recruitment attempts. In June, US Central Command said it supported six D‑ISIS operations (five in Iraq, one in Syria), killing or detaining operatives and disrupting weapons caches—an indicator of continued, intelligence‑driven pressure against small nodes rather than large formations. Capacity, Finance, And Intent A combined picture from the Global Coalition statements, financial‑crime bodies, and UN reporting highlights three structural pillars of ISIS resilience in 2025: -Cellular persistence and prison risk: Coalition partners stress the need to hold pressure on ISIS attack planners and facilitators, while analysts continue to flag detention‑facility vulnerabilities and cross‑border recruiting as latent accelerants if security coordination weakens. -Adaptive financing: The Financial Action Task Force's July 2025 review points to diversified, small‑scale channels—including informal value transfer, family networks, and micro‑donations—suited to a dispersed insurgency. Cutting these streams matters as much as clearing cells on the ground. -Operating concept: Independent assessments describe a strategy centered on rural sanctuaries, IED warfare, targeted killings, and opportunistic infiltrations—especially along ground lines of communication linking the central desert to Syria's south and the Iraqi frontier. Scale Of The Network A Shafaq News review of Syrian and Lebanese interior ministry reporting, along with Iraqi intelligence inputs, found 150–200 small ISIS sleeper cells active along the Syria–Lebanon borders and the Syria–Iraq border region by mid‑2025. This range aligns with the pattern observed by independent trackers: numerous micro‑cells with limited headcounts, designed to be replaceable and hard to roll up in a single sweep. How ISIS Is Changing The Fight Counterterrorism specialist Samer al‑Homsi told Shafaq News that sleeper cells 'still pose a real threat despite security blows,' noting the shift to small‑scale bombings and assassinations and emphasizing the need for sustained intelligence fusion and counter‑radicalization work to undercut recruitment pipelines. His assessment tracks with coalition practice in 2025: fewer large‑unit raids, more precision arrests based on human and signals intelligence, and continuous partner‑force mentoring. Reactions And Security Posture — Iraq, Syria, Lebanon Partnered raids and precision strikes continue to target desert nodes and mountain hideouts in Iraq—especially in Hamrin—to disrupt planners and safehouses before they can scale operations. The focus remains interdiction and denial, not area holding. In Syria, alongside SDF‑led and local‑authority operations in the northeast and center‑south, periodic sweeps in Homs and Badia‑adjacent areas have netted suspected ISIS operatives since January. Arrest and interdiction notices from local authorities and conflict monitors reinforce the 'small, many, mobile' threat profile. Meanwhile, authorities in Lebanon reported rolling arrests and foiled plots in mid‑2025, including the July 24 announcement that the Lebanese Army dismantled an ISIS‑affiliated armed cell allegedly planning attacks. This follows earlier warnings about recruitment attempts leveraging border‑community hardship and online propaganda. Key 2025 Cases: Illustrative, Not Exhaustive -January (Syria/Homs countryside): Security services detained multiple ISIS suspects and seized arms—part of early‑year sweeps that prioritized weapons interdiction and cell mapping. -Spring–early summer (Syria, Suwayda periphery): Two late‑May IED attacks demonstrated ISIS's ability to re‑activate southern cells along routes linking the Badia to the south. -June (Iraq/Syria theaters): CENTCOM reported six partnered D‑ISIS operations, with deaths and detentions of operatives and the recovery of weapons. -July (Lebanon): The Lebanese Army announced a takedown of an ISIS‑linked cell as authorities pursued recruiters targeting economically vulnerable communities. -Late July (Raqqa region): Internal Security Forces in northeast Syria reported arresting nine alleged ISIS 'mercenaries' from sleeper cells in Raqqa and its countryside. Holding The Line The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS reiterated in June 2025 that it is sustaining pressure through partner‑enabled operations and synchronized stabilization assistance, messaging that complements on‑the‑ground raids and interdictions. UN Security Council experts and Security Council Report briefings continue to warn that ISIS's regional risk endures—even as global focus pivots to other theaters—if counter‑terrorism coordination and detention‑facility security are not maintained. Why Now: The Enablers Isis Is Exploiting Three drivers recur across official and open‑source assessments in 2025: -Economic stress and governance deficits in border peripheries, which create openings for logistical facilitation and micro‑financing. -Fragmented security control across desert and rural belts that straddle administrative seams, where response times are slower and terrain favors small cells. -Prison and camp vulnerabilities (Syria's northeast remains a focal point), where attempted breakouts or insider recruitment could quickly change the threat scale if guards and funding are stretched. What Might Happen Next If pressure eases, ISIS would likely attempt a multi‑pronged uptick: (1) more IED and assassination campaigns against local officials and security personnel in Syria's east and central belts; (2) cross‑border facilitation aimed at reviving networks in Iraq's deserts and mountain ranges; and (3) sporadic recruitment or facilitation efforts in Lebanon's frontier areas. The center of gravity remains local: small, resilient clusters linked by couriers, online handlers, and informal finance—hard to eradicate, but containable with relentless, intelligence‑led pressure and sustained stabilization aid in vulnerable districts.
