Starmer hopes ‘pathway to peace' will end Gaza war. History is not on his side

The Guardian

3 days ago

The former British prime minister Harold Macmillan once said there was no problem in the Middle East because a problem has a solution. Keir Starmer is the latest incumbent in No 10 to try to prove Macmillan wrong, with a plan that has been described by Downing Street as a 'pathway to peace' for Gaza and the wider region. The record of Britain's previous interventions do not augur well.
The famous commitment drafted by the then British foreign secretary, Sir Arthur James Balfour, to 'view with favour the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people', was integrated into Britain's UN mandate over Palestine between 1923 and 1948 and paved the way for the birth of Israel.
But the declaration contained a key qualification: nothing should be done to prejudice the 'civil and religious rights' of Palestine's 'existing non-Jewish communities'. Britain afforded Israel de facto recognition on 30 January 1949, in the last stages of the first Arab-Israeli war, and de jure recognition on 27 April 1950. For many Palestinians, the second part of the Balfour promise is yet to be made good.
In the Arab nationalism of the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, Britain saw a destabilising force that might subvert pro-western states such as Jordan. For Israel, Nasser was a threat for allowing Palestinian militants permission to launch attacks against it from the Gaza Strip, then controlled by Egypt.
Matters were brought to a head when Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956. Under a secret agreement, Israel agreed to attack Sinai, the Egyptian peninsula between its western border and the canal. British and French forces would then intervene to 'separate the combatants', seizing control of the canal zone.
The Anglo-French element was a debacle. The Israeli part of the plan went well. Israeli forces captured Sinai in its entirety, destroying three Egyptian divisions. From then on Israel was considered to be a major fighting force by the west. Britain exported arms to it from the 1960s in the belief that a strong Israel would reduce the chance of further war in the region.
In the aftermath of the six-day war in 1967 between Israel and a coalition of Arab states, primarily Egypt, Syria and Jordan, Britain played a key role in drafting United Nations security council resolution 242.
It embodies the principle that has guided most of the peace plans that have followed – the exchange of land for peace.
The resolution called for the 'withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict', such as Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as 'respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force'.
It would come to be criticised for being vague and for its depiction of the Palestinian people as lacking national rights, describing their cause as the 'refugee problem'.
Britain's role as a key player was overtaken by the US when President Jimmy Carter brought the Egyptian leader, Anwar Sadat, and the Israeli prime minister, Menachem Begin, together at Camp David.
The plan sought to set up a 'self-governing authority' in the West Bank and Gaza, leading to eventual 'final status' talks. The agreement included only a token gesture to Palestinian aspirations for self-determination. No Palestinians were involved in the negotiations and the plan did not include any mention of a Palestinian state.
The European and British perspective was voiced in the Venice declaration of 1980 issued by the then European Economic Community. 'The Palestinian people … must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination,' it said.
It further added that the Palestine Liberation Organisation must be involved. This was controversial as the PLO was at this stage calling for Israel's destruction. It prompted criticism from the US.
But even under the solidly pro-Israel leadership of Margaret Thatcher and John Major, British policy was to avoid straying too far from the European consensus. Major in 1995 became the first western leader to meet Yasser Arafat inside the Palestinian Authority's area of control, which had been established through the Oslo accords overseen by the US president, Bill Clinton.
The second intifada, an uprising that raged from 2000 to 2005, took place in the wake of Clinton's failed Camp David Summit, which was meant to broker a final agreement on the peace process.
The intifada overlapped with the 'war on terror' that followed the 9/11 attacks. Tony Blair used his close relationship with the then US president, George W Bush, to issue the 2003 roadmap peace plan that would resolve all issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 2005 through implementation of a two-state solution. It failed.
After leaving Downing Street, Blair was appointed as the envoy of the Quartet on the Middle East. The quartet consisted of the UN, the EU, the US and Russia. Blair sought to develop the Palestinian economy and improve governance but struggled to make headway. He resigned after nearly eight years in the role, with Palestinians criticising what they saw as his closeness to Israel, including his decision to deliver a eulogy at the funeral of the former Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon.
Britain's policy under the succeeding prime ministers – Gordon Brown, David Cameron, Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak – has been criticised for reciting the mantra that a two-state solution is the only way forward without expending energy or political capital on the goal.