U.S. Forces Japan chief calls new command ‘historic' shift
Lt. Gen. Stephen Jost submitted an opinion piece to The Asahi Shimbun in which he explained the aim of the recently initiated Japan Self-Defense Force Joint Operations Command Cooperation Team, or JCT.
During his late March visit to Japan, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that the first steps had been taken to give U.S. Forces Japan operational command authority to eventually better coordinate with the SDF Joint Operations Command.
Jost explained that the role of the JCT would be 'to further strengthen our bilateral ability to respond to crises or contingencies.'
The team would serve as the 'primary interlocutor and liaison' between the SDF and U.S. Forces Japan, he said.
He added that the team, 'marks the first tangible step we're taking to enhance our operational synergy with Japan.'
Based in Tokyo, the JCT is 'a small team today, but it will continue to grow as USFJ expands its capabilities and authorities,' Jost said.
He added that the primary mission of U.S. Forces Japan would result in a switch from 'alliance management' to integrating and synchronizing 'operations that span the spectrum ... from humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and armed conflict.'
U.S. Forces Japan currently comes under the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, based in Hawaii, but will gradually increase its command authority over the next few years, Jost said.
Touching on recent moves by Tokyo to possess the capability to strike at enemy bases preparing to launch missiles against Japan as well as sharply increase defense spending, Jost said they illustrate 'Japan's determination to serve in a leading role' in regional security.
In the context of China's continuing military buildup, Jost said the decision to integrate the command-and-control structures would lead to 'deeper security cooperation while signaling a clear-eyed resolve to uphold stability, deter aggression and ensure a prosperous future' in the region.
***
The following op-ed piece by Lt. Gen. Stephen Jost appeared in The Asahi Shimbun on June 28 under the headline, Advancing the Alliance: USFJ, JSDF transform future of Indo-Pacific Security
The U.S.-Japan security alliance has entered a transformative era, most recently marked by Japan's establishment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces Joint Operations Command and the ongoing evolution of our U.S. Forces, Japan headquarters. The security, freedom and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific face increasing challenges from adversarial nations, primarily the People's Republic of China, and I can tell you firsthand that these threats are only intensifying.
The security developments now in motion underscore a growing urgency to prioritize combat credible forces and reinforce our readiness to protect peace in the Indo-Pacific, and I welcome this new phase of our enduring alliance.
During the recent Defense Ministerial meeting in Tokyo, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Defense Minister Gen Nakatani reaffirmed the necessity of our collective transformation efforts, highlighting the increasingly severe security environment. 'We have a robust alliance agenda that will strengthen our deterrence posture, keep the enemy guessing, creating dilemmas for them, and ensure that we achieve peace through strength,' said Hegseth.
I join both defense officials in celebrating the establishment of the Japan Self-Defense Force Joint Operations Command; a historic development reflecting Japan's commitment to a more integrated and agile security posture. But what is the Japan Self-Defense Force Joint Operations Command and why does it matter to USFJ and the broader alliance?
The answer is an organization with increased functionality and requisite authorities. In other words, the new joint operations command will operate much like a Joint Force Headquarters to unify operational commands across the Japan Self-Defense Force.
Japan's ability to provide a more comprehensive and timely response to emerging threats and natural disasters will significantly increase. This crucial step forward represents a key structural evolution and is being done in tandem with a growing defense budget marked by fundamental reinforcements in Japan's defense capabilities, including the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities. The combination of these measures signifies Japan's determination to serve in a leading role in providing regional security.
Parallel to these changes, USFJ is transforming to better protect peace and security in the region. As we transition to a Joint Force Headquarters in the years ahead, we will integrate new capabilities across the joint warfighting functions, signaling an important shift to a more distributed and resilient force posture.
Moving from a headquarters primarily charged with an alliance management mission to one that, in time, will integrate and synchronize operations that span the spectrum of operations from humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and armed conflict is a monumental task. Our aim is to field a capability that significantly enhances the depth of connectivity and warfighting effectiveness with our Japanese partners to strengthen the Alliance's deterrence.
Growing USFJ in parallel with the Japan Self-Defense Force Joint Operations Command requires a collective vision and shared commitment, and I could not be more encouraged by the opportunities ahead. The most recent and visible commitment to the transformation is USFJ's launch of the Japan Self-Defense Force Joint Operations Command Cooperation Team, or JCT.
This team is now serving as the primary interlocutor and liaison between our two independent command structures. It's a small team today, but it will continue to grow as USFJ expands its capabilities and authorities as part of our deliberate headquarters transformation efforts. The cooperation team's primary purpose is to further strengthen our bi-lateral ability to respond to crises or contingencies. This team marks the first tangible step we're taking to enhance our operational synergy with Japan. The team is operating from Tokyo and focused on daily, in-person collaboration opportunities across both parallel command structures.
Additional organizational and structural changes to USFJ are also being developed in close consultation with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
These shifts in command and control are occurring against the backdrop of intensifying regional concerns, including a rise in coercive and unprofessional military maneuvers in all domains of operations. These activities emphasize the necessity for a more robust U.S.-Japan security alliance.
By modernizing our collective command and control structures, we are achieving deeper security cooperation while signaling a clear-eyed resolve to uphold stability, deter aggression, and ensure a prosperous future for the peace-loving people of Japan and the Indo-Pacific region.
It is an honor to be a part of this alliance at such a pivotal moment, and I am confident that together we will rise to meet the challenges ahead.
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