Saudi MSMEs receive SAR 351.7B credit facilities in 2024
Credit facilities extended to micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) rose by 28% year-on-year (YoY) to SAR 351.7 billion in 2024, data from the Saudi Central Bank (SAMA) showed.
Medium-sized enterprises topped the total amount of credit facilities with approximately SAR 187.2 billion, small enterprises with about SAR 122.2 billion, and micro enterprises with SAR 42.3 billion.
In Saudi Arabia, medium-sized enterprises are classified as those with annual revenues between SAR 40 and SAR 200 million, or employing 50 to 249 on rolls. Small enterprises are those generating annual revenues between SAR 3 and SAR 40 million (employing between 6 and 49 people). Micro enterprises have annual revenues of less than SAR 3 million (fewer than five employees).
The following table shows developments in credit facilities provided to MSMEs by banks and financing companies:
Credit Facilities to MSMEs Since 2018 (SAR bln)
Period
Value (SAR bln)
Change
2018
108.52
--
2019
117.35
+8%
2020
182.24
+55%
2021
203.23
+12%
2022
229.03
+13%
2023
275.58
+20%
2024
351.70
+28%
The financing offered by the banking sector reached SAR 333.5 billion, representing 95% of the total facilities. Meanwhile, the financing institutions offered SAR 18.2 billion, or 5% of the total.
The table below indicates details of credit facilities provided to MSMEs by sector:
Credit Facilities by Sector (SAR bln)
Total
Financing Institutions
Banking Sector
Period
95.68
7.83
87.84
Q1 2018
101.26
7.66
93.60
Q2 2018
106.68
7.68
99.00
Q3 2018
108.52
7.76
100.76
Q4 2018
113.17
8.15
105.02
Q1 2019
113.03
7.87
105.16
Q2 2019
115.61
8.75
106.86
Q3 2019
117.35
9.38
107.97
Q4 2019
134.84
9.68
125.16
Q1 2020
158.04
10.64
147.40
Q2 2020
175.74
10.75
164.99
Q3 2020
182.24
11.89
170.35
Q4 2020
188.43
12.97
175.46
Q1 2021
198.22
13.46
184.76
Q2 2021
200.37
14.16
186.22
Q3 2021
203.23
14.64
188.59
Q4 2021
218.68
15.27
203.41
Q1 2022
221.00
15.39
205.61
Q2 2022
228.03
15.47
212.57
Q3 2022
229.30
16.08
213.23
Q4 2022
252.23
17.28
234.95
Q1 2023
262.66
17.31
245.34
Q2 2023
268.57
16.93
251.64
Q3 2023
275.58
17.28
258.30
Q4 2023
293.43
17.70
275.73
Q1 2024
3 07.40
17.61
289.80
Q2 2024
329.23
17.46
311.77
Q3 2024
351.70
18.20
333.50
Q4 2024
Medium enterprises accounted for SAR 179.9 billion, or 54% of total banking facilities, while small enterprises held around SAR 114 billion, as shown below:
Credit Facilities by Banks (SAR bln)
Total
Medium
Small
Micro
Enterprise
87.84
61.62
22.01
4.22
Q1 2018
93.60
69.10
20.82
3.69
Q2 2018
99.00
73.22
21.80
3.97
Q3 2018
100.76
74.76
22.31
3.70
Q4 2018
105.02
79.17
22.98
2.87
Q1 2019
105.16
79.44
23.11
2.61
Q2 2019
106.86
80.84
22.97
3.05
Q3 2019
107.97
81.44
23.01
3.53
Q4 2019
125.16
93.92
27.47
3.78
Q1 2020
147.40
110.80
31.28
5.33
Q2 2020
164.99
121.54
37.26
6.20
Q3 2020
170.35
123.26
39.92
7.18
Q4 2020
175.46
127.45
39.67
8.34
Q1 2021
184.76
132.11
44.18
8.47
Q2 2021
186.22
129.99
45.08
11.14
Q3 2021
188.59
128.64
50.59
9.37
Q4 2021
203.41
135.54
54.04
13.83
Q1 2022
205.61
134.88
55.78
14.94
Q2 2022
212.57
136.64
61.55
14.37
Q3 2022
213.23
132.97
65.08
15.18
Q4 2022
234.95
145.09
70.25
19.62
Q1 2023
245.34
149.43
75.70
20.21
Q2 2023
251.64
152.42
77.87
21.35
Q3 2023
258.30
151.89
84.09
22.32
Q4 2023
275.73
153.74
95.19
26.80
Q1 2024
289.80
160.41
98.26
31.13
Q2 2024
311.77
174.12
104.15
33.50
Q3 2024
333.50
179.93
113.98
39.60
Q4 2024
Small enterprises received SAR 8.2 billion of the total facilities offered by financing institutions in 2024, while medium enterprises received around SAR 7.3 billion in the same period, as follows:
Credit Facilities by Financing Institutions (SAR bln)
Total
Medium
Small
Micro
Period
7.83
3.38
3.00
1.45
Q1 2018
7.66
3.38
2.91
1.37
Q2 2018
7.68
3.32
2.98
1.39
Q3 2018
7.76
3.34
3.21
1.21
Q4 2018
8.15
3.57
3.47
1.11
Q1 2019
7.87
3.20
3.60
1.07
Q2 2019
8.75
3.63
3.83
1.29
Q3 2019
9.38
3.88
3.81
1.69
Q4 2019
9.68
3.71
4.23
1.74
Q1 2020
10.64
3.85
4.76
2.03
Q2 2020
10.75
3.73
5.17
1.86
Q3 2020
11.89
4.19
5.18
2.51
Q4 2020
12.97
4.55
5.63
2.79
Q1 2021
13.46
4.66
6.10
2.70
Q2 2021
14.16
4.78
6.61
2.77
Q3 2021
14.64
4.93
6.77
2.94
Q4 2021
15.27
4.90
7.22
3.15
Q1 2022
15.39
4.97
7.26
3.17
Q2 2022
15.47
4.87
7.17
3.42
Q3 2022
16.08
5.34
7.54
3.20
Q4 2022
17.28
6.06
8.30
2.92
Q1 2023
17.31
6.19
8.18
2.95
Q2 2023
16.93
6.21
8.04
2.68
Q3 2023
17.28
6.52
8.19
2.58
Q4 2023
17.70
6.85
8.26
2.59
Q1 2024
1 7.61
6.90
8.14
2.57
Q2 2024
17.46
6.93
7.88
2.64
Q3 2024
1 8.20
7.28
8.20
2.72
Q4 2024
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