Why young Japanese are ditching passports and overseas travel
The figure, drawn from research conducted through the Newt travel app, places
Japan well behind several developed economies in terms of international travel readiness. In comparison, about 40 per cent of South Koreans, 50 per cent of US citizens and 60 per cent of Taiwanese hold valid passports.
Those findings align with research by the outbound promotion division of the Japan Association of Travel Agents (JATA), according to executive director Hiroshi Tanimura.
'The research we have done especially indicates that young people are not willing to travel overseas and prefer to travel within Japan,' he told This Week in Asia.
'The weak yen is one big reason why overseas travel is 70 per cent of what it was before the pandemic.'
People wait to check in at the departure hall of Haneda Airport in Tokyo. A recent study has placed Japan well behind several developed economies in terms of international travel readiness. Photo: AFP
Even more worrying is that business travel has picked up a lot of the slack, recovering to more than 80 per cent of pre-pandemic figures, leaving the leisure market at just 53 per cent, according to Tanimura.
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