Supreme Court Won't Hear Tribal Challenge to Copper Mine
The U.S. Supreme Court on May 27 turned away an appeal by Apache Indians who want to stop a copper mine from being developed on land they consider sacred.
The court's decision in Apache Stronghold v. United States took the form of an unsigned order. The court did not explain its ruling.
Justices Neil Gorsuch and Clarence Thomas dissented, saying the court should have considered whether the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) applies to the mine development. Justice Samuel Alito did not participate in the case.
Resolution Copper, which plans to develop the site,
Western Apaches have worshipped for centuries on a small sacred site in Arizona known as Oak Flat, which they consider to be a 'direct corridor to the Creator and the locus of sacred ceremonies that cannot take place elsewhere,' Apache Stronghold, a tribal organization, said in its
The land is part of the Tonto National Forest, which is overseen by the U.S. Forest Service.
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Although the government had long protected Apache rituals at the site, its stance changed after copper was discovered there, according to the petition. The government moved to transfer the site to Resolution Copper to create a mine there 'that will undisputedly destroy Oak Flat—swallowing it in a massive crater and ending sacred Apache rituals forever,' the petition said.
Apache Stronghold contested the decision, citing the RFRA and the Constitution's free exercise clause. A divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the lawsuit in May 2024 after a federal district court denied a request to block the land transfer. The district court found Apache Stronghold's lawsuit was not likely to succeed.
The RFRA was created to safeguard the constitutional right of minority religious groups to exercise their religious beliefs. The statute forbids the federal government from 'substantially burdening' religious exercise unless doing so is deemed to be the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling government interest.
Although the appeals court acknowledged that the destruction of Oak Flat would 'literally prevent' the Apaches from participating in practicing their religion, it still found that developing the mine would not substantially interfere with their religious exercise under the RFRA, the petition said.
In his
'No more. Now, the government and a mining conglomerate want to turn Oak Flat into a massive hole in the ground. To extract copper lying beneath the land, they plan to blast tunnels that will result in a crater perhaps 1,000 feet deep and nearly two miles wide.'
The development will prevent the Apaches from ever using the site again for religious worship, and it is 'a grave mistake' for the Supreme Court to reject the case, which 'meets every one of the standards we usually apply when assessing petitions' for review, Gorsuch wrote.
'The decision below is highly doubtful as a matter of law, it takes a view of the law at odds with those expressed by other federal courts of appeals, and it is vitally important. Before allowing the government to destroy the Apaches' sacred site, this Court should at least have troubled itself to hear their case,' the justice said.
Then-Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar said in a
The district court was correct to find that the congressional authorization for the land transfer was a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability' that 'merely authorizes the exchange of land' between Resolution Copper and the federal government.
That court also determined that the land exchange would not 'substantially burden' religious exercise under the RFRA, the brief said.
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